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Summary findings
There are three main approaches to analyzing  rhe effects  on how aid affects the private sector macroeconomically;
of aid money and aid-supported reform:  more is known about how to analyze  the public  secror's
* Before-and-after  comparisons  response  to aid inflows.
* Control group (simple  and modified) studies  The analysis  of aid money and aid-supported  policy
* Modeling.  reforn] can be incorporated into a sing]c  framework-
All three approaches  have been used to carry out  but with the effects of each clearly  separable. White and
macroeconomic  analysis  of policy reform. But before-  Luttik favor a country-specific  modcling  approach
and-after and simple control group approaches  are not  because  it allows the separate analysis of policies  and
valid explanatory tcchniques,  say  Whice  and Luttik; the  money as well as the separate analysis of differenr
results may be used to describe  what happened, but not  policies.  Country-specific  analysis  can capture local
wby it happened.  factors that may be omitted from cross-country  analyses.
Theoretically, the modified control group is the  They argue that counterfactual analysis  using
strongest approach. In practice, it has many  econometric or general equilibrium models  may be the
shortcomings  - in particular, its failure  to allow for rhe  most legirirnate  approach to analyzing  the relationship
effects of aid and other capital flows as an explanatory  between poverty and economic reform. Modeling has
variable.  yielded results quite different from the common  view
The macroeconomic  impact of aid inflows is best  about the social impact of reform policies,  they say, but
understood within the context of an accounting  existing models  fail to incorporate aid as an important
framework, say  White and Luttik.  The literature on the  macroeconomic  variable.
macroeconomic  effects  of aid funds has relied almost  Project aid, program aid, commodity (mainly  food)
entirely  on modeling. But much work has used only  aid, and technical  assistance  are the four main types of
single equations, so that many potentially important  aid. One problem in much of the literature is that an
relationships  - notubly aid's effect on output and  aggregate  aid figure is used, even though the
income  -are  exduded from the analysis.  Even the  macroeconomic  repercussions  of these different types of
simultaneous  models used are mostly partial, not general,  aid will differ.
equilibrium models  -which  makes  the findings  Much analysis  is also flawed by considering  the effects
doubtful. And much of the empirical  work suffers from  of a 'program'  (despite different intensities  and
methodological  shortcomings.  Much research  is needed  compliance  rates) rather than the policies implemented.
This paper - a product of the Macroeconomics  and Growth Division,  Policy  Research  Departmenr  - is part of a Bank-
wide effort investigating  aid effectiveness.  Copies of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 18  18 H Street NW,
Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Emily Khine, room N11-061, extension  37471 (130 pages).  August 1994.
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- INTRODUCTION
In 1992  US$ 60.8 billion  of aid flowed  from the developed  to developing  countries  through
official  bilateral  and multilateral  channels.' Although  aid flows  have grown  only  very modestly
in real terms since  the early 1980s  and many  donors  are making  little ,r no progress  toward  the
agreed  target of aid equal to 0.7 per cent  of GNP (see White  and Woestman,  1993)  there is,
nonetheless,  an increasing  restlessness  in donor  countries,  often  labelled  "donor  fatigue".
Whatever  the reason, aid budgets  are being  subject  to additional  scrutiny  - and, in some  cases,
cuL It is against  this background  that  the World  Bank  is mobilising  research  efforts  to analyze  aid
efftctivenessO
The first stage  of the study  is a series  of background  papers, which  review  the existing
liteature - pointing  to problems  that exist  and discussing  possible  ways  to overcome  these
problems.  This report is one such study, and is concerned with the analysis of the country-wide
effects  of aid - specifically  aid's macroeconomic  impact  and the effects  on social  and
environmental  variables.
The terms of reference  for this study  stated  that aid was to be broadly  interpreted  so as to
include  all official  flows. In fact, existing  theoretical  work makes  little or no distinction  between
the impact  of concessional  versus  non-concessional  (or public  versus  private)  flows. In empirical
work  there has been a tendency  (though  not a universal  one) to separate  out the different  types  of
flows  - but not to exclude  one at the expense  of the other. Thus, although  the distinction  is
mentioned  as it arises, it does  not feature  strongly  in this review  for the simple  reason  that the
distinction  is seldom  made  in the literature  itself.
How are we to understand  aid's macroeconomic  impact? In Chapter  2 three approaches
that  have  been used in examining  the impact  of structural  adjustment  and stabilisation
programmes,  but which  can be applied  to aid more  generally,  are discussed. The three
approaches  are: W  before  versus after; (ii) control  group approach;  and (iii)  modelling. Some
general  issues  relating  to good  econometric  practice  are also discussed.The macroeconomic  impact  of aid inflows  is best understood  within  the context  of an
accounting  franework, as prescnted  in chapter  3.  Outside  of such a framework  is the empirical
literature  on aid and growth  - which  is, anyhow,  an over-ambitious  exercise  (a point  of view
explained  in more detail  in Part 3.2).  The remainder  of Chapter  3 reviews  the channels  through
which aid may influence imports, investment  and government expenditure, the theoretical
mechanisms  that may  offset  these  effects  and the related  empirical  evidence. Those  familiar  with
the macroeconomic  debate  should  recognise  the rigorous  application  of the accounting  framework
as a new  approach.'
A similar  review  is attempted  in Chapter  4 of the literature  on the macroeconomic  impact
of adjustnent  policies. Particular  attention  is paid  to the issue  of how  the analysis  of aid monies
and aid-supported  policy  reforns can be incorporated  into a single  framework  - but with the
effects  of each  clearly  separable. An important  related  issue  is whether  we wish  to measure  the
effects  of policies  or the presence  of a programme  - the latter, which  has dominated  the
literature - appears conceptually  flawed.
Aid may assume  one of four main  types:  project  aid, commodity  aid (notably  food aid),
programme  aid and technical  assistance. One  problem  in much  of the literature  is that an
aggregate  aid figure is used, even  though  the macroeconomic  repercussions  of these  different
tpes  of aid will differ. Chapter  5 reviews  the elements  of the debates  over food  aid, technical
assistance  and project  aid which  have  macroeconomic  relevance.
Chapter  6 examines  the literature  on the impact  of aid and adjustment  on social and
environmental  variables. Ways  in which  the mechanisms  that have  been identified  in this
literature  may  be incorporated  .ato the macroeconomic  accounting  framework  are discussed,  since
this report suggests  a synthesised  approach  as a direction  for further  research. The main  channel
for such  effects  is through  the response  of the sectoral  composition  of government  expenditure,
altiough adjustment  policies  will also have  affects  through  changes  in relative  prices (mcluding  the
introduction  of user charges).
Chapter  6 provides  a summary  overview,  including  an agenda  for research.
2Notes to Chapter  1
1.  This figure is for aid from DAC countries and multilateral institutions only.
2.  The last such major effort was under the auspices of the Development  Committee and
resulted in the volume Does Aid  Work? (Cassen  et al.,  1986).
3.  This report does not repeat in full the points to be found in my survey article of aid's




Analysis  of the effects of aid monies  and aid-supported  policy reforms has been the subject of a
large and growing literature.  In the second part of this chapter we outline and appraise the three
main approaches  that have been adopted to examine these effects: (i) before and after; (ii)
comparator country; and (iii) modelling. This discussion lays the basis for the review of the
evidence in subsequent chapters.
In this chapter we also (Part 2.3) indicate  potential problems in orthodox econometric
methodology  and illustrate how data analysis and general to specific modelling  can cast doubt on
some results in the aid literature.  Part 2.4 provides a summary.
2.2  Three Approaches to the Analysis of Aid Inpact
The problem is to analyze the impact of aid monies and aid-supported  policy reforms in three
areas: macroeconomic  performance, poverty and welfare measures, and environmental
considerations. Of these three, tie  greatest attention has been paid to methodological
consideratiojis  in the case of the impact of structural adjustment  policies on macroeconomic
performance (see Goldstein and Montiel, 1986; World Bank, 1990: Annex 2.1; Mosley et a,
1991 Volume 1: 181-187; Mosley, 1993; and Ajayi, 1993). The same debate has taken place to a
lesser extent in the examination of the impact of these policies on the poor (e.g. Cornia, 1987: 53-
55).
Three distinct methodological  approaches  have been identified: (Q)  before and after; Cii)
comparator country; Ciii)  modelling. In this section we discuss these approaches and the
advantages and disadvantages of each.  Before moving to this discussion two points need to be
made.
First, the underlying basis for the correct economic approach, as for all scientific work, is
analysis  which compares the "with case" against the "without case".  This notion is that captured
by Goldstein  and Montiel in their definition  of program effectiveness as
4Jrr
the difference between actual macroeconomic  performance observed under a Fund
program and the performance that would have been expected in the absence of
sucl  a program.
(Goldstein and Montiel, 1986: 305)
To understand the impact of action x on events the question to answer must be what would have
happened if action x did not take place but all other circumstances remained unchanged (the
ceteris  paribas assumption). MTe  tree  methodologies  must be appraised against their ability to
answer this question. If this question is answered correctly then a main concern in recent analysis
- to separate out the effects of aid funds from those of aid-supported  policy reforms - is
automatically  taken care of.  Second, the literature we are discussing here is that which has been
used to analyze the impact of adjustment  policies.  But the approaches are just as applicable to the
assessment of aid monies and to an analysis of environmental and poverty effects.  The framework
adopted in this report is to classify all studies of aid impact according to the three basic
approaches identified  here.
Before versus after
The before versus after approach compares the value of a variable before and after the
occurrence of the event (the implementation  of an adjustment  program, an aid inflow or
whatever), attributing the whole of the change to the program.  Baldly stated thus, the limitations
of the approach seem clear - its validity is correctly dismissed by Goldstein in the following
words:
the before-after  approach can be useful to show what happened in program
countries, but not why it haWpened.
(Goldstein, 1986: 3; my emphasis)
A before versus after analysis makes no allowance for other factors that influence outcomes, and
so cannot possibly accurately be used as an indicator of effectiveness. Before and after is not
without versus with.
Nonetheless,  the approach has been a popular one in the analysis of adjustment  policies:
though sometimes it is applied by implication  rather than in an explicit manner.
An example of explicit application of the methodology is Cornia's (1991) assessment of
adjustment  in 24 adjusting sub-Saharan African countries based on a table of performance
5indicators for 1980-8  and 1987-88. For example, in the case of investment he concludes  that:
capital accumulation  slowed down in five-sixths  of these fadjustingl countries.  In
1987-88 the average (unweighted)  gro  investment/GDP  ratio was 30 percent
lower than in 1980-81.
(Cornia, 1991: 23)
Jespersen's (1992) discussion of the same topic also gives before and after data on capital
accumulation, manufacturing  value added and growth performance. The terminological  sleight of
hand between the description of the data and ascribing causation is clear from the sentence:
With few exceptions, stabilization  was accompanied  by sharp losses in GDP
growth, investment  and human capital development. Of the 18 countries which
managed to stabilize their economies in the 1980s,  only five recorded positive
growth in GDP per capita.  In all others macroeconomic  stabilization was achieved
at the expense of growth.
CJespersen,  1992: 14)
The descriptive  term 'accompanied" becomes  the causal relationship "at the expense of".
OScon  the logical non sequitur of the above quotations is left implicit, as in the following
examples:
..  he per capita income of non-cocoa farmers [in Ghana] has stagnated...  In
suommary,  conventional  adjustment  policies.. often aggravated  poverty.
(Cheru, 1992: 507)
the [Tanzanian]  reform program has seen a sharp improvement in export
performance, increasing from an average of 9.6 per cent of GDP in the pre-reform
period to an average of 26.9 per cent during the period of reform.
(Nord et al,  1993: 17)
The quote from Nord a  at. is doubly misleading. Not only do they apply the before-after
approacb but also base the comparison on ratios calculated  using current prices, ignoring price
effects from devaluation. The current price ratio may be written as:
EXP  EP',,  X  (2.1)
INC  PJY
where EXP and INC are nominal exports and income respectively, E is the exchange rate (local
6currency per dollar), P, the dollar export price index, Py  the GDP deflator and x and y real
exports and GDP respectively.  From equation (2. 1), the percentage change in the current price
export ratio may (ignoring  higher order effects) be decomposed into three components:
.- ~~~~~~~~~~~~.g
±StP  E  t  |  i  (+Z2)
--  l~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~NC  Py  Y
where  A  denotes percentage change.'
The nominal export ratio rises if there is a devaluation  even though all other factors
(export and output volumes and prices) remain constant.  In Tanzania the average exchange rate
from the five years 1981-86 to the period 1987-91  increased over 800 per cent - by contrast the
current price export ratio reported by Nord et at.  increased by only 180 per cent.  Export growth
has been around the same level as that for the economy as a whole so that the third component of
-equation (2.2) has been constant - the difference between the current price ratio and the large
positive revaluation effect is accounted  for by falling export prices whilst domestic inflation  has
been in the range 20-30 per cent a year.  The apparent increase in the export ratio is purely a
price effet,  and so not indicative of any improvement in performance, as measured by the export-
output ratio in real terms.  In general, one should be careful in the interpretation  of nominal price
ratios during periods devaluation, especially if the ratio involves exports, imports or investment
(as most investment  goods are imported) and, of course, the aid ratio.
Comparator (control group) country approach
The control group approach overcomes the problem of changes in external environment  by
comparing the experience of adjusting and non-adjusting  countries over the same time period
(although  the variable analyzed  may be either a levels indicator or the change in that indicator).
The assumptions are that all included countries have experienced  the same external environment
over the period of the analysis and that they share the same basic structure.  The World Bank
studies identify three groups: non-adjusting, (early) intensively adjustng and other adjusting
countries.  Whether or not a country is "adjusting" is defined by whether or not it has drawn on
adjustment  credits, not its policy stance.  No additional attempt is made to ensure comparability  of
the countries, so that doubt may be cast on the underlying assumption  that countries in different
groups are the same except for the fact of adjustment.
Table 2.1 shows data from the second World Bank report on adjustment  lending which
7'7  01  . Table 2.1  Comparison  of adjusCing  and non
adjusting countries
(a)  Initial conditions
Debt/  Fiscal  Resource  Real  GDP  Invest.
-exports  deficit  balance  growth  rate
EIAL  204.7  -6.4  5.1  4.6  22.5
OAL  206.2  -7.0  7.3  3.9  21.3
-NAL  144.6  -4.4  6.7  5.5  23.4
(b) Exteal  shocks
-.. ;..*  - X -1981-84  against 70-80  :  1985-88 against  70-80
Termsnof  -Real  Total  -Terms  of  :Real  interest  Total
trade  interest-  trade
BA:  -. 10.5  -1.9  -12.4  -6.0  -32  -9.2
O ..  .,:At  :  --:  -. 9:  -2.0  -4.9  -3.4  -3.6  -7.0
1  NAt-  ='  .,':--10.4  -1.2  -11.6  -13.9  -2.0::  -45.9
:  Note:totshock  is.  sum  -of  the:  terms  'of -trade  and  real interest  rate  -shocks-  For calculation
o these.shocks  see'  -rl  99:  .
'::.ource:;WorlcBanlc  (1990:  13-14).
demonstrate  that  neither  the initial  conditions  nor external  factors  were  particularly  similar
between  the three  groups  identified.  Thne  initial  conditions  were in most  instances  worst  in "Other
Adjusting  Lending"  (OAL)  countries  and best in "Non  Adjusting  Lending"  (NAL)  ones. On the
other  hand,  OALs  suffered  least from external  shocks;  either  NALs  or "Early  Intensive
Adjustment  Lending"  (EIAL)  countries  were  the most adversely  affected,  depending  on the period
of comparison.
Mosley  et aL made  more  effort  to ensure  comparability  by matching  forty  countries  into
twenty pairs, where each adjusting country was matched with a non-adjusting  partner with a
similar  economic  structure. Despite  this effort  some  of the pais  (for  exmple, Ghana-Zambia;
Jamaica-Nicaragua;  and Philippines-Indonesia)  seem  ill-matched:  both  for reasons  of internal
structure and because there the countries do not share a common extemal environment  as
assumed. The data  in Table  2.2, given  by the authors  themselves,  confirm  the view that some  of
controls  are rather dissimilar  to their partners.
8One reason for non-comparability  of adjusting and non-adjusting  countries is that the
samples  are not  drawn  from populations  witfi  the same  characteristics.  More  specifically,  it has
been  argued  (notably  by Goldstein  and Montiel,  1986)  that  countries  adopting  stabilization
programs  are more  likely  to be in a situation  of economic  crisis. To the extent  that current
economic  performance  is determined  by lagged  economic  performance  then  there  will be inherent
sample  selection  bias in the control  group approach  - since  on average  the pre-programn
performance  of adjusting  countries  will be worse  than that  of non-adjusters  (a view  supported  by
the data  on initial  conditions  presented  in Table  2.1).  Goldstein  and Montiel  proposed  the
Table=2.  Economic  variables for selected
county  pairs
Change  in  Change  in  GNP  per  Real GDP
- .:  .;  -. . ;  terms  .of  trade- - terms  of trade,  capita  ($),  growth,
:-  -:  - . 1  J975-81  1981-86  1981  197081 (9%
-(%pa)  -- (pa)  pa)
Bolivia . -7.7  4.0.  600  7l
Colombia  0.6  3.7  1,380  3.6
halawi  -4.3  .w.8200  -'2.5
*-aw  -4-D--  f  -s  . --0 :,* Zimbabwe  -RI  ~~~na  870O'
-akistan  :....6  -.0  - 50  :1.9.
AEgyt  -294.61  -:650  4.9.
Thailand  .~~~~  ~~  ~  7.0  -639  770  4.
Malaysia  -0.1  -6.3  1,840  5  .
-Turky  :-  -.6  -na  :21540  2.
..  :--.--.~Greece.:---  . .........  . . ~--  -2  .~  - :---~44  -:-  :--~.: --  na  ..  . 4420  -.  3.3
*  Source: Mosley ..  a.. (-t  1991:. 1  . .
;  Ec.M  O1  -a  - ,,  ,X  .-- :-: 
modified  control  group approach  to overcome  this problem.
Modified control  roup auDroach
The modified control group approach endogenizes  the policy  response  in order to model
what policies  would  have  been in the absence  of adjustment. The effrct of these  policies  is
removed  to give  the net impact  of the program  itself  The presentation  that follows  is based  on
Goldstein  and  Montiel  (1986),  who  laid the foundations  for subsequent  work in this area.
9X  (Goldstein  and  Montiel  were concerned  with  the analysis  of IMF stabilization  programs,  though
the approach can and has been applied to World Bank adjustment  programs.  Their terminology
is, however,  preserved  below).
The model  consists  of four core  equations,  the first of which  captures  the determinants  nf
macroeconomic  performance:
Ayg  = Axji3  + A  W  au + DI  Ad,  +  (2.3)
where  yu is thejth macroeconomic  outcome  variable  for country  i, x, the vector  of policies
observed  in country  i the absence  of a program, W a vector  of global  variables  affecting  domestic
performance,  d; is an dummy  variable  which  takes  the value 1 if a country  has an IMF program
and  zero otherwise  and q; w white  noise  error term.
The apparent  problem  with equation  (2.3) is the variable  xi - policies  is the absence  of the
program  - which  is clearly  unobservable  for program  countries. The values  of x, for program
countries  are generated  by the policy  reaction  function:
Ax 1 =  y[y_" - (yj)]  +  (2.4)
where  yl is the desired  level  of yi (also  unobservable)  and -q  an error term.  In practice  yi is
assumed  to be constant  for each  country  over time and  so for the purpose  of empirical  estimation
is captured  by county  dummies.
The final two equations  determine  whether  or not a country  will adopt  an IMF program:
=  - 1  (2.5)
di =I  ez1>z*  (2.6)
di = 0  fz;sz
where  z7  is the vector  of determinants  of program  adoption  and 1r  an error term.
In the context  of this model,  Goldstein  and Montiel  define  three measures  (estimators)  of
the effects  of IMF programs  on macroeconomic  performance,  corresponding  to the before-afer,
simple  control  and modified  control  group approaches  respectively:
where  the subscripts  P and  N stand  for program  and nonprogram  countries.
10=  wyp-  (Ayj=  (2.:)
:;7FS
M (y)  (y)  - (x  (2.9)
The derivation of the expected  value of these estimators using equation (2.3) shows the
first two approaches  to be biased. The bias of the before-after  estimator comes both from the sum
of changes in global conditions (W) r.nd domestic policies undertaken in the absence of the
program.
The simple control group approach is biased even assuming that changes in and reactions
to global conditions are the same for program and nonprogram countries.  The remaining bias
comes from the extent that the contribution  of macro policy in the absence of the program differs
between the two groups - which will be the case if we expect policies in program countries, in the
absence of the program, to differ from policies in nonprogram  countries.  Goldstein and Montiel's
argument is, as stated above, that we should expect such differences since program countries are,
on average, worse initial performers (so that the reaction function - equation (2A4)  - suggests they
will have different "without program' policies to those countries without programs).
By contrast the modified control group approach attempts to remove the sample selection
bias by differencing  out the effects of policies in the absence of the program.  The proof of
unbiasedness  by Montiel and Goldstein does, however, rely on the assumption  that the vector of
global non-program  variables is the same across countries.  Ihis assumption  seems doubtfdl:
countries experience  different terms of trade shocks depending on the composition of their exports
and imports, with the former also influencing  how sensitive they are to demand conditions in the
developed countries; and a country's debt structure determines the importance of changes in the
"world interest rate".  More importantly  for our analysis is the absence of a variable to measure
capital inflows in the analysis of Goldstein  and Montiel.  Their approach potentially provides an
avenue for separating out the effects of aid flows from aid-supported policies, but in practice they
(and subsequent  applications of the technique) have ignored the role of the flows altogether.
Moreover, the estimates  of programme effectiveness  may remain biased if the errors in equations
(2.4) and (2.5) are correlated, ie.  given all observable  factors, countries with systematically  bad
policies are less likely to embark on programs.
11IRA
Goldstein and Montiel demonstrate  that the impact of the adjustment  program on any one
performance indicator may be decomposed  into three separate effects: (i) the change in policies
from what they would have been in the absence  of the program; (ii) the change in effectiveness of
given policies; and (iii) a 'confidence effect'  associated with the program.  However, neither their
study nor any subsequent ones of which I am aware have applied this decomposition  empirically,
which is an unfortunate omission in the literature.
Discussion  of the direction of bias suggests that the other two approaches  will give an
over-optimistic  picture of the impact of IMF programs.  The empirical analysis presented by
Goldstein  and Montiel supports this suggestion. They calculate the impact of fund programs on
the overall balance of payments and the current account both expressed as a per cent of GNP, the
rate of inflation and real GDP growth by all three methods using a common data set  Comparing
the modified control group approach with the other two methods they report that:
the improvement  in the current account ratio disappears  entirely, the deterioration
in the balance  of payments ratio is magnified, and the favorable outcomes for
inflation  and growth are reversed.
(Goldstein  and Montiel, 1986: 337)
HIowever,  the coefficients  on the dummy variable are in fact insignificant  in all cases.
In summary, the modified control group approach is a considerable  advance on the before
versus after and simple control groups approaches. However, there have been shortcomings  in its
application  - in particular to failure to allow for the effects of aid inflows.  It is possible within the
technique to allow global factors (mcluding  aid flows) to be country specific.  But to do so is to
move towards the estimation of a separate model for each country in the sample - in which case
why not just proceed on the basis of country-specific  models?  Such an approach is indeed the one
favored in this report.
Simultaneous  estimation of aid flows and macroeconomic  performance
Before moving to a discussion  of modelling approaches, we should mention the
simultaneous  estimation of aid and macroeconomic  performance, which is the analogous  technique
to the modified control group approach for aid flows rather than aid policies.  It is sometimes
argued - for example in Mosley (1980) -that countries receive aid because of poor performance as
well as aid affecting performance. Hence the relationship  between aid and perfrmance  must be
12estimated  simultaneously.  There are, however,  a number  of reasons  not to accept  the importance
of this argument.
First, donors  may  conceivably  allocate  aid by income  per capita  but will not do so by
- growth,  which is often  the dependent  variable  of interest  in aid studies. Second,  donors  are more
concerned  with policy  than performance,  and the link between  thc.;e  two varies  across  time  and
place. Third, studies  of aid allocation  shown  that  donor political  and conmnercial  interests  are a
stronger  determinant  of bilateral  aid flows  than  are measures  of recipient  need  (e.g. Maizels  and
Nissanke,  1984). Finally,  the allocation  decision  concems  aid commitments,  whereas
disbursements  are the relevant  variable  for economic  analysis  - and there may  be little  relationship
between  commitments  in any given  year and the amount  actually  disbursed  in that  year
(McGillivray  and White, 1993).
Modelling
Models  can have  a great range of complexity.  The simplest  model  is a single  equation  -
for example  a savings  function. At the other extreme,  models  can run to thousands  of equations-
The complexity  of the required  model  depends  on the task to hand. It is not the intention  of
having  a model  which  captures  every aspect  of reality. 2 On the other hand,  too simple  a model
may omit  key relationships  which,  if included,  would  greatly  alter our conclusions.
Most  of the literature  on the macroeconomic  impact  of aid hs  relied  on a single  equation
approacb  and so fallen  into the latter  trap.  Whilst  a full blown  general  equilibrium  model  may not
be required,  a single  equation  is often  too partial  an analysis  to give  meaningful  insights. An
example  of this argument  is the savings  debate.
Griffin  (1970  and 1971)  argued  that  aid displaced  domestic  savings. He reasoned  that aid
will be treated  by the recipient  as income  and so there will be an increase  in consumption.  As
consumption  has risen but income  (net of aid) is constant  then domestic  savings  (mcome  net of aid
minus  consumption)  must necessarily  fali. The fallacy  in this argument  (explored  further  in
Chapter  3) is that income  will not be constant  in the face of an aid inflow. At its sinplest the aid-
induced  increase  in consumption  will set off a multiplier  process  leading  to an eventual  increase  in
inoome  that may  be well in excess  of the value of the aid inflow. Alternatively,  production
multipliers  may achieve  the same  results? Hence,  it is quite  possible  that both  consumption  and
savings  can rise.  We will see in Chapter  3 that most conclusions  in the literature  on the
13macroeconomics  of aid can be faulted for adopting a partial approach.
Some  studies  of the effects  of adjustment  pol  icies  use single  equation  techniques,  and they
-- f  may also be faulted  for their  partial  analysis  (see Chapter  4).  But larger macro  models  have  also
been  more intensively  used  is the adjustment  debate. There can be a problem  of non-transparency
which  restricts  the influence  that  such studies  have. That is, the economic  mechanisms  driving  the
results  from model  simulations  may  not be at all obvious. Hence  models  should  be parsimonious
where  possible,  but sufficiently  comprehensive  to incorporate  the most important  relationships.
Ideally,  the modelling  approach  can solve  the problem  of analyzing  with  versus  without.
A properly  specified  model  will contain  all the main  determinants  of the variables  of interest  and
the impact  -of  changes  in these  variables  - other  factors  held  constant  - may be examined  through
model  simulations.  Hence  the impact  of aid monies  can in principle  be distinguished  from that  of
aid-financed  policies. In modelling  policy  changes  it is important  to remember  that policies  may
have  effects  through  two channels. First, through  changes  in the exogenous  poiicy  variables.
Second,  by changing  the nature  of behavioral  relationships,  which  can be captured  through  the use
of dummy  variables. Proper  use of dummy  variables  is just one  aspect  of good  econometric
modelling  - in Part 2-3 some  other aspects  are discussed.
2.3  Speciication Searches  and Data Analysis
Econometric  methodology  since  the Cowles  Commission  may  be broadly  characterized  as
the statement  of a model  which  is estimated  using  the appropriate  technique  (OLS,  two stage  least
squares  or whatever). By contrast,  recent  developments  emphasize  instead  that  the model  cannot
be established  independently  of the data. These  developments  are contained  in two approaches:
general  to specific  modelling  and data  analysis. Although  the two approaches  have  somewhat
different  heritages  they  do share  a common  philosophical  rejection  of much  orthodox
econometrics.  It is my view also  that  the two methodologies  are complementary  rather than
competitors.
General  to specific  modelling  (GSP)  is identified  most strongly  with the "LSE  school"  and
David  Hendry  in particular  (for overviews  see the recently  published  coliection  of Hendry's
papers  (1993)  and Gilbert, 1986). An incorrectly  specified  model  (i.e. the one  with the wrong
variables  - or right variables  with  the wrong  lag structure  - on the right hand side)  will give
incorrect  coefficient  estimates  and  test statistics. Therefore  there is no point  in testing  hypotheses
14relating to economic  theory until the correct model (the data generation  process) for the
independent  variable of interest has been established.
A misspecified  model gives inconsistent estimates  of all parameters.  It is therefore not
correct to argue, as Mosley et al. do in their study of adjustment  policies dtat:
there are many other independent  variables which could have been included as
explanatory  variables in the equations.  In addition, lags could have been
introduced to more of the independent  variables...  However, since it is
specifically the impact of Bank finance and policy conditions  which we wish to
quantify, we have refrained from more complex specification of the equations
(Mosley eral.  1991: 210)
The correct model must be established - that is with the right explanatory  variables and correct lag
structures - before we can sensibly look at the coefficients  on the variables of interest.  But how to
establish to what is the correct model?
The specific to general approach is to start with the simplest possible model.  Only if this
model does not appear to perform adequately Gudged  by the R 2, t-test and usual diagnostics)
should additional variables be added.  The flaw in this argument is that the t-tests etc. are not
valid if the model is misspecified, and so they are not the appropriate means by which to judge
the model's validity.  Diagnostic tests may give clues as to misspecification,  but the output from
esfimating  a model may equally well obscure the misspecification. Specification  can only be
properly tested by reference to some more general model.
General to specific modelling  begins from an unrestricted dynamic equation (IJDE) which
contains all potential variables of interest with a number of lags.'  Testing proceeds from this
general model to exclude insignificant  variables until a more specific form consistent with the data
is identified. (Successive  restricted models are tested, by the F-test, against the UDE).
The main form of misspecification  identified by GSP is omitted  variables or an
inappropriate lag structure.  Incorrect finction'l  form may also be detected 5, but such
misspecification  is often more easily spotted by data analysis.
Data analysis relies on the use of graphical techniques, using both simple and partial
scatter plots.  In this way, non-linearities  are readily detected.  In addition to identifying the extent
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and nature of key relationships, data analysis may indicate if one or two observations  exert an
undue influence on the results.  Any observation that has an X value far removed from the mean
for that series is a point of leverase, with the potential to exert a large influence on the result.  An
influential point is defined as one whose exclusion would result in a substantially  different
regression line.  Under such circumstances it may be more appropriate to use robust regression,
which will reduce the weight given to the influential  point.
The term robust regression is used both to apply to this specific technique and more
generally.  In tne general sense, a robust result is one which is not dependent upon the sample
(and therefore not the result of influential points) but also one that holds up in the face of different
(but appropriate) specifications. 6 These points may be illustrated by the well known, but not
robust  result that aid displaces domestic savings.
Griffin (1970, 1971) claimed that aid displaces savings 7 and backed up his argument by
reporting the results from regressions of the savings rate on the aid ratio.  He found statistically
significant slope coefficients  from cross-section  data of -0.67, -0.73 and -0.82.!
Using more recent cross section data for 66 developing countries I obtained a coefficient
of -0.87 (White, 1992b and 1992c). But the regression of the savings rate on the aid ratio is
clearly misspecified: other factors play a role in determining savings.  Indeed, from Griffin's own
algebraic presentation of his model (contained  in the 1971  paper) it is clear that the estimated
equation should include the inverse of income (1/Y), which he omits.  Re-estimation  of the
equation with my data set including this variable changes the coefficient from -0.87 to -0.40!9
A graphical illustration of this change in impact is shown in Figure 2. 1.  The upper graph
shows the simple scatter of the savings and aid rates and the fitted simple regression line.  The
lower box shows the partial scatter plot - that is one the effect of 1JY has been removed from both
S/Y and ANY. The fitted line in this plot (which  has the same slope as the coefficient on A/Y
from the multiple regression of SlY on A/Y and 1IY) is much less steep than that from the simple
plot.
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Further  variables  should  also be included  on the right  hand  side for a convincing  model  of
savings  determination.  In White  (1992b  and 1992c)  I report  the regression  in differences  for this
data  set including  also the export  rate, inflation  and income  per capita  - in this regression  the
coefficient  on aid is insignificant.
The top graph in Figure  2.1 shows  also that  there are three  points  somewhat  to the right
of the rest of the observations.  Are  these influential  points? Figure  2.2 shows  the fitted  lines
from (i) the full sample;  (ii) from  omitting  the point labelled  observation  1; and (iii) from omitting
observation  2.  The slopes  of these  lines  are -0.87, -0.64 and -1.24 respectively.  Clearly  the
results  do depend  on the sample.
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Further illustrations  of the importance  of data analysis  to identify  irnluential  points  may  be
provided  from a recent  World  Bank  report on adjustment  in sub-Sahara  Africa.' 0 It is usefil
that this report  contains  the scatter  plots  for many  of the relationships  discussed. But it is
surprising  that  many  of them  have  evident  points  of leverage  with no discussion  of whether  or not
these  points  exert undue  influence  on the results.
18Figure 2.3 illustrates one such case.  Using data for 27 sub-Saharan African countries, the
graph purports to show how much of the improved growth performance  of the late 1980s  may be
attributed to changes in macro policies, and is accompanied  by the statement that 'the effect of
changes in macroeconomic  policies on growth is positive and statistically significant".  Indeed, the
regression coefficient is 1.91 with a t-statistic of 2.88.1" Yet this result depends crucially on one
observation - that in the botom left, which is for Cameroon.  Once this observation is excluded
the line looks rather different - the sIope is now only 1.31, with a t-statistic of 2.24.  If Rwanda is
also dropped from the sample the slope coefficient falls to 1.14 and is no longer significantly
different from zero.
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One further example of the importance of visual data analysis is shown by Figure 2.4,
drawn using data from Holmqvist (1992). The figure shows cross-country data for 38 developing
countries - plotting educational expenditure per capita against aid receipts for educational
purposes, also per capita.
The author is concerned to test if aid for education does indeed increase educational
expenditure.  Accordingly  he regresses educational expenditure on aid for education, other aid and
GNP (all expressed per capita), with the following result:
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The results apparently confirm that educational expenditure rises by roughly one dollar for every
dollar of educational aid received - whereas aid for other purposes has little or no impact.
The scatter plot shown here is a simple rather than partial plot - but it strongly suggests
that the top three recipients  of educational aid, all of which have high leverage, play an important
part in determining the position of the regression line.  The line would be  e  - that is
educational aid increase educational  expenditure on a more than one for one basis - if these
observations  were omitted.  The results reported in Table 2.3 for repeating the regression from
equation (1) bear out this suspicion: the slope of the line increases as the sample size is reduced
(the sample is sorted by educational  expenditure in ascending order).
But more important in this case than the slope coefficient is the t-statistic - other than in
the full sample the cuefficient on educational aid is insignificantly  different from zero.12 The
20Table 2.3  Rtegression  results with different
sample sizes
Slope  t-statistic  R
coefficient
Full sample  0.917  3.903  0.752
Observations I to 37  1.209  1.678  0.703
Observations 1 to 36  1.432  1.282  0.701
Observations 1 to 35  1.504  0.678  0.698
intuition behind this finding is as follows.  The t-statistic is the ratio of the estimated slope
coefficient and the standard error of that estimate.  The second of these is square root of the ratio
of variance of the error tern  and the sum of squared deviation of the independent  variable.  In the
fill  sample the denominator is large - there are three observations  with a large mean deviation  - so
that the standard error will be smaller and the t-statistic larger than if these observations were
omitted.  C(o put it simply: once the tliree influential points are removed there is very little
variation in educational expenditLre,  which must necessarily  result in inexact estimates).
Meanwhile the numerator will (taking the fitted line as an approximation  of the true relationship)
be small in the full sample since these three observations lie very close to the line - removing
these observations will not reduce and may even increase the error variance.
Therefore the results reported by Holmqvist are very sensitive to the sample used.
Dropping  just one observation leaves GNP per capita as the only significant  determinant of
educational expenditure. Aid - either that targeted to education or for other purposes - has no
role.
The examples presented here are of cross-section  regressions, and most of the aid
effectiveness  literature has been of this type.  However, the need fur analysis of individual
countries using time series has long been recognized (e.g. Papanek, 1973) and some studies have
adopted such an approach (for example, Morisset's study of Argentinean savings, 1989).  As is
now widely recognized, economic time series data are prone to spurious regression.
A variable which assumes its own lagged value plus a random error (white noise) is
described as a random walk.  It has been shown that the regression of one random walk on
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another will most likely yield a significant  result, even though there is actually no relationship
between  the two variables - this is a spurious regression. A random walk is an example of a non-
stationary series.  More generally it has been demonstrated  that OLS regression with non-
stationiary  series yields biased and inconsistent  results.
The techniques for handling non-stationary  series (tests for cointegration  and estimation  of
an error correction model) are beginning  to make an impression  in the development  literature.
Papers by Mavorota  01992)  and White (1992d)  estimate error correction models  for aid's impact
on savings in Ghana anri for a model of fiscal response  in Sri Lanka respectively.
Country-specific  analyses  of aid's macroeconomic  impact have to handle the likely
problem of non-stationarity. Since such models  are also simultaneous  systems it is important  to
note that the problem of non-stationarity  "takes  precedence"  over that of simultaneity  bias.  That
is, the coefficients  in an error correction  model will not suffer from simultaneity  bias even though
the equation may be part of a wider system.  On the other hand, techniques  for estimating
simultaneous  equations  (two or three stage least squares) do not avoid spurious  regressions if the
series are non-stationary.
2.4  Summary
Three approaches  have been applied to the analysis  of the impact  of adjustment  and stabilization
programs: (i) before versus after; (ii) control (and modified)  control group approach; and (iii)
modelling. These approaches  may be more generally  applied to the analysis  of aid impact  The
before versus after and simple control group approaches  must be rejected as they make ceteris
pariba&assumptions  that will not generally  be valid.  The modified approach  is more appealing,
although its application  has not addressed  the important  issue of separating out the effects of aid
monies that are received in support of adjustment  programs.  Moreover, a country-specific
approach is the preferred methodology  of this report, thus rendering the modified control group
approach inappropriate.
Modelling  can in principle  overcome the difficulties  identified  in the other approaches. In
developing  an appropriate  model a trade-off must be made between a model so simple that
important relationships  are absent and obscuring key mechanisms  with over detail.  The strategy
proposed here is to begin with an accounting  framework (which ensures consistency)  and use data
22analysis  to determine  the key  behavioral  relationships.  The  combination  of identiies  with
behavioral  relationships  will  form  the (different)  model  for each  country. The  next  chapter
presents  an appropriate  accounting  framework.0.:
Notes to Chapter  2
1.  The treatment given here understates the revaluation effect since it ignores the fact that, in
the presence of a trade deficit, a devaluation will reduce nominal GDP.
2.  Joan Robinson said that such a model would be as useful as a map with a scale of I in 1.
3.  It has recently been argupd that (Bhaduri  et al.,  1993) that aid depresses domestic
demand, so Griffin's point is reinforced not negated by incorporating  aid's impact on
income.  These arguments are pursued in Chapter 3.
4.  There is an obvious limitation  to this approach given the restricted length of most
developing country data sets.  For an modified approach using developing country data see
White and Wignaraja (1992).
5.  For example, the apparent presence of autocorrelation  in either time series or cross-section
data is often symptomatic  of incorrect functional  form.
6.  The concept of robustness (and its converse fragility) are formalized in the extreme
bounds analysis (EBA) propounded by Leamer (1983).  Pagan's (1987) examination of
GSP and EBA shows there to be many points of overlap, and where they differ that GSP
probably has the upper hand.
7.  His argument is discussed more extensively in Chapter 3.
B.  Time series analysis of Colombian data gave a coefficient of -0.84.
9.  White (1992d) discusses the factors behind the size and direction of the bias resulting from
Griffin's misspecification.
10.  This report is not yet in the public domain.
11.  These results are from the simple regression.  Despite the fact that the report contains the
data for the analysis I was unable to replicate the regression results in the report (but got
close for the macro policy variable).  The slope coefficient on that variable is quite robust
to changes in model specification (but not choice of sample).
12.  The problem here may also be one of imposing an invalid restriction on the data by
inappropriate pooling, which may be dealt with by adding dummy variables.  (Invalid
pooling is a forn  of omitted variable bias).  Re-estimation of equation 2.3 with a slope
dummy for EDUEXP (equal to EDUEXP for observations  36 to 38 and zero for all
others) gives a siilar  result to that from omitting these observations: the slope coefficient
for EDUEXP is higher but insignificant.
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AID'S IMACT  ON MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES
3.1  Introduction
The traditional  economic  rationale  for a_velopment  aid is that it will increase growth in the
recipient  countries. This belief remains widespread,  as evidenced  by the following  quote from a
recent World  Bank report:
A net transfer of resources of about 9 percent of GDP on average will be required
to achieve  sustained  growth during the 1990s.
(World Bank, 1989: 176)
By contrast many academic  studies have found no relationship  between aid and growth.
The British economist  Paul Mosley (1980, 1987  and 1993)  has published  a number of papers
illustrating  the absence of such a relationship  - in a recent example  he writes:
The apparent inability  of development  aid over more than twenty years to provide
a net increment  to overall growth in the Third World must give the donor
community  a grave cause for concern.
(Mosley  et al., 1987: 636)
It is my view, argued  in Part 3.2 of this report, that existing regressions  of growth on aid
do not yield meaningful  results, and so can be of no use in deciding whether or not aid has
increased  growth.  A more fruitful approach is to examine  the channels  through which aid is
intended  to increase  growth - increasing  imports  and investment  and raising the efficiency  of
investmnent.
In Part 3.3 an accounting  framework is presented whicn is a usefuil  basis for laying out the
possible channels  through which aid may or may not affect imports, investment  and other
macroeconomic  aggregates. This discussion  locates the existing literature on the macroeconomics
of aid within a single consistent  framework  and forms the basis for the subsequent  discussions  in
Parts 3.4 and 3.5 of aid and external  and internal  balance. The issue of aid and the efficiency  of
investment  is explored in Part 3.6 and the notion of aid dependence  in Part 3.7.  Part 3.8 reviews
25two  related  literatures:  global  macroeconomic  modelling  and estimates  of aid requirements.  Part
3.9 provides  a brief summary.
3.2  EmipIrical  Estimation  of the Aid-Growth  Relationship
Empirical  analysis  of the impact  of aid on growth  has typically  regressed  real growth  of income
on aid inflows  (perhaps  aggregated  with other  capital  inflows,  or perhaps  disaggregated  into  types
of aid, e.g. grant  or non-grant),  usually  with some  additional  regressors  included  (e.g. change  in
TOT, domestic  savings  rate and various  dummies).'  The results  from  selected  regressions  of
growth  on aid are shown  in Table  3.1.  As can be seen,  there is little  agreement:  both  positive
and negative  significant  relationships  have  been  reported.
Table 3.1 Results  of selected  aid-grwth stuies
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However,  the lack of unanimity  need  not concem  us, since  the equations  on which  these
26results are based are misspecified  in three respects: (i) omitted variable bias; Cii)  single equation
estimation  of simultaneous  relationships;  and CQii)  parameter instability!  We deal with each of
these in turn.
Omitted  wnable bias:  the  fragilty of cross-country  growth  regressions
We have only an imperfect understanding  of the growth process.  But it is not difficult to
make a long list of variables that have at one time or other had growdt regressed upon them
(military expenditure,  instability  of export earnings, policy orientation and various social
indicators, to name but a few), many of which have been fbund to have a 'significant" irnpact  on
growth - Levine and Renelt (1991)  report that over fifty variables  have been found to be
significantly  correlated with growth.
To the etnt  that aid is correlated  with any of these omitted  variables (as it surely is in
many cases - such as military expenditure,  educational  indicators, macro policy performance
variables etc.) then the equation is subject to a specification  error that will cause the estimate  of
the aid coefficient  to be biased.
Levine and Renekt  (1992)  examined  the robustness  of some established  results in the
growth literature - they find that many of the macroeconomic  indicators  commonly used in the
literature are indeed correlated  with growth, but that the results are fragile.  Their analysis
concentrates  on the replication  of two representative  existing studies, from which they conclude
although  each study presents intuitively  appealing  results, they use different
explanatory  variables... a union of the two sets of variables leaves none of the
economic  policy indicators  significantly  correlated with growth.
(Levine and Renelt, 1992: 959)
They  go on to say  that
We find that very few economic  variables are robustly correlated with cross-
country growth rates of GDP or the ratio of investment  expenditures  to GDP.
(Levine and Renelt, 1992: 959)
Average investment  rates are, however, reported to be robustly related to average growth rates.
Levine and Renelt do not include any measure of aid or capital inflows amongst  their
27explanatory  variables. But  their  results  strongly  support  the argument  made  above  - the
coefficients  from  regressing  growth  on aid and a few  other  variables  are not  likely  to be robust,
that is the coefficients  will  change  substantially  if different  variables  are included  in the
regression.  But  even  if all the relevant  variables  could  be included  other  problems  would  remain.
Single  equation  estimation  of a simultaneous  system
Relationships  may  exist  between  aid and  other  variables  on the right  hand side  so that
single  equation  estimation  is unable  to capture  aid's full impact. Consider,  for example  literacy,
which  is included  in the model  of Mosley  et  a.  (1987). The inclusion  of this  variable  on the right
hand  side of the regression  holds  literacy  constant  whilst  analyzing  aid's impact  on growth. Yet
increasing  literacy  may  be one  of the channels  through  which  aid affects  growth  - it is hoped  that
higher  literacy  will result  from aid to the education  sector. This effect  will not be captured  by
including  literacy  in the equation,  since  a single  equation  is being  used  to estimate  what is, in fact,
a simultaneous  system.
One  response  to the problem  just raised  may  be that  the link from aid to literacy  to growth
is a long  term  one, so that  single  equation  estimation  is not  inappropriate.  But  this response  is no
answer  to the problem  at all - in fact it just highlights  the third, and  most important,  fault in
regressing  growth  on aid.
Parameter zstabbiWiy
What  are the channels  through  which  aid may  affect  growth? During  the 1960s  it may
have  been  the case  that aid was used  for investment  in infrastructure.  But  since  that  time aid has
expanded  into  the social  sector,  there  has been  increased  use of technical  assistance  and aid
explicitly  tied  to policy  reforms  intended  (after  a period  of restructuing)  to facilitate  growth.
During  the 1980s  a larger  proportion  of aid has been  program  aid  rather than  project  aid:
with excess  capacity  import  support  aid may  lead  to substantial  increases  in output  whereas  fiurter
project  aid may  acualaly  reduce  output  as it draws  resources  into expanding  capacity  rather  than
using  existing  capacity  (Doriye  and Wuyts,  1992;  Doriye  et alt, 1993).
Aid may  well  contribute  to growth  - but  both the extn  and  the period  over which  it
occurs  will  be very different  for different  types  of aid and  for diffent  sectors. It would  be
foolhardy  to claim  that a texile factory,  a feeder  road, a primary  health  clinic  and a student
*  ~~~~~~~~~28;  pursuing  a masters  degree  are all going  to have  the same  return, and what is more, within the
same  time-frame.  Yet this is precisely  what is implicitly  assumed  by studies  that  regress  aid on
growth. Most  studies  (Mosley  et al., 1987  being  one  exception)  also take  no account  of the quite
*  lengthy  lags which  may  exist  in the aid-growth  relationship.
Few such  studies  have  incorporated  the lags that will  occur  between  aid-financed  activities
- and their  eventual  impact  on growth. But such  efforts  are, anyhow,  futile,  since  the required  lag
structure  will change  as the sectoral  composition  of aid changes. There is no theoretical
foundation  whatsoever  for assuming  that  the impact  of aid on growth  is constant  either  across
countries  or across  time. We would  therefore  expect  that  the aid coefficient  in an aid-growth
*  regression  would  be unstable  (in both  cross-section  and time series  studies).
White  (1992c)  reports  results  for a cross-country  regression  of growth  on official
ansders,  net long-tenm  capital  inflows,  savings  and  exports  for a full sample  of seventy  three
countries  and for three sub-samples  of African,  Asian  and  Latin  American  and Caribbean
countries.  An F-test  is used to test the hypothesis  that the pooled  regression  is a valid  restriction
of the three sub-sample  regressions.  The calculated  F-statistic  is 6.21, compared  to a critical
value  of less  than 3, so that the null hypothesis  of parameter  stability  between  the three regions
may  be rejected  with 99.9 per cent  confidence.
Anclusior
In summary,  whilst  studies  of aid and growth  do not tell us that aid has increased  growth,
neither  do they tell us that it has not done so. There  are too many  problems  inherent  in the
methodology  being  employed  for us to put any  reliance  on the results  of this  literature  one way or
the other. We would  be far better  advised  to analyze  aid's impact  by examining  the various  links
in the chain  running  from aid to growth  more  carefully. The accounting  framework  presented  in
Part 3.3 provides  a basis  for such  an analysis.
3.3  An Accoustng Framework
The national  acccunting  identity:
Savins  gap  =  Current  account =  Capit  accowun  ,1)
is a usefil starting  point  for the discussion  of aid's impact  on macroeconomic  aggregates.  The
gap between  gross  national  savings  and investment  (the  savings  gap) must  be fmanced  by the net
29inflow  of foreign  savings  (the capital  account),  and the value  of this inflow  must  equal  the current
account  deficit  (the trade gap). These identities  must  hold at all times. As describ2d  below,  aid
will appear  in either  the current  or capital  account. The question  is: how are the identities
preserved  when  one of the balances  is disturbed  by an increase  is aid? (Or, to use the
terminology  adopted  below,  how does  the economy  accommodate  the aid inflow)?
In the remainder  of Part 3.3 this question  is examined  in more  detail, linking  the possible
accommodatory  mechanisms  to the existing  literature  on aid's macroeconomic  impact. Parts  3.4
and 3.5 review  the relevant  empirical  literature.
Fwagibiliy
Aid  is primarily  intended  to increase  investnent  and imports  - to the extent  that  these
aggregates  do not increase  by the value of the aid inflow  then  the aid is said to be fungible. It is
useful  to distinguish  two kinds  of fingibility:  aggregate  fungibility  and categoricai  fungibility.
Suppose  that funds  (A) are intended  to be used to finance  goods  or activity  X.  Aggregate
fungibility  occurs  if the increase  in expenditure  on X is less  than the value  of the funds  (that is,
dXldA  < I).  Suppose  X may  be sub-divided  into items  X,, X2... Y., and that  the funds  are
intended  to be used  for item  X,.  If expenditure  on the other categories  of item X (X2...  X.) rises
in response  to the increased  availability  of funds (dX/dAjO for any  jl)  there is categorical
fungibility.
This distinction  may appear  unnecessary,  as whether  a case is described  as aggregate  or
categorical  fungibility  rests on the perhaps  arbitrary  designation  of expenditure  items  as X or non-
X goods. In practice,  the distinction  proves  easy to apply.
Consider  the case  of import  support  aid given  to finance  importation  of intermediate
goods. If the aid reduce  exports  through  Dutch  disease  effects  or displaces  foreign  borrowing
imports  rise by less  than the value  of the aid inflow:  there is aggregate  fungibility. But if imports
of consumer  goods increase  as a result of the aid then  there is categorical  fungibility. Of course,
both may  types  of fungibility  may occur at once.
The distinction  is also  useful  in the discussion  of aid's impact  on fiscal  policy. Aggregate
fungibility  exists  if taxes or goverment borrowing  fall when aid increases. There is categorical
fungibility  if non-developmental  expenditres (such  as military  expenditure)  rise with higher  aid.
30Th-e  captal and currem  accounts
The capital  and current  accounts  may  be written  in more  detail  as:'
X +NTR +  NFP - M  -(L7L' +  LTVn +  Sm  +  OJ+  dR)  (3)
where  X is exports  of goods  and non-factor  services,  NTR  net current  transfers (which  comprise
official  transfers  (OT)  - that is grant aid - and private  current  transfers,  PCI),  NFP net factor
payments  from abroad,  M imports  of goods and non-factor  services,  LTL' net disbursements  of
concessional  long-term  capital,  LTL net disbursements  of non-concessional  long-tenn  capital,
STL net short-tenn  inflows,  OKI  net other capital  inflows  and dR the change  in reserves. (A
positive  dR is a reduction  in reserves,  that is an 'inflow" of capital  to the capital  account).
Aid is either  a grant - that is an official transfer (01)  - on current account or a
concessional  long term inflow  (LTI)  on the capital  account.' The net aid inflow' is therefore
given  by:
ASD = OT  + LL'  (3,7)
Combining  equations  (3.2) and (3.3) gives:
AmD =  M  - PCT  - NFP  - X  - LV'  - S  - ORI  - dR  (3"4)
The orthodox  view - made  explicit  in the two gap model  (of which  Chenery  and Strout
(1966)  is the best  known  example)  - is that aid leads  to a one  for one  increase  in imports:  *us the
identity  contained  in equation  (3.4)  is preserved  since  the first  term on both the left and  right hand
side of the equation  increase  by the same  amount. There is an mWrtant  implication  of such a
response  for  'gap analysis'.  If aid is on capital  account then  the current  account  detriorates  by
an amount  equivalent  to the value  of the aid inflow. If aid is on current  account  then  the current
account  excluding  official  transfers  (which  is how  it is often  reported  - see note 4) deteriorates  by
this amount. Hence,  if aid is having  the intended  effect,  an economy  with substantial  aid flows
will (must)  have a -large  exteral deficit. It is not appropriat to point  to the poor  performance  of
such  econoniies  on the basis of their  mrrent  account  deficits  - but such a practice  is not
uncommon. 6
Similarly,  it is incorrect  to look at the magnitude  of the current  gap and say that the aid
was required  to fill that  gap - the aid itself creates  the gap. Aid is gap creating  rather than gap
31filling.  The important issue - and the one in relation to which I define the concept of aid
dependence  - is whether  the economic  structure  is such that  the gaps will close  over time.
Discussion  of this point is pursued  in Part 3.6.
But it may not be the case that imports  rise by the value of the aid inflow  - the
accommodation  may, in principle,  be through  any  of the other items. Maybe  exports  or non-
concessional  borrowings  are displaced  or aid may  be used to finance  debt service  or accumulation
of reserves:  if any of these  occur, then the increment  in imports  will be less than  the value  of the
aid inflow.
Identities  are not behavioral  relationships.  We may  observe  that imports  rise by less than
the increase  in aid because  the purchasing  power  of exports  has fallen. There  may be a
relationship  here - the aid inflow  causing  a real  exchange  rate appreciation  that  crowds  out
exports. But  there may not - perhaps  the fall in purchasing  power  is solely  the result of adverse
movements  in the external  terms  of trade. Nevertheless,  the accounting  framework  is useful  both
theoretically  and empirically.  Theoretically  it allows  the identification  of the kind of effects  that
may  undermine  aid's impact  on imports  and investment.  Empirically,  it points  to questions  as to
aid's effect  in a particular  economy. For example  the application  of this fimework to Tanzania
(White  and Wuyts,  1993)  highlights  the fact that  real imports  have  fallen  since 1970  despite  a very
substantial  increase  in aid volume. But  the framework  can only be the starting  point for an
investigation  of behavioral  relationships.
Bearing  these comments  in mind, I now describe  aid's possible  relationship  with the other
capital  and  current  account  items.
(a) Aid and exports:  the two gap model  was criticized  using  a traditional  trade theory  approach
by Joshi (1970)  and  Findlay  (1973:  Chapter  10)  who both questioned  the excessive  structuralism
of the model  which  excluded  any price effects. An aid inflow  in the alternative  model  presented
by Findlay  would  improve  the terms  of trade of the recipient  - that is reduce  its competitiveness
so that imports  rise by less than  the value  of the aid (White,  1992b:  211-212). The result that  aid
reduces  the competitiveness  of the recipient  follows  from a wide range  of open economy
macroeconomic  models  (see Dornbusch,  1980:  Chapter  6; and White, 1990)  and analyses  of the
real  exchange  rate (Edwards,  1988  and 1989)  and  has led to a small  literature  on "aid as Dutch
diseasen.
32The Dutch disease operates through the spending  effect.  Aid-financed  activity results in
increased demand, some of which will fall upon non-tradables. The price of the non-tradable
goods and services will therefore rise relative to that of tradables, whose price is assumed  to be
given (the small country assumption):  that is, there is an appreciation  of the real exchange rate.
(If there is a floating  exchange rate regime the real appreciation  may also operate through the
nominal rate).
The basic mechanism,  outlined in the previous paragraph, is simple. The analysis  of
actual cases is more complex  on account  of the different channels through which aid reaches the
economy. For example, Younger's (1992) analysis  of the aid boom in Ghana suggests  that the aid
crowded out private investment  since the government maintained  a tight monetary policy to
counteract the aid-financed  increase in demand  as part of an attempt to maintain  the real exchange
rate.
More complex stories also emerge from consideration  of changes in the composition  of
expenditures  - especially  investment  - resulting from Dutch disease effects, an analysis  that has
been taken furthest in the work of David Bevan, Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning (for
example, Bevan et aL 1990) and their analysis  of construction  booms.  As indicated  above, a
windfall gain (including  an aid boom) results in increased demand for non-tradables  - non-tradable
capital goods are identified as "construction"  so that the analysis of the impact of aid on
investment  becomes a theory of construction  booms.
(b)  Aid and other inflows: the recipient may substitute  away from non-concessional  sources of
finance if aid funds are available, hence the increment  in forex availability  (and therefore imports)
is less than the value of the increase in aid.  One critic of aid, Peter Bauer, has argued that this
saving of debt service charges is the only benefit of aid to the recipient (1976: 106-110). On the
other hand - aid may "crowd in" other inflows if they support a reform process which improves
the country's credit-worthiness. The notion that adjustment  lending would act as a catalyst for
other inflows  was common  in the early 1980s. The most recent World Bank report on adjustment
lending restates the view, but with a recognition  that there will be lags:
Reforms increase the ability of a country to use foreign savings productively. Eventually,
good performance  is recognized  by international  capital markets and bilateral lenders, but
33a long  dme may  elapse  between  execution  of reforms  and this recognition,  leaving  a
balance  of payments  gap that needs  to be filled  for growth  to occur.
(World  Bank, 1992:  9)
If such  crowding  in occurs  then  the initial aid may  support  increases  in imports  over and above
the value of the aid itself.
(cl  Aid apd debt  service:  some  part of the aid may  be intended  to be used  for debt  relief.
Accurate  recording  would  show  the inflow  as aid receipts  and  the outflow  as either  net factor
payments  for interest  relief  or a reduced  net capital  inflow  for amortization.  If the relief  is for
principal  payments  on past aid then the net aid figure  is unaffected  by the debt relief  if the debt
would  have not  been  paid in the absence  of the relief. If the debt  would  have  been  paid then  the
debt  relief is equivalent  to untied  foreign  exchange  (and so may  stimulate  imports).
The above  accounting  points  may apply  if aid intended  for imports  is diverted  to debt
service. If repayment  of principal  is an important  capital  account  item it is preferable  to present
the  ,ata  showing  gross  disbursements  and amortization,  rather than  the net disbursement  form
used  in the equations  above.
(d) Changes  in reserves:  a part of an increased  aid inflow  may be added  to reserves. Studies  of
the macroeconomic  effects  of counterpart  fiuds - notably  Roemer  (1989)  and Bruttn and Hill
(1990  and 1991)  - discuss  this  possibility. Such  a response  may  be appropriate  if there are likely
to be Dutch  disease  effects  from a temporary  aid boom.
Internal  and etaenrl balace
Now consider  how  the internal  (investment-savings)  balance  accommodates  an aid inflow.
First suppose  aid to be a grant. Combining  the definition:
GNS =  GDS + NFP +JMR  (35)
where  GNS and GDS  are gross national  and domestic  savings  respectively,  with die first identity
in equation  (3.1) gives:
GDS +  NTR +  NFP - I  = X  MR  . NFP - (3,6)
34Suppose  that  the increase  in NTR is fully  accommodated  within  the current account  - this
is mcant  to happen  by an increase  in M of the same  amount. The left hand side of equation  (3.6)
must  therefore  also remain  unchanged.  The orthodox  view  of how  this balance  occurs  is that
investment  increases  by the value  of the increment  in aid with other variables  (notably  GDS)
remaining  uncharged. Simply  put, the aid is fully (and  directly)  used  to finance  higher
investment:  in equation  (3.6) the increase  in NTR is entirely  offset  by the one-for-one  increase  in
investment  so that there is no change  in the net balance  on the left-hand  side.
Similar  arguments  may  be applied  if the aid is on capital  account  - analyzed  througii  the
identity  of internal  balance  with either  the current  or capital  accounts. But, as before,  the
accommodation  may through  several  alternative  channels,  of which  the main  one is savings
displacement  - Griffin's  argument  that  aid may displace  savings  has been  one of the most debated
issues  in the macro  aid effectiveness  debate.
Aid and savin=s
Griffin  (1971)  presented  his argument  in the following  model. Consumption  is given  by:
C =  a  + P(GDP+A)  (3,7)
where  C is consumption.  Since  domestic  savings  are given by:
GDS = GDP - C  (3,)
it follows  that:
GDS =  - + (1-p)GDP  - pA  (3,9)
demonstrating  the negative  relationship  between  aid and savings.
Colman  and Nixson  claimed  that the above  argument  contains  a "basic  algebraic  flaws
(1978:  115) since,  they argue, aid should  also be added  to the savings  identity  (so that S = Y +
A - C).  This argument  is not correct. Equation  (3.7) is a behavioral  function  - maybe  aid should
be included  and maybe  not, the issue  is ultimately  an empirical  matter. But equation  (3.8) is an
identity  and cannot  be messed  about. Equation  (3.8) is a correct  definition  of gross  domestic
savings. If savings  were instead  to be gross national  savings then grant aid should  be included
but aid loans  not (though  Griffin  states  that the "S" in his analysis  is domestic  savings). The issue
35can be clarified  by the writing  out the identities  in full.
By definition:
GNS  GDS  NFP  +  0,10)
where  GNS  and GDS are gross  national  and domestic  savings  respectively.  Equation  (3.7) is re-
written  as:
C = e  p(GDP +A .NFP)  (341)
Hence:
GDS = -a  + (1 -P)GDP  - P (A+NFP)  (3a2)
GNS = -a  + (I-P)(GDP+NFP+O0T)  - PLTLC
Thus if are concerned  to analyze  national  rather  than domestic  savings  then Colman  and Nixson
are correct  that  aid on current  account  will not have  a negative  relationship  with savings  - but that
on capital  account  still  does. Moreover,  as stated  above, the concern  is really  with  domestic
savings  anyhow.
There have  been  a number  of criticisms  of arguments  of Griffin's  argument,  of which
three are discussed  here." First, he measured  capital  inflows  by the cumnt account  deficit. As
discussed  below,  there are (and  were then)  more  accurate  measures  available. Second,  as shown
in White  (1992b:  179-181),  Griffin's  presentation  implicidy  assumes  that  fungibility  exists  - in
terms of the graphical presentation (given  in Griffin, 1970) the budget constraint should be
kinked. This issue  is discussed  in the next  section  in which  we explore  the relationship  between
aid and public  savings. Finally,  Griffin's  argument  assumes  that GDP  is constant  in the face  of
the aid inflow  - it is this assumption  which  is examined  here.
Aid  may (and  should)  result  in higher  output  and income  in both  current  and future
periods. This higher  income  will allow  both consumption  and savings  to expand:  a point  noted by
both Eshag  (1971:  149-150)  and  Kennedy  and Thirlwall  (1971: 136)  in their  comments  on
Griffin's  paper, but lost sight  of in most of the subsequent  literature.
In Figure 3.1 Griffin's  diagrammatic  presentation  is shown  to demonstrate  how feedback
in the current  period  leads  to an ambiguity  in the  relationship  between  aid and savings. The top
36;:art of the figure  shows  Griffin's  presentation. Without  aid income  is YO  - so that  consumption  is
CO  and domestic  (and  national)  savings  are YO-CO.  He argues  that the aid inflow  shifts  out the
budget  constraint  in a simple  additive  manner,  so that the horizontal  intercept  is now  Y.+A,
consumption  rising  to C,.  Domestic  savings  are now YO-C,  - that is, they fall be the amount  that
consumption  rises since  domestically  generated  income  (output)  is assumed  constant.  But it is
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The bottom  part of Figure 3.1 shows  a budget  constaint with a horizontal  intercept  Y 2.
Y2  includes  A not as an additive  component  but as the income  that results  once  multiplier  effects
in the period  of the aid inflow  - which  may  be either  consumption  or production  multipliers  - are
allowed  for. That part of domestic  income  not given  by the transfer  may  be designated  Y27A,  so
that the comparable  domestic  value for domestic  savings  is YrA-C,.  This value may  be greater
or less than  the value  of domestic  savings  in the absence  of aid, depending  on the strength  of the
aid multiplier. We discuss  in the final section  of Part 3.3 factors  which  determine  this multiplier.
The feedback  from aid to higher income  may  also (or instead)  occur  in subsequent
periods: indeed,  that  this would  be the case was an important  part of the two gap model  as the
37savings  gap will then close  as income  grows  (assuming  that the marginal  propensity  to save is
greater  than  the average). Grinols  and Bhagwati  (1976)  and White  (1992d)  show  that, as higher
income  leads  to higher  savings,  savings  levels  and rates  may be higher  with aid than without  it,
even  allowing  for displacement  effects.
The absence  of feedback  in either  a dynamic  or static  context  is one manifestation  of the
weak  theoretical  basis of Griffin's  argument,  which  has no real theory  of savings  determination.
A convincing  theory  would  have  to begin  with a distinction  between  public  and  private  savings,
which  may be done with  the accounting  framework.
Decomposing  internal  balance
The savings-investment  balance  may  be broken  down  into those  for the government  and
private  sectors:
GNSp  - I  + GNSg  - X  I  =X+ N  FP - (3a3)
or, equivalently:
GNS - IP  + T - G = X +  NR  + NFP - M  (3,14)
with obvious  notation,  noting  that  grants  received  by government  from abroad  are a part of
government  savings  (GNS,)  and revenue Ml.
Consider  first the case  in which  an increase  in grants  leads  to no increase  in GNS-I. This
result  may  be explained  by government  savings  increasing  by the full value  of the rise in NTR  and
4 increasing  by the same  amount. Alternatively  4 may  not rise by this full amount  if government
revenue  does not increase  by the amount  of the rise of NTR, which  is commonly  supposed  to
occur  as government  uses  some  of the aid to "finance"  lower  taxes.
A similar  point  to that made  above  about  current  account  performance  in the presence  of
large aid inflows  may  be made about the  budget  deficit  (which  is T-G or S-I).  Suppose  the
government  receives  substantial  grants  which  are used, as intended,  entirely  to finance
development  expenditures.  Government  expenditures  rise with no increase  in recurrent  revenues  -
the budget  deficit  before  grants looks  bad - and it may appear  as if the grants  are needed  to fill the
gap. In fact the causation  flows  the other way, with  the grants  creating  the gap. It is wrong
therefbre  to condemn  the poor perfbrmance  of the budget  deficit. The relevant  question  to ask is
38instead  if the aid is being used in such a way  so that in future  the government  will be able  to fund
all expenditures  from domestic  revenue. To this end an analysis  of the tax base is an important
part of analyzing  aid effectiveness.
Whilst  project aid is intended  to increase  government  expenditure,  this use should  not be
the case for aid intended  for budget  support. If aid is intended  for budget  support  then  T is
intended  to go up by the full amount  of NTR whilst  G remains  unchanged. (Donors  that  tie their
budget  support  to particular  expenditures  may either  be trying or may  anyway  succeed  in
increasing  G above  what it would  have  been  in the absence  of the aid.  To the extent  that this is
the case  then  the budget  support  is not reducing  the need  for deficit  financing). Suppose  the aid is
given  as import  support in grant  form and leads  to 100%  additional  imports. The left-hand  side
of equation  (3.13)  (or 3.14) must remain  unchanged. Tbus any increase  in T-G must be offset  by
a reduction  in Srpi.  For example,  if the imports  are all capital  goods  then Ip  rises by the value of
the import  support  thus maintaining  balance. Consumer  imports  will, instead,  affect  SF.
Our discussion  thus far is restricted  to the identities  and does not look for behavioral
links. These  links have  been analyzed  in the fiscal response  literature,  to which  we tun below.
First, however,  we consider  the link between  aid and investment.
Aid and investment
Perhaps  surprisingly,  the theoretical  (and  much  of the empirical)  literature  have  focused
on the aid-savings  link, rather than  that between  aid and investment. Moreover,  nearly  all studies
regress  agcate  investment  on aid, whereas  - as argued  in White  (1994b)  - to trace the aid-
investment  link it is important  to begin  with the disaggregation  of investment  into public  and
private, and then  to explore  how aid may affect  each of these components  (which  have  very
different  behavioral  determinants).
Historically  it has been  the case  that aid-supported  investment  projects  fall under  the
public sector - a situation that has probably not changed so greatly.  The direct impact of aid on
investment  will, by and large, be on government  investment. It is, however,  important  in any
particular  case  study to examine  the amount  of aid channelled  to the private  sector  Irough DPCs
and other credit  schemes.
The strength  of the direct effect  of aid on government  investment  depends  on the extent  to
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which the aid is fungible.  This issue has been examined in the context of the fiscal response
literature, which is discussed below.
The indirect relationship between  aid and private investment  operates through the
crowding in\out mechanisms  linking public and private investinent. Crowding in may occur as
aid-financed  activity generates demand for domestically  produced goods and services - but these
same effects create relative price movements  which may discourage investment  in other sectors.
Public investment  projects should create infrastructure  which opens up new investment
opportunities for the private sector (for example, agricultural marketing in response to improved
roads).
Empirical analysis of the determinants  of private investmnent  in developing countries (e.g.
Greene and Villanueva, 1991) have found the accelerator mechanism  to be important - that is the
level of investment  is positively related to the rate of growth of output.  Aid-induced  growth may
therefore initiate a "virtuous circle" of higher growth and private investment.
Whether there is crowding out through credit markets (or credit rationing) depends on the
net impact  of aid on the budget deficit - if the increase in expenditure  plus the fall in revenue
collection exceeds the value of the aid inflow then the government's borrowing requirement  will
increase, resulting in the possibility of crowding out.  (This argument is presented in a formal
framework in White and McGillivray, 1992). The fiscal response literature explores aid's impact
on these different aspects of government fiscal behaviour.
The fiscal response literature
Peter Heller's 1975 paper in the American Economic Review, which investigated  the fiscal
response of recipient govermments  to an aid inflow, has resulted in a growing literature: Gang and
Khan (1986 and 1991), Mosley et al. (1987), Khan and Hoshino (1992), McGillivray and
Papadopoulos (1991), Forster (1993), Binh and McGillivray (1993), Gupta (1993a) and White
(1993 and 1994a7.  Here we concentrate on the model presented by Gang and Khan and critiques
of its construction - problems in the estimation  of the model are discussed in Part 3.5.  So much
space is devoted to this model since it is one of the growing areas of the new macroeconomics  of
aid and since this form of the model is so seriously flawed as to be a poor basis for further
analysis.
40Heller's model  supposes  that recipient  governments  maximize  a loss function  comprising
five choice  variables  subject  to two budget  constraints. The choice  variables  are: government
investnent  (1d,  government  expenditure  on socio-economic  (or developmental)  and other civil (or
non-developmental)  purposes  (G. and G, respectively),  taxation fl  and borrowing  (B). Denoting
a target  variable  by an asterix  ('), the objective  function  used  by Heller and adopted  by Gang  and
Khan  is:
U  =  ao  +  +IQr-l)-  2  i)  +  -3(G,
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Binh  and McGillivray  (1993)  fault the specification  given  in equation  (3.15)  on the
grounds  that the model  is not optimized  when  the target  values  of the choice  variables  are
achieved,  so that  the targets  may not truly  be considered  targets. To avoid  this problem  Binh and
McGillivray  suggest  the specification: 10
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from which  it is clear that utility  is maximized  (to a,;) when  the targets  are satisfied.
The loss function  given  by either equation  (3.16)  or (3.16)  is then  maximized  subject  to
budget  constrais:
Ig = B + (1-p 1 )T +  (1-p2)A,  +  (1  - pAl,  (3,17)
G, + G, = p1T + p2Ag +  PA  (3,18)
where  A. and A, are grant aid and  foreign  loans  respectively.  The loans  term must, by definition,
include  all foreign  borrowing,  not just concessional  aid.  Although  Gang  and Khan (1991)  and
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Khan  and Hoshino  (1992)  are correct  on this point in their  definitions,  they use the term "aid"
interchangeably  with the sum  of the two - a practice  which  is incorrect  terminology.
The rationale  for the separate  budget  constraints  is that  governments  will not finance
recurrent  expenditure  out of domestic  borrowing.  This rationale  is asserted  by Mosley  et at.
(1987:  619), Gang  and Khan  (1991:  358) and Khan  and Hoshino  (1992:  1483). Examination  of
the data  for Greece  by McGillivray  and Papadopoulos  (1991),  Papua  New  Guinea  by Forster
(1993),  and Tanzania  by Doriye  et al. (1993)  show  that this assertion  is not true in general"  -
and  defies  the notion  that developing  country  governments  are rather prone  to printing  money  to
finance  their spending. 12
But this criticism  withstanding,  it is odd  to write  the budget  constraint  in a way which  pre-
determines  the allocation  of the income  terms in given  proportions  (that is, the p parameters).
Such  an allocation  should  be the outcome  of the utility  maximization  problem. By pre-
determining  the allocation  of aid, government  behaviour  is over-restricted  - a problem  which  is
apparent  from simulations.  White  (1994a)  calculates  the model's  solution  with  the values  of the
ps obtained  by Gang  and Khan  and a hypothetical  set of as which  give  equal weight  to each
target?  The hypothetical  policy  targets  and aid inflows  are set exogenous  to the model,  being
chosen  to ensure  that  the government's  targets  can all be met. Using  equation  (3.16)  as the utility
function,  utility  will be maximized  to a0 by each  endogenous  variable  being  equal  to its target
level - hence, since  the targets  are attainable,  this outcome  is the solution  that should  be found  by
the model. But the solution  is not that - utility  is not maximized  since  government  fiscal
behaviour  is detexmined  by the two separate  budget  constraints.
,On account  of this problem  we may  wish  to use instead  the single  budget  constraint:
Is + G  + Ge = T  .B  + Ag  ,  A,  (3,
It is shown  in White (1993)  that  the fiscal  response  model  will produce  the result  of fungibility
when  the utility  function  is combined  with  the budget  constraint  given  in equation  (3.19). That is
aid inflows  do not fully  fund  expenditure  increases,  but are pardy  used to decrease  taxes and
borrowing  - which  is what  the model  is intended  to demonstate  - even  when a budget  constraint
is used.
However,  the budget  constraint  in equation  (3.19)  is problematic  since  different  types  of
42aid are analytically  equivalent,  which  will only be the case where  all aid is fully  fungible. Aid
will not be fully fungible  if the target  level for a category  of expenditure  is less  than the aid tied
to that use since  actual  expenditure  on a category  must  be at least  equal  to the aid inflow  tied to
that  purpose  -that is the budget  constraint  should  be kinked  to allow  for the fact that  aid tying sets
a minimum value to expenditure categories."  Further work is therefore required on theoretical
modelling  of fungibility. However,  as demonstrated  in Part 3.5, there are serious  shortcomings  in
the empirical  application  of the fiscal  response  model,  so that it is not an appropriate  vehicle  for
such an analysis.
A further  limitation  of the fiscal response  model  is that it is only a partial  analysis,  since it
does not take account  of feedback  effects  which  may  operate. Such effects  may  be of two kinds.
First, the equations  for the target equations  (reported  below)  contain  economic  paramneters,
including  lagged  values  of some  of the model's endogenous  variables. For example,  the target for
government  non-developmental  expenditure  is an increasing  function  of the lag of that variable.
Through  this channel  a current  aid inflow  will increase  future  non-developmental  expenditure.
Second,  the model  contains  no examination  of economic  variables. Mosley  et at. (1987)
combine  the model  with a Harrod-Domar  equation  and a private  investment  function  to examine
the impact on growth.  But the model of Mosley et  al. ignores the dynamics the model contains,
since  income  and growth  are treatd as independent  of one another  (whereas  income  should  be
given as a function  of growth  and lagged  income)? 5 White  (1993)  allows  for consumption
multiplier  effects  by combining  the fiscal  response  model  with investment  and consumption
functions  and the income-expenditure  identity. Dynamic  feedback  from higher income  to
increased  tax targets  are also included. Simulations  show  that the theoretical  result  from the fiscal
response  literature  that aid reduces  taxes  may  be reversed,  depending  on parameter  values,  once
these effects  are allowed  for.
Aid, income  and ouaput
Feedback  effects  - that is the possibility  that consumption  and  production  multipliers  that
reinforce  aid's positive  impact  on income  - have  been  mentioned  above  as very important,  but
have  received  very little atetion  in the aid literature. As indicated  in the previous  paragraph,  the
introduction  of a consumption  multiplier  into a simple  fiscal response  model,  shows  that the initial
adverse  impact  of aid on taxes  may be reversed  by feedback  effects.
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However,  my own  analysis  was misfonnulated,  since  the national  accounting  identity  used
is that for a closed  economy:
0  f  . . Y  = C  I  Z'(3,2)
But an aid-receiving  economy  cannot  be closedl The identity  should  instead  be:
Y = C + I  + X - M  (3,21)
Since  M =  X + A, equation  (3.17)  may  be rewritten  as:
Y  =C  I  - A  3,22)
suggesting  that aid has a depressing  effect  on domestic  demand. This argument  that  aid displaces
demand  for domestic  output  has been  around  for a long time  under the guide  of the "disincentive
effect"  in the analysis  of food aid (see Chapter  5) but has only recendy  been  stated  at the
macroeconomic  level  by Bhaduri  et al. (1993)  and Bhaduri  and Skarstein  (1993).
But to argue that  aid displaces  domestic  demand  assumes  that consumption  and investment
are unchanged  in the face  of the aid inflow  - which  is not so.  At the simplest,  the sum of
consumption  and investment  rise by exactly  the amount  of the aid inflow. The aid fully  finances
these increases  and there in no net impact  on expenditure  on domestic  output. But  the story may
be more complicated.  Let us suppose  Griffin's  consumption  function  and an aid-driven  investment
fmunction:"
C=  0 +  pl(Y  +  A)  0323)
1=  Yo  +  0,A  '324)
From equations  (3.22), (3.23)  and (3.24)  it follows  that:
dY  _  Pi% Yi-1  (325)
di  1 - A
showing  that  the overal impact  of aid on income  is positive,  provided  that /,+  y,> 1 - that is, the
impact  effect  of an aid inflow  on absorption  is greater  than one.
The impact  on savings  is given by:
44--- d-Yi  - (3,26)
dA
That is, savings  fall if the increase  in investment  is less than  the value of the aid inflow. This
result is the same  as Griffin's;  but the difference  is that it is possible  in the formulation  given  here
for y > 1.  If the aid goes to increase  government  investment  and there is crowding  in then it is
not unlikely  that this condition  will be satisfied."
For an increase  in demand  to lead  to higher  output  and income  then  the economy  must be
demand  constrained. If, instead,  the supply  constraint  is binding  then  this higher demand  will just
be converted  into inflation  (ike aid as Dutch  disease). Of course, if on the other hand, the aid
depresses  demand  for domestic  output  it has a deflationary  price  effect. In practice,  we might
usually  expect  a combination  of higher  output  and inflation.
It is also possible  that the aid has production  multiplier  effects  - through  increasing  the
efficiency  of production  or providing  intermediate  goods  to enable  the utilization  of idle  capacity.
If aid does stimulate  supply  in this way the effect  may  be deflationary. Roemer  (1989)
incorporated  such a possibility  into his model  of the macroeconomic  impact  of counterpart  funds.
But little  empirical  or detailed  theoretical  work exists  analyzing  the differential  impact  of aid
depending  on the type  of aid and  the nature  of the binding  supply-demand  constraints. Rather,
empirical  work  has for the most part been  restricted  to single  equation  analysis  of specific
relationships  identified  in the aid debate. In Parts 3.4 and 3.5 we turn to a discussion  of these
empirical  studies. Before  doing  so it is in order  to first briefly  discuss  the measurement  of aid.
The  measurement  of aid
Some  analyzes  (e.g. Griffin,  1971;  and Collier, 1991)  have  used the current  account
deficit  as a measure  of aid inflows  - yet this figure includes  also changes  in reserves,  errors and
omissions  and does not allow  us to disaggregate  the different  types  of capital  inflow  or to explore
disaggregations  of interest  within  the aid variable.
The appropriate  measurement  of the aid variable  depends  on the purpose  of the analysis.
This purpose  may  be partly informed  by the accounting  fiamework. Should  technical  assistance
be included  in the aid variable? If the services  provided  by technical  assistance  are recorded  on
the import  service  account  (which  is doubtful  in the extreme)  they  TA should  be included  in an
analysis  of real imports  of goods and  service. If these  items  are not included  then  they should  be
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$:  excluded from the identities.  (But both experts and scholarships generate additional import
demand,  and so some  allowance  for TA need  be made when  it comes  to analyzing  behavioral
relationships).  If growth  is the dependent  variable  then (hopefullyl)  TA should  be included
(though  it has usually,  without  explanation,  been  excluded). It has been argued  here that growth
regressions  should  be discarded  as a tool of analysis  of aid effectiveness,  but TA should  also play'
a role in analyzing  the efficiency  of investment.
The question  is not only one of what  should  be included  and what not - but also at what
level of disaggregation.  There can be little  doubt  that  sensible  discussion  of aid's macroeconomic
effect quickly  recognizes  the need  to disaggregate  aid - at least into project  aid, program  aid
(possibly  separating  out further  commodity  aid, general import  support  and debt  relief)  and
technical  assistance. The desired  effects  of different  types  of aid vary. Project  aid is intended  to
raise government  expenditure  on the designated  activity  by at least  the value of the aid.  On the
other hand, many  donors  intend  the counterpart  funds  raised  by the sale of commodity  aid to be
used to offset  the need  for deficit  financing  (reduce  borrowing).
But  data on aid flows  by type  are not readily  available  for most  countries"  - with the
result  that most empirical  work  has, inappropriately,  used total aid as the aid variable. Other
studies  (particularly  fiscal  response  studies)  separate  grant from loan aid and/or bilateral  from
multilateral.  But these  breakdowns  are not functional  classifications,  and so of little  reai interest.
Levy (1987a)  attempts  a disaggregation  of anticipated  and unanticipated  aid, but it is unclear  that
his series may  be meaningfully  interpreted.
A further  issue is whether  to use gross disbursements,  net disbursements  (gross  minus
amortization)  or net transfers  (net disbursements  minus  interest  repayments).  Lipton  (1972)
argued  that the appropriate  measure  also depends  upon  the use:  to analyze  aid's effect  on
investment/growth  then  gross disbursements  should  be used, but to look  at imports  net transfers
are the correct  variable. However,  consideration  of the accounting  identities  presented  above
suggest  that  net aid should  be used in each  case. Some  studies  (e.g. Mosley  et at., 1987)  have
used the grant  equivalent  of aid, bat it is difficult  to see a theoretical  rationale  for this procedure.
A recent World Bank paper (Demery  et at.,  1993) further adjusts (real) net transfers to
take  accOunt  of terms of trade losses. This procedure  is acceptable  for the descriptive  purpose  of
the extent  of additional  resources  mobilized  for development  purposes. But it is not the
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appropriate  measure  to use in analyzing  the impact  of aid, since  the tenns of trade adjustment
"belongs"  to the capacity  to import  rather  than aid inflows.
How is the real value  of aid to be calculated?  The most common  procedure  is to deflate
by the import  price index,  since aid is intended  to purchase  imports  (but a less  valid  assumption
where  there is a significant  component  of local-cost  financing  from the aid budget,  a phenomenon
which  has reemerged  in recent  years). Other studies  (notably  in the fiscal  response  literature)
deflate  all categories  by the GDP deflator. In the latter  case it may be preferable  to use specific
deflators,  but a problem  will emerge  in the accounting  framework  of identities  no longer  holding
as we move  further  from the base period  where  different  deflators  have  been  used for different
series.
3.4  Empirical Analysis  of Aid and the External Account
Much of the aid literature  has been empirical  rather  than theoretical  in nature  - and the empirical
work is most  strongly  concentrated  in the aid-savings  and aid-growth  debates. In this part,
however,  empirical  evidence  of aid and external  account  variables  is presented.
Aid,, imports and frungibiliy
Despite  the fact  that aid is intended  to increase  imports,  then  there has been  surprisingly
little empirical  analysis  of this issue. Some  more attention  appears  to being  attacted to the issue
given  the extreme  forex  shortage  faced  by many  sub-Saharan  African  countries.
As we shall  see in Part 3.8, some  global  models  assume,  as did the two gap model,  that
aid is fully  used to finance  higher  imports  - a result  confirmed  by the cross-country  study of
Massell  et a.  (1972). However,  Chenery  and Syrquin  (1975)  report a coefficient  of only 0.43.
Moran (1989)  provides  a more rigorous  analysis  of the topic, but reports  his results  as elasticities,
so with out the data it is not possible  to bnow  if the marginal  increment  is significantly  less  than
unity, which is the hypothesis in which we are inerested.
Work  undertaken  witiin the World  Bank  (Demery  a  aL, 1993)  for the SPA has analyzed
how much  higher  import  volume  in SPA  countries  in the pre and post adjustment  periods  is
because  of higher  aid inflow  and how much  because  of improved  export  performance  (and
therefore  the result  of policy  reforms). The paper states  that 58 per cent  of the increase  in import
volumes  is from improved  export  performance  and  the remaining  42 per cent from the aid inflows
47(and  in the best performers  improved  exports  accounts  for the whole  of the increase,  as the higher
aid they have  received  is  just sufficient  to meet the debt  burden).
A study  of import  support  in Tanzania  (White  and Wuyts, 1993),  applying  the accounting
framework,  found  import  volume  to have  fallen  as aid has risen - therefore  other sources  of forex
must have  fallen. Analysis  of causal  links in the Tanzanian  case found  evidence  of some  aid
being  used for reserve  accumulation  in the 1970s  and  a displacement  effect  in the first part of the
1980s. Few other studies  have  explored  the possible  fungibility  of aid with respect  to reserves
and other borrowing. Faini  et al. (1991b)  analyzed  whether  adjustment  fiunds  had acted  as a
catalyst  for other inflows,  and  found  that they  had not; Mosley  at al. (1991)  find the same  result.
The one area that has received  rather  more attention  has been  the recent  concern  that aid may
cause  Dutch  disease.
Aid and the real exchange rate
Econometric  analysis  of aid's impact  on the real  exchange  rate has been  reported  by van
Wijnbergen  (1985)  and White  and Wignaraja  (1992). Younger  (3992)  discusses  the pressure  for
an appreciating  real rate in the case  of Ghana  and  Nabi and  Hamid  (1990)  make  the same  point
with regard  to Pakistan  in the 1960s,  but both without  a fornal test.
Van  Wijnbergen  regressed  the real exchange  rate on current  and lagged  aid, GDP, a proxy
for technological  progress,  the terms of trade and non-concessional  borrowing  for six African
countries:  a significant  negative  relationship  is found  in four  cases. Aside from some  econometric
problems  (see  White, 1992b:  219), van Wijnbergen's  specification  leaves  out important  short-run
determinants  of the real exchange  rate, notably  the nominal  rate, but  also a measure  of the
government's  fiscal  and monetary  policy  stance.
The model  of White  and Wignaraja  is based  on that of Edwards  (1989)  which  combines
long-run  (fundamental)  and short-run  determinants.  The Sri Lankan  case  is one of substantial  aid
inflows  since  liberalization  in 1977  and little movement  in the real exchange  rate, despite
continued  nominal  devaluation.  That is, there has been  an increasing  wedge  between  the nominal
and real  rates.  The aid inflows  are shown  to have  had an important  contributory  role.  LI  (1985k
reached  the same  conclusion  by a rather  different  route.
The behaviour  of the real exchange  rate in the presence  of substantial  aid inflows  has also
48;  ;--been  examined  in the context  of a CGE in two studies,  which  also  permit  the tracing  through  of
the price effects  on exports. The model  of Collier  and Gunning  (1992)  analyses  two alternative
means  of maintaining  a liberalization  - devaluation  or aid inflows  - in African  economies. They
find that  aid inflows  do indeed  have a price response  that  draws  labor and capital  into the
production  of non-tradables,  so that the export  supply  response  is weakened  - exports  expand  by
only 9% two years  after the reform  in the case  of an aid-financed  liberalization,  compared  to 12%
if there is devaluation.
Weisman's  (1990)  CGE of Papua  New  Guinea  shows  aid to have  spending  effects  through
increases  in government  expenditure  which  result in a real exchange  rate appreciation  and move  of
resources  into the production  of non tradables.
3.5  Empirical Analysis  of Aid, Savings  and Investment
There has been rather more  work on aid and savings,  with a lesser  amount  on aid and investment.
The most recent  area of attention  has been  to the fiscal  response  literature,  which  analyzes  both
aid and pubiic  investment  and savings  (though  the latter  has been  left implicit). Each of these
three areas  is discussed  in turn.
Aid and aggregate savngs
As was discussed  in Chapter  2, Griffin  supported  his argument  that aid displaces  savings
with a simple  regression  of aid on savings. Table  3.2 shows  Griffin's  results  and those  of
subsequent  studies,  which  have  also mostly  found  significant  negative  relationships.
But, as pointed  out above,  such an approach  suffers  from serious  misspecification  bias
(even  in the context  of Griffin's  own  model). Subsequent  work (e.g. Morriset, 1989)  has used
more sophisticated  specifications,  but single  equation  estimation  cannot  clearly  identify  the
different  channels  through  which  aid affects  savings. Yet few studies  have adopted  a simultaneous
approach.
Snyder  (1990)  argues, correctly,  that single  equation  estimation  is biased and  sets out a
simple  two equation  simultaneous  model  - which  he then estimates  by OLS! Levy (1984)
estmates a model  for Egypt  in which  aid can increase  investment  and so, through  a production
function,  output,  thus leading  back  to higher income. Despite  this feedback  effect  his empirical
estmates  suggest  that  displacement  effects  of aid inflows  on public  savings  dominate. However,
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he does not look at the dynamic  aspects  of his model  - that is the possibility  that  future savings
may  be higher  despite  current  displacement.
Analysis  of theories  of consumption  (the converse  of savings)  are, of course,  rooted in
more complex  formulations  than  the simple  savings  function  used by Levy (and others). Gupta
and Islam  (1983)  estimate  a simultaneous  model  of savings  and growth  which  contains  a number
of demographic  relationships  - but the model  is void of economic  analysis.
The aid-savings  relationship  is a debate  very much  in need of some  attention  to quality,
rather than quantity,  of analysis. One  direction  for such attention  is to analyze  the relationship  at
50the more disaggregate  level of public versus private savings  - the fiscal response liteiature
considers the former of these.  There is practically  no literature at all analyzing  the response  of
private savings to aid inflows  (Levy (1984) is the only case of which I am aware). Before moving
on to the fiscal response literature  a short discussion  of empirical analysis  of the aid-investment
link is in order.
Aid and  investment
The comments  of the preceding paragraph apply equally to the aid-invest-ment  literature
(which is much smaller than that on aid and savings - the results from some studies are shown in
Table 3.2).  In Part 3.3 a number  of channels  for aid's impact  on public and private investment
were identified  - but (with the exception  of White, 1992d)  these mechanisms  have not been
empirically  explored. Indeed, the aid-private  investment  link has not been empirically  analyzed,
except for (other than my paper  just mentioned)  a cross-country  simple regression by Mosley
(1987).
Levy (1987b and 1988) has reported some regressions  of aid and investment. The
coefficients  from these regressions are always significantly  positive and usually  close to unity.
But the shortcoming  of single  equation estimation  of such relationships  need be borne in mind.
Bhalla (1990) estimates  a simultaneous  investment-growth  model for Sri Lanka, finding the
elasticity of investment  with respect to aid to be 0.94% (which suggests  a more than one-for-one
increment since aid only finances one third to one half of investment).
Empirical  esfmation  of thefiscal response  model
As in Part 3.3, the discussion  of the fiscal response  literature concentrates  on the
presentation  of Gang and Khan (1991), though the problems  discussed are present in other
applications  of the model.  It will be recalled that government is supposed  to maximize  a loss
fimction  subject  to two budget constraints. Gang and Khan solve the model algebraically  to obtain
the structural equations:
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To estimate the parameters of equations (3.27) to (3.30) it is first necessary to obtain
values for the target variables.  To do this the targets are defined as follows:
g,  =  +1  F y2y 1 *  Y  r3Ip,  (331)
G,=  y4 5 + ysENR,  + y 6Y  + y7t  (3.32)
G  .c,  y8  +  ygr9¢-
G,=  'O  (3.33)
7: = Y10 +  +t  2Mg  l  (3.34)
8> = 0  (3.35)
where Y is GDP and 1 growth of GDP, I,, private investment, ENR primary sR'iool  enrollments
and M iinports.
The parameters for the target equations (3.31 to 3.35) are obtained by OLS using the
actual values of the variables 1, etc. as the regressand.  The fitted values from these regressions
are then used as the target values.  There are two problems with this approach.
First, there is no guarantee  that the targets so produced will be consistent with the budget
constraints  - indeed, they almost cerainly shall not  A better approach may be to model targets
for expenditure  and taxes, and then model target borrowing as that required to fill the gap once
expected  aid flows are taken into account. 1
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to the variables  selected  to detetmine  the target  level. Suppose  in fact that  the R 2 from this
regression  is 1.  Then  1j  1,1 When  we come  to estimate  equation  (3.27), which  involves
regressing  13  on 1,, we will be regressing  I, on itself - the coefficient  on I. will of course  be unity,
and all the other coefficients  insignificant.  In practice  the 112  will not be 1, but if it is high then
the problem  will still be present. If the R2 is low it is difficult  to see  how  the fitted  values
calculated  using  the estimated  coefficients  may  be meaningfully  interpreted  as values  of the
targets. The fit will be poor either because  the wrong  variables  have  been included  in the target
equation,  or because  the outturn  was  far removed  from the target. In the latter  case  the
coefficients  will not be those  used in the formation  of targets.
Consider,  for example,  the parameters  for the tax equation. If the argument  of the
preceding  paragraph  is correct  we would  expect  P, to be unity  and 03, 64  and P. to all be
insignificant.  These  expectations  are indeed  borne  out by Gang  and Khan's  results. For the
estimate  of equation  (3.27)  we expect  #B  to be zero - again  this is the case. The other two
equations  are more complicated.  From equation  (3.28)  we may  expect  4. to have a value  of one -
but from equation  (3.29)  w" expect  a value of zero! Since  the coefficient  cannot  be both zero and
one, it falls between  the tNo.
This hybrid  result  is also perhaps  suggestive  of the fact that the cross  equation  restrictions
contained  in the model  are not  valid. As mentioned  in Chapter  2, restrictions  imposed  on the data
by the model  should  be tested. Gupta  (1993a)  reports  the results  of estimating  both restricted  and
unrestricted  versions  of the fiscal  response  model  and shows  the restrictions  to be decisively
rejected.
It therefore  appears  that  Gang and Khan's  results  are derived  from the way in which  the
target  series  are estimated:  as such  the results  can tell us nothing  about  the Indian  government's
fiscal  response  to aid inflows.
But even  if we ignore  the above-mentioned  problem  then  we may  still argue  that Gang  and
Khan  give a misleading  interpretation  of their results  for two reasons:  (i) failure  to report reduced
form coefficients;  and (ii) suppression  of the model's implicit  dynamics. The second  of these was
discussed  above  in Part 3.3 - that is feedback  effects  through  the target equations  are ignored.
Forster (1993)  did allow  for such  effects  in his estimation  of the model  for Papua  New Guinea
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and found that, as expected, they reinforce the impact of aid on investment  and reduce to the
extent to which the increase in funds is offset by falls in borrowing and taxation. Here we
consider the first point.
Gang and Khan write that "foreign aid does not have any statistically significant  effect on
government consumption" (1991: 363).  This  conclusion is based on the result that the estimates
for p2 and PJ are insignificantly  different from zero, and so do not enter the budget constraint for
govermment  consumption. By the same reasoning, we would suppose that all aid is used to
increase government investment. Simulations  (reported in White, 1994a) using Gang and Khan's
point estimates, show an increase in loans of 100 units, for example, causes an increase in
government investment  of 103 units and a drop in total government consumption  of 3 units.
But it is rather odd to look at the coefficients  of the budget constraint.  For these results
do not imply that 1 will increase by 103 units if Al increases by 100 units: for the results to mean
this would require B and T to be constant in the face of the increased aid.  But the whole point of
the model is that B and T are not constant - indeed, fungibility suggests that some aid will be used
to reduce these domestic revenue sources.  In order to analyze the total impact of aid on the
different categories of government expenditure and revenue we must either derive the reduced
forms or otherwise obtain solution values for the system of structural equations. White (1994a)
reports the results of model simulations  using Gang and Koan's parameter vah.cs for the fPs  and ps
and a hypothetical set of exogenous  variables to examine the impact on the various categories of
expenditure of an increase in A, and Al of 100 units.
The results of these simulations  are rather a stark contrast to the conclusions drawn by
Gang and Khan.  For example, an increase in grant aid reduces borrowing by nearly twice the
value of the increase in aid and reduces taxes by nearly the amount of the aid - that is the
reduction in the recipient's own revenue raising efrts  Sets  off the new aid monies more than two
and one half fold.  The result is that higher aid must lead to a reduction in total expenditures.
This reduction falls entirely on government consumption. Neither type of aid has any impact at
all on government investment.
The various shortcomings  in the fiscal response model and the methodologies  applied to its
estimation clearly indicate the existing results cannot be meaningfully  interpreted.  We would
argue, moreover, that the problems in the model are too great to be resolved.  An alternative
54approach,  which  has been  adopted  to examine  the sectors]  impact  of aid, appears  to be the more
promising  channel.
Categoricalfrngibiy of aid to specific  sectors
Pack and Pack (1990)  regress  sectoral  government  expenditure  (D) on GDP, project  aid
designated  to that sector (AJ, project  aid to other  sectors  and time for five sectors  (the total
included  in these  five sectors  omit expenditures  on a few items). 2t Logs  are used  so that the
coefficients  are elasticities. It is not clear why  logs  are used, since  we are interested  in the
marginal  increment  in expenditure  with  respect  to aid.  (If Di is inclusive  of aid, as it is for Pack
and Pack,  then the hypothesis  of interest  is whether  the coefficient  on A, is one or more; if the
expenditure  is exclusive  of aid, as for the similar  study of Kenya  by Ekman  and Metell  (1993),
then there is fungibility  if the coefficient  is significantly  less  than zero). Regressions  are also
estimated  for recurrent  (non-developmental)  expenditures  and revenue. System  estimation
(Seemingly  Unrelated  Regressions,  SUR.)  is used  to allow  for the cross  equation  error correlation
implied  by the relation  of the dependent  variables  through  the budget  constraint.
The coefficient  estimates  are then used to simulate  the effects  of a one rupiah  increase  in
aid per capita,  whicb  is spread  over the sectors  in proportion  to their average  share in project  aid
during  the period of the study. The results  are shown  in the top part of Table  3.3.
The table also shows  the results for Kenya  obtained  by Ekman  and Metell (1993). Since
they use an expenditure  series  which  is exclusive  of aid the total impact  is given  by the sum of the
three columns,  rather than the two aid coefficients,  as is the case  for Pack and Pack's results.
The figures  for Indonesia  show  an expenditure  increase  of 1.58  rupiah for a one rupiah
increase  in aid.  Half of this increase  (0.29 rupiahs)  is financed  by an increase  in revenue. The
finding  that aid increase  revenue  collection  is in contrast  to the consensus  in the fiscal response
literature  that  taxes fall as aid rises. Pack and Pack suggest  that  the need  to increase  revenue
collection  comes  from the local cost financing  contribution  of government.22
The remaining  0.29 rupiab  is supposed  to come from falls in expenditure  in the excluded
sector. The method  of excluding  a sector  means  that, tLrough  an identity,  expenditure  in this
sector is assumed  to adjust  to the required  level. This assumption  is in effect  a cross-equation
restriction  in the model  - a restriction  whose  validity  may be roughly  checked  by plotting  the fitted
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Catevorical funxl1bility  in Indonesia
Coefficient on
Change in  Sector aid  Other aid  Toa ad  Ratio
- R  . - - ~~~~~~aid
- 0  :-  - - - ~~~  ~~~~(1)  (2)  C3)  (4)  m(4}()
Agriculture  0.10  0.09  0.05  0.13  1.41
Industry  0.46  0.37  0.08  0.44  0.97
Transport  0,21  0.18  0.02  0.20  0.96
and tourism
Socia  . 0.10  0.07  0.12  0.19  1.86
sectors
Other  0.14  0.18  0.27  0.45  3.23
-Current  0.00  n.a.  n.a.  0.17  .n.
expenditure
Total  1.00  0.88  -0.53  1.58  1.58
-Revenue  0.00  -0.29
-Source: Pack and Pack (1990)
CateoricaI funibility  in Kena-  .-
Coefficient:on
hange-m -i  Sector aidL  -ther  -aid  Total ad  -Ratio
-:~~~~~~~~~~id
:  Agriculture  0.18  0.11  4-.10  -019  1.-0
Industry  - 033  - 0.05  -0.18  -0.21  0.63
Public  0.15  0.07-  0.09  0.31  2.04
-works
Social  0.22  -0.02  0.01  ---.22  0.97.
sectors
O- .e-r  -0.11  0-X--t  -- 0  :  --- O  .00.  A.00  0.  0.98
:::C:urrent  - :  -0.00  - .a.  n.a.  . 0.06  na.
expenditure
Total:  1.00--  0.22-  -0.18  098  0.98
Revenue  -- 0.60  -:0;4
Source: Ekman  -and Metell f(1993)
versus actual values  but which is left implicit by Pack and Pack's methodology. A better
approach would be to incorporate the restriction into the model and estimate by three stage least
squares.11 This approach is laid out more filly below.
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probably  insignificantly)  less than  one - so that they  conclude  that  aid causes  a slight  reduction  in
non-aid  financed  expenditure. In fact, we cannot  be sure about  this statement. If the budget
constraint  they  give is correct  then  expenditure  in the excluded  sectors  must fall in the face of the
aid inflow, since  the increase  in expenditure  in other  sectors  plus the fall in revenues  is slightly
greater  than one. But the budget  constraint  is written  excluding  borrowing  (printing  money)  -
Pack and Pack state  that in Indonesia  budgets  have  been  balanced,  but the topic  is not mentioned
in the Kenyan  study."  The observed  decrease  may be accommodated  by a fall in borrowing  -
but borrowing  also may  have  risen to allow  a further  rise in expenditure  in the excluded  sectors:
we simply  cannot  say.  But we can  say that inappropriate  imposition  of a balanced  budget  budget
constraint  assumes  that aid has no effect  on public  savings,  when  this effect is one of the key
issues  under  examination.
Therefore  one modification  to the approach  should  be to include  borrowing  in the budget
constraint  (which  may  take the value of zero if there is none). Second,  as explained,  the rationale
for excluding  certain  sectors  is unclear. It would  be preferable  to include  all sectors.
Gupta's (1993b)  study  of India  both includes  the full budget  constraint  (although  the
treatment  of non-project  aid is unclear)  and does not exclude  any sectors. in his model,  however,
borrowing  is determined  as a residual,  so that same  comments  as before  apply. The results sbow
an increase  in development  expenditure  which  is almost  identical  with  the aid flow, but also an
increase  in non-developmental  expenditures,  almost  entirely  financed  by increased  borrowing.
These results  are difficult  to understand:  we find neither  fungbility between  developmental  and
non-developmental  expenditures,  nor that aid crowds  in government  developmental  expenditures.
Why should  the govermnent  borrowing  to finance  defence  be considered  a response  to the aid
inflow  when the aid cannot  in any sense be being  said to be being  used for the defence
expenditures?
The approach  described  here is only a partial one for reasons  already  discussed. The
expenditure  equationrs  include  GDP as a regressor,  hence  holding  income  constant  rather than
allowing  for multiplier  effects. To the extent  that aid does increase  GDP  the fill effect  of aid on
expenditure  is being  under-stated.  To capture  the full effect  of the aid inflow  requires  estimation
of an economy-wide  model.
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Categorical fungibity  in India
Coefficient on
Change  Sector aid  Other aid  Total  Ratio
in aid  (3)  aid  (4)1(l)
(1)  (2)  (4)
- - *+  Agriculte  . -- 0.17;  0.07  0.10  0.16  0.94
- . F.oodesubsidies  0.01  -0.00  0.07  0.07  11.76
Ind.u-s-t-:  0.32  -0.07  0.02  0.10  0.30
:  Energy  030  0.13  - 0.04  0  0.55
Transporzand  0  . 0.10  0.01  0.06  0.07  0.86
--,communications
Other  010  'o0.09  0.35  0.44  4.31
- TottE  100  0.36  0-.64  '  1.00  1.00
%  ,k,  e,, ,  ,6 e=  ,  iD.  ..  -730.
__,.O_.  0..  ,  . ...
*  Hiipo  e  -.  0.0  ma.
;~~~oe  . -,f,''.  ._, 
B  or ow n  .::  1.*..*  ..  --  <  7  - ::￿..:  - . . ^=i::-  4  .4  - :.-L 
.- Y'i  ;!W  :,..-  0".  .:  -;-->=
fi  .- p.  (1993  . : '  . -
So far we have discussed the results of these studies as regard to aggregate fungibility.
Analysis of the sectoral effects shows that sectoral expenditure increases by nearly or more than
the value of aid allocated to that sector in all but one case (industry in Kenya).  However, only in
one case (other for Indonesia) is the increase attributable to sector-specific aid as large as the
increase targeted at that sectr.  ln the odier cases the remainder (which is as often as not the
larger part) comes from other aid.  These results are evidence of categorical fimgibility.  First,
because sector aid is apparently  not fully used in that sector and, second, because other aid
increases sectoral expenditure. But some of the increase must, at least in the Indonesian case,
come from higher revenue.  It is curious that a revenue term is not included in the expenditure
regressions.  Use of the fidl simultaneous model, incorporating  the budget constraint, as suggested
58above, would  take  care of this problem.
Holmqvist's  analysis  of the impact  of education  aid on educational  expenditure  using  cross
section  data, already  discussed  in Chapter  2, is an alternative,  approach  to categorical  fungibility.
We have  already  expressed  reservations  about  cross  section  analysis. 'These  doubts  aside, his
simple  methodology  is intuitively  appealing. However,  as demonstrated  in Chapter  2, his
particular  results  are determined  by a single  observation.
Simultaneous  equation models
The argument  of this report is that  broad-based  analysis  using cross-section  data of very
general  relationships  should  be replaced  by more  careful  analysis  of time series  data of more
detailed  channels  through  which  aid may  affect  macroeconomic  aggregates. It is also argued  that
such work should  usually  be conducted  in the context  of simultaneous  economic  models,  to
capture  the full range  aid's effects.
Some  object  to econometric  models  using developing  country  data, as the data  are not
deemed  sufficiently  good  for such analysis. Poor data quality  is, however,  a more  convincing
argument  against  cross-section  analysis,  since  the researcher  is more likely  to be using  numbers
pulled  out of a database  and about  which  they  have  little knowledge  (changes  in definition,  lack of
comparability  between  countries,  and, most of all, inadequacies  in the data). Analysis  of a single
country  allows  greater  famiiarity with these  issues.
there are a few multi  equation  models  of aid impact  which  may  be mentioned  (in addition
to the two CGE models  mentioned  above  in the discussion  of aid and exports). Hill (1988)
presents  a twenty-two  equation  output-driven  model  of Bangladesh,  which  disaggregates  the
government  and agricultural  sectors:  a halving  of aid flows  is shown  to lead  to a drop in GDP  of
between 5.9 and 11.8 per cent.  White's (1992d) eleven equation model of Sri Lanka focuses on
investment,  but is set in the context  of a demand-determined  macroeconomic  model. A reduction
in aid is shown  to reduce  both public  and private  investment  and lead  to a fall in GDP  of about
twice  the value of the aid reduction. Radelet  (1993)  presents  a CGE  - the results  from which  are
discussed  in Chapter  4-  to analyse  if Gambias economic  growth  comes  from rain, aid or policy
reform. Ahiuwalia's  (1979)  model  of India  - discussed  in Chapter  5 - alows for the incorporation
of possible  disincentive  effet  from aid.  These models  provide  a useful  basis for further  work.
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3.6  The EMciency  of Investment
Chenery  and Strout's (1966)  two gap model  assumed  the ICOR in their two gap model  to be
constant. Griffin (1970)  questioned  this assumption,  asserting  aid-financed  investment  to be less
productive  than  that financed  from domestic  resources. Since  he also argued  that aid displaced
domestically-financed  investment,  the average  productivity  of investment  will fal  with  the aid
inflow. 2 "
Defenders  of aid may argue  to the contrary  that aid increases  the productivity  of
investment  dtrough  the provision  of technical  assistance  or enhancing  the transfer  of technology.
The microeconomic  evidence  on these  issues  is necessarily  mixed  since  there are both good and
bad aid projects. Unfortunately  no theoretical  or empirical  work  has explored  these issues  at the
macroeconomic  level (except  a couple  of attempts  to regress  the ICOR  on aid - Voivodas,  1973;
and  Rana, 1987). The development  of such analysis  should  be high  on the list of any research
agenda on aid issues.
3.7  Aid Dependence
The concept  of aid dependence  has long been  evoked  by critics  of aid, who imply  that aid allows
foreign  interference  in domestic  political  and social  development.  Such  a concern,  which  we do
not say is unfounded,  is not the one pursued  here.  Instead  we define  aid dependence  with
refrence to the two gap model  (see Mutasa  and White  (1993)  for a fuller exposition).
Chenery  and Strout's (1966)  approach  was to set a growth  target  and hence, given  the
model  parameters,  determine  the savings  and trade  gaps.  The amount  of aid required  is that to fill
the larger of the two gaps. If either  gap is positive  then aid is required  to attain  the target growth
rate.  Most important  is if the gaps are closing  or widening. If they  are not then, in the absence
of further  structural  change,  the country  will need  to receive  aid indefinitely  to maintain  growth.
It is this situation  - when the gaps are not closing  - that we define  as one of aid dependence:  the
country  will always  need  aid.  A related  topic of interest  is the extent  to which  aid is helping
remove  (or reinforce)  this position.
This definition  of aid dependence  differs  from that implicit  in much  of the original  two
gap literature,  where  the term was used to describe  a situation  in which  aid was needed  to attain
the target  growth  rate.
60Mutasa  and White's study of Tanzania  shows  that  the country  is aid dependent,  since  the
conditions  are not satisfied. Further structural  change  will be required  before  the economy  will be
on a path  toward  self-sustaining  growth. Doriye and  Wuyts  (1993)  and Doriye  et al. (1993)  show
how project  aid maty  have  been partly responsible  for this situation  as aid-generated  demand  led to
an expansion  of food production  at the expense  of the export  sector.
3.8  Other Relevant ULteature
There are two academic  literatures  closely  related  to that of the macroeconomics  of aid: these are
aid requirements  studies  and global  modelling  of financial  flows. From  the point  of view  of this
report the interesting  question  is: does the literature  on these  different  aspects  contain  insights  on
aid's macroeconomic  impact  not in the literature  already  reviewed? The converse  question  is of
more general  interet: does  modelling  of aid's macroeconomic  impact  in these  models  reflect
current thinking  on the macroeconomics  of aid?
The Aid Requirement. Lierature
Chenery  and Strout's  seminal  1966  paper  in American  Economic  Review  grew out of work
they had done for USAJI)  on the capital  requirements  of LDCs. They combined  two existing
approaches  to estimating  capital  requiremnents  - those  based  on the savings  gap and those  using the
foreign  exchange  gap.  Th-us  the idea of calculating  the aid required  to fill a gap had been  around
for some  time and remains  in use to this day.'
Rtecent  academic  contributions  to this approach  are Fishlow  (1987)  and Lensink  and van
Bergeijk  (1991).  Tle later determines  capital  needs  through  a Harrod-Domar  equation  and
various  exogenous  projections  concerning  debt  and other inflows. By conitrast,  Fishlow's  model  is
based  on import  requirements. But  the important  point  to note  is tha none of these  exercises
allow  for any kind of fungibility,  the analysis  of which  has dominated  the aid literature.
It is this discrepanicy  that underlies  the contrast  between  the quotes  with which  we opened
this chapter. The World Bank's  forecasts  of requirements  are also a "gap  filling"  exercise,  with
very little, if any, ateion  paid to the actua macroeconomic  impact of aid in the recipient
country.
61Modelling Macroeconomic  Imipact  of Financial Flows at rthe  Global Level
Modelling aid impact at the national level, no mater  how sophisticated, can be condemned
as a partial  approach  as it does  not allow  for global  feedback  effects. The case made  by the
Brandt  Commission  in the early 1980s  for a massive  increase  in resource  transfers  to LDCs was
based  on a simple  'global Keynesianism"  (aid would  feedback  to the donor in the form of higher
demand  for its exports)  - as Brandt  said it is no good to say you are alright  because  it is the other
end of the boat which  is sinking.
Global  macroeconomic  modelling  is a relatively  new  field - the pioneering  Project  LINK
model  was launched  in 1968. Of the global  models  developed  since the 1970s,  those  of particular
interest  here are those  concerned  with (i) tie North-South  income  gap; (ii) the evolution  of the
foreign  debt  situation;  and (iii)  the transmission  of macroeconomic  shocks  from industrial
countries  to LDCs.
In global  models,  developing  regions  are generally  represented  by a finance  constraint
current  account  equation.  An inflow  of external  finance  increases  import  capacity,  and, assuming
that additional  imports  are capital  goods, increases  investment  - that is, a common  assumption  is
that aid (or other capital  flows)  allow  a one-for-one  increase  in both imports  and investment.
There is no fungibility. Hence,  with the assumption  that  all external  finance  is used efficiently,
inflows  contribute  to growth. We  see below  that not all global  models  are this simple.
Many models  do not make a distinction  between  private  flows  and ODA,  usually  treating
total external  finance  as commercial  loans. In other models  the supply  of ODA - usually  a fixed
proportion  of GDP in industrial  countries  - is different  from the supply  of privati external  flows,
but the mechanisms  through  which  ODA  and private  flows  affect  the economy  are the same. In
some  models  ODA is assumed  to go to the public  sector  of the receiving  economy,  which  behaves
differently  from the private  sector, receiving  only private  flows.
Here we discuss  four  global  models  (the World  Model,  the FUGI model,  STAC  and a
model  due to Lensink),  focusing  on the mechanisms  through  which  aid affects  growth  in the
receiving  economy.  To repeat,  the crucial  question  is: are there things  to be learned  from aid in
global  models  that cannot  be learned  from analysis  at the national  level? (Or is the modelling  of
the aid-growth  relation  too simple  in global  models,  and is global  modelling  lagging  behind  recent
developments  in the aid-growth  literature?).
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The World  Model,  first described  in Leontief  et rI. (1977),  is an interregional  input-output
*  0  imodel  of the world economy.  The model  was constructed  for dhe  study of development  in relation
to environmental  questions.  However,  the model  is a general-purpose  economic  model  and is thus
applicable  to the analysis  of the world economy  from other points  of view (Leontief,  1977:  2).
The model  projections  are mostly  produced  with fixed  income  targets, and determine  the
levels  of employment,  rates of investment  and international  transfers  required  to achieve  these
targets  irrespective  of the economic  and institutional  forces  that affect  these instruments  of growth.
In the scenario  which  treats income  levels  as dependent  variables,  the future growth  of LDCs is
determined  either  by the projected  rates  of domestic  savings  supplemented  by the funds  coming
from abroad  or by foreign  exchange  constraints  - operating  through  the balance  of payments  -
which  would  limit  the imports  of raw materials  and  capital  goods  that these  countries  cannot  yet
produce  themselves  (Leontief  1977:  28).
Another  example  of scenario  analysis  through  a world  model  is found in Lensink  (1993).
The model  is constructed  with four objectives:  (i) to forecast  LDCs' economic  performance  in the
1990s;  ji) to assess  the contribution  of an increase  in ODA to LDCs;  and (iii)  to investigate  the
impact  of higher growth  rates in industrial  countries  on LDCs' economic  growth.  A central
feature  of the analysis  is the foreign  exchange  constraint,  and, for LDCs, the emphasis  is on
intermediate  imports.  Potential  production  is partially  determined  by ODA through  imports.  ODA
is a fixed  percentage  of C;DP  in industrialised  countries. Total  capital  flows  from official
creditors  are exogenously  distributed  over the different  regions  (by a fixed  percentage).  In the
ODA  scenario,  ODA  donations  gradually  increase  to a level of 0.7% of GDP of industrial
countries  in the year 2000 - the simulation  shows  that only growth  rates of Sub-Saharan  Africa  are
substantially  increased;  in other  developing  regions  the ODA to GDP ratio in the baseline  is too
low for ODA to have a strong  impact  on growth.  In Sub-Saharan  Africa  the foreign  constraint  is
eased, resulting  in a rise in intermediate  imports  and hence  potential  production.  The growth
stimulating  effects  of ODA are strongest  in the first five  years of the simulation  period. The
model  also allows  for Dutch  disease  effects  as the increase  in ODA  stinmlates  inflation  and hence
reduces  exports (since  exchange  rate adjustment  is sluggish). Thus  the increase  in ODA is partly
counteracted  by a decrease  in ioreign  exchange  due to lower  exports.
63The FUGI model  not only  distinguishes  between  official  and private  creditors,  but also has
a public-private  disaggregation  at the receiving  end. There  are in fact  three  different,  loosely
interrelated  models:  (i) a global  macroeconomic  model;  (ii) a static  global  input-output  model;  and
(iii)  a set of global  metal  resource  models.  The macroeconomic  model  represents  a system  of
regional  submodels,  witch  are linked  through  trade, ODA and  private  overseas  investment  (Kaya
et at., 1983).  The level of ODA  from the donor  nation  is determined  by its GDP  - the individual
country  parameters  allow  either  a rising  trend in the share  of ODA in GDP (the newer  donor
countries),  a declining  trend (the US), or essentially  no trend (Japan). Each  country's  bilateral  aid
is allocated  across  recipients,  with shares  either  reflecting  the most  recent  allocation,  or the
developing  country's individual  allocation  summed  across  all donors.  Productive  potential  in
developing  countries  is determined  by the capital  stock, recent  past investment,  the real oil price,
government  expenditure  on education  and ODA. Since  ODA is usually  provided  as an inter-
official  grant or loan, its first effect  is to increase  the financial  resources  available  to the recipient
goverment, relaxing  the budgetary  constraint  on public  expenditure.  The receipt  of ODA
influences  the recipient  country  through:  (i) an increase  in government  expenditure  which  adds to
the capital  stock  of the economy;  (ii) an increase  in foreign  exchange  earnings,  increasing  the
capacity  to import,  which  adds  to private  sector  investment;  and (iii)  an increase  capacity  to
import  which  allows  increased  exports  from trading  partners,  with macroeconomic  repercussions
which  will ripple  at least in principle  back  to the aid recipient  (Gregory,  1991:  11).
The purpose  of the World  Bank  Global  Economic  Model  is to develop  a fully  linked  (with
trade and financial  flows)  model  of the world  economy  that incorporates  small  macro-models  of
growth  and adjustment  for 100  LDCs.  The individual  LDC receives  a fixed  share  of credit  from
official  concessional  funds, which  follows  the growth  of incomes  in OECD  countries.  Limited
supplies  of external  finance  places  a constraint  on the country's  ability  to import  capital  goods,
hence,  constraining  the growth  of investnent  leading  to slow  growth  of output  over the medium
term (Petersen  et at., 1991:  25). Countries  with  limited  supply  of external  finance  are classified  as
supply-constrained.  Middle-income  countries  generally  enjoy  access  to international  capital
markets  unless  their creditworthiness  is marred  by a debt overhang.  With  a few exceptions,  low-
income  countries  have  little access  to international  capital  markets,  relying  almost  exclusively  on
ODA;  some  countries  are not supply-constrained  because  they  are able  to get large chunks  of
ODA (Petersen  et al., 1991:  26).
The STAC  model  (Vos, 1991)  is a structuralist  North-South  model, incorporating  aid
64flows and the commercial  loan  market  developed  to study global  macroeconomic  interactions
between  North and South.  In the STAC  model,  output  will increase  with public  investment  on the
assumptions  that inadequate infrastructure forms a bottleneck in production. Aid flows finance
public  sector  investment  (ess resources  needed  to finance  current  expenditures,  which  are
endogenous  with terms  of trade) . A larger public  sector wage  bill will decrease  available  funds
for public  investment,  assuming  aid funds  may  be fungible  (Vos, 1991: 153  and 166).  The growth
rate in the South  is determined  by: (i) the growth  rate of the North; (ii) Northern  government
debt; (iii) capital  stocks  in North  and South,  (iv)  world interest  rate; (v) aid flows;  (vi) public
sector  employment  South.  There is a direct  (positive)  effect  from aid-financed  public  investment.
There are indirect  effects  which  depend  on the way the aid transfer  is financed  in the North.  The
STAC model  provides  theoretical  explanation  for the often  hypothesized  negative  relationship
between  foreign  aid and domestic  savings  (Vos, 1991: 167-170).?
We see that  many  models  capture  aid's main impact  as relaxing  a foreign  exchange
constraint  which  has been  binding  investment  or capacity  utilisation. The fonner view is that of
the two gap model,  whereas  the role of aid in supplying  intermediates  goods  has been  only little
analyzed  in the aid- macroeconomic  literature. The models  also contain  disaggregations  of the
public  and  private response  that  much of the aid literature  has ignored. The model  of Lensink  has
endogenous  prices, thus allowing  for Dutch  disease  effects,  but this is not a general  feature  of
these  models. And more  generally,  the possibilities  for fungibility  are not captured  in any depth
by the global  models.'  In conclusion,  there is scope  for cross-fertilisation  between  the two
literatures.
3.9  Snimary
The literature  on the macroeconomic  effects  of aid has been almost  entirely  from a modelling
perspective  - usually  single  equation  - and with  an emphasis  on empirical  estimation  at the expense
of theoretical  consideration.  One of the largest  areas  - regressions  of growth  on aid - are argued
here to be uninformative,  and should  be discarded  as a tool of analysis.
The main  requirement  is for more careful  work that  requires  further  disaggregation  of
both dependent  and independent  variables. More  thorough  theoretical  analyzes  of how  aid affects
private  savings  and investment  are required. Theoretical  discussion  should  be informed  by, and
empirical  work  use, the breakdown  of aid by finctional  categories  (project  aid, programme  aid
and technical  assistance).
65The single  equation  approach  is incapable  of capturing  all the channels  through  which  aid
ffircts  the macroeconomy  - a simultaneous  model  is required. Hence  work  should  proceed  on a
country-specific  level (a recommendation  much  made and little  heeded  in the literature). The
accounting  framework  presented  in Part 3.3 is the basis for such a model:  but good theory  and
estimation  are required  to provide  the behavioral  relationships  to fit in such model. Additionally,
modes will provide  the basis for separate  analysis  of aid monies  and aid supported  policies. The
latter  of L"-e is the subject  of Chapter  4.
66Note to Chapter  3
1.  For reviews  of such studies  see Riddell  (1987),  Michalopoulos  et al. (1989)  and White
(1992b).
2.  The argument  of this part of the report is given in more  detail  in White  (1992b  and
1992d).
3.  In practice  there will also be an errors and omissions  term  on the capital  account.
4.  By the UN's System of National Accounts (SNA) grant aid intended for investment
purposes  should  appear  in the capital  account  as capital  grants. Some  economists  dispute
this method,  arguing  that  only inflows  carrying  with them a repayment  obligation  should
appear  in the capital  account. And in practice  most countries  do not follow  the SNA
recommendation  but instead  record  all grant aid (that intended  for both consumption  and
investment)  as an official  transfer. Although  transfers  are a current  account  item it is a
common  practice  to treat OT as an 'intermediary  item"  and report  the current account
with  and without  official  transfers. Such a practice  is commonly  adopted  by the World
Bank  and IMF and has important  implications  for the macroeconomic  analysis  of countries
with high aid inflows.
5.  That is, net of amortization  payments  on past aid.  The various  definitions  of aid flows are
discussed  below.
6.  And  this point  has been almost  entirely  overlooked  in the academic  literature. One
exception  is Lele and Agarwal's  (1990)  observation  that the tying of aid to India  in the
1960s  meant  thar aid was of no help in relieving  the balance  of payments  problems.
7.  The three 'Comments"  published  a year after Griffin's  paper  (by Eshag, Kennedy  and
Thirlwall,  and Stewart)  have been  unjustly  ignored  in the subsequent  literature.
8.  In accordance  with the above  argument  YO+A-C,  is gross  national  savings  plus aid on
capital  account.
9.  The discussion  of the fiscal  respopse  model  in this report draws  heavily  on White  (1994a).
10.  This specification  had already  been  used by Mosley  et al. (1987)  in their application  of the
fiscal  response  model. But these authors  did make explain  their reasons  for preferring  this
functional  form. Although  the target  values are the optimal  ones the model  does  not have
an asymmetry  that is desirable  in such a function. As Gang (1993)  points  out,
overshooting  the target  for a variable  such as government  investnent  should  be less
heavily  penalized  than undershooting.
11.  Pack and Pack (i990) state  that the Indonesian  government,  on the other hand, has
maintained  balanced  budgets  over the period of their study.
12.  It may  be more, but not entirely,  credible  to argue  that foreign  borrowing  is not used  to
finance  recurrent  expenditure  - but this assumption  is not made.
13.  Attempts  to derive  the implicit  as from Gang  and Khan's results  show  them  to be
calculable  from different  expressions,  but that the numbers  thus derived  are inconsistent.
For a demonstration of this point with respect to the results reported in Khan and Hoshino
67(1992)  see McGillivray  (1993).
14.  For a more  formal  demonstration  of this point  see White  (1992b).
15.  Mosley  et  al. also solve  the model  incorrectly,  leaving  the endogenous  variable,  taxes, in
the reduced  form. The correct  solution  is given  in White  (1992a).
16.  Stewart  (1970)  puinted  out that multiplier  effects  from aid may raise import  demand  over
and above  the value  of the aid inflow  - the consumption  function  used  here implicitly
allows  for such  an effect. The simple  investment  function  may  be viewed  as a reduced
form incorporating  direct  effects  and crowding  in/out (see  White  and McGillivray,  1992).
17.  Akrasanee's  (1990)  discussion  of aid to Thailand  argues  that, although  relatively  small in
macro  terms, aid has had a large  effect  on growth  because  of its concentration  on
infrastructure. (By  contrast,  Handoussa  (1990)  says  that in the case of Egypt  aid's focus
on infrastructure  meant  that it did not affect  the agricultural  and industrial  sectors).
18.  The form that  donors  file to the DAC  for their database  would  allow  this functional
dassification  to be at least  partly achieved,  but  DAC  do not report  any data in thAis  form
(other  than for separating  out technical  assistance).
19.  Whilst  the approach  suggested  here is intuitively  appealing  it may  well render  the model
inestimable. If actual  aid flows  are close  to expected  then  there will be extreme
multicoliinearity  when  attempting  to estimate  reduced  forn equations  (as is required  for
the 3SLS  approach  used in the literature):  if expected  aid flows  equal actual  then there
will be perfect  multicollinearity.  It may  therefore  not be possible  to estimate  the reduced
form since  the matrix  of regressors  may be singular  or near  singular.
20.  The restrictions  imposed  by Gupta  are tighter  than  those  in the model  estimated  by Gang
and Khan  since  he also ensures  that  unique  estimates  of the utility  function  coefficients
may be derived. However,  Gupta  misinterprets  his results;  saying  that the restrictions
must be imposed  in order to get 'consistent"  parameter  estimates. The correct
interpretation  is that  the model  is misspecified  and that an alternative  model  should  be
sought.
21.  A recent  paper by Pack and Pack (1993)  presents  the same analysis  for Dominican
Republic.
22.  Doriye  and Wuyts  (1992)  make  a similar  argument  in the case  of Tanzania.
23.  It is not clear  why Pack and Pack excluded  one equatior.  from their system. If all
equations  are included  then  the cross-equation  restriction  most likely  will not hold unless  it
is specified  in the system  prior to estmation:  3SLS allows  the imposition  of the
restriction.
24.  The budget  constraint  also excludes  non-project  aid, which  should  be added.
25.  If the two effects  are sufficiendy  strong  aid amy  therefore  have an adverse  impact  on
growth.
26.  For a more  detailed  review  of the early litature  see White  and Woestan  (1993).
6827.  A number  of other  studies  were reviewed  in the preparation  of this  report, but are not
discussed  in detail  here  since  they  add little  over the points  discussed  thus  far.  These
models  include  OECD's  INTERLINK  DEMOD  (for Latin  America)  (Dittus  1990:  18-19)
and  that of Vines  and AMlen  (1992).
28.  INTERLINK,  mentioned  in the previous  note,  allows  for reserve  accumulation  out of
increased  inflows.
69CHAPlER 4
MACROECONOMIC  EFFECTS OF AID-SUPPORTED  POLICY REFORM
4.1  Introduction
The conclusions  to a recent  volume  on the role of capital  inflows  is development  (Lele  and Nabi,
1990a)  deliberately  avoided  quantifying  the contribution  of these  flows  to growth. The reason
given  was that the country  case studies  showed  domestic  policies  to be the primay determinant  of
a country's  development  (Lele  and Nabi, 1990b)  - the role of government,  aid and policies  is too
complex  to disentangle.  Whilst  not agreeing  that we should  not at least  try to answer  the question
"can aid work without  reform7?'`  it is undoubtedly  true that policy  stance  is a vita]  factor in
macroeconomic  perfbrmance.  In this chapter  issues  concerning  the assessment  of the impact  of
aid-supported  policy  reforms  are discussed.
The first analyses  of policy  conditionality  (e.g. Killick,  1984)  focussed  on IMP
stabilisation  programs  and were critical  of the excessive  emphasis  on demand  restraint  to restore
balance  of payments  equilibrium.  In more recent  years  the study  of World  Bank  adjustment
programs  has led to a slightly  more  positive  consensus. Most  studies  find the investment  rate to
suffer  as a result  of adjustment  policies  (e.g. Mosley  eta!.,  1991;  World  Bank, 1988, 1990  and
1992). The effect  on growth,  however,  is usually  positive  - but often  weakly  (and  often also
insignificantly)  so (e.g. Mosley  et al., 1991;  World  Bank, 1988  and 1990  - but not 1992,  which
reports  a significant  positive  impact). The effect  on the balance  of payments  is negative  (Mosley
et al,  1991;  World  Bank 1988)  - largely  because  of the import  surge following  trade liberalization
and the weak  or slow supply  response  of exports  (World  Bank, 1990  - again  the 1992  report finds
a stronger  export  response). 2 However,  there  are a number  of methodological  issues  that need to
be addressed  before  these  findings  may  be accepted.
For aid-supported  policy  reforms  to have a beneficial  impact  on a country's  economic
performance,  two conditions  must be satisfied. First, the donor  presence  must make  a difference
to the reforms  that are implemented.  Does  the presence  of aid donors  make  for better policies  or
does  aid, as critics  maintain,  allow  recipient  governments  to pursue  unsustainable  and misguided
policies? Second,  the reforms  that do take place  must  have a positive  impact  on performance.
These  two issues  are analytically  distinct.
70If the reforms  would  have  gone ahead  even in the absence  of the aid we may  still be
interested  to learn the economic  impact  of such  reforms  (since  they  are the types  of policy  which
donors  support)  - but the impact  of the reforms  cannot  be directly  attributed  to the aid.  It is
therefore  important  to address  the two questions  separately,  as we do in Parts 4.2 and 4.3
respectively.  Part 4.4 draws  out the implications  of this chapter's  discussion  for futrther  research
on aid effectiveness.
4.2  Does Aid Affect Policy?
The World  Bank's reviews  of adjustment  lending  (1988, 1990  and 1992)  have  reported indicators
of "compliance"  - that is the extent  to which  countries  have  actually  implemented  the reforms
outlined  in the various  agreements  relating  to adjustment  loans.
Mosley  et al. (1991  Volume  1: 134-145)  argue  that these  compliance  measures  do not
give an accurate  picture  of the extent  of reform  since some  measures  are very easy to implement
whereas  others may prove  impossible  to do so because  of either  poor design  or changes  in the
external  environment.  If our concern  is to trace causation  from aid to policy  to performance  we
must  take their argument  very seriously:  compliance  simply  is not a measure  of the degree  of
reform, and so is not a suitable  variable  to use in such  analysis. There are two  problems  here.
Since  complilance  measures  cannot  tell us the extent  of actual  changes  which  have  occurred  they
cannot  tell us how  much  reform  aid has really  supported. Second,  these  indicators  are therefore
not the appropriate  variable  for analyzing  the macroeconomic  impact  of reform. This litter point
is returned  to in Part 4.3.
Furthermore,  compliance  indices  are a form of before versus  after approach  - all changes.
in policy  since  the star-t  of adjustment  borrowing  are attributed  to that borrowing. No attempt  is
made  to determine  the piolicies  that would  have occurred  in the absence  of the adjustment  loan.
As argued  in Chapter  2, before  versus  after is not a satisfactory  method  for determining  causality.
But a more serious  underlying  problem  is that the presence  of a program  is fl  the
relevant  exogenous  variable,  it is the p.olicies  which  are themselves  pursued  - this point was partly
recognized  in the World  Bank's (1992)  third report  on adjustment  lending,  which  suggested  that
the analysis  of the impact  of adjustment  borrowing  should  consider  the change  policies  rather than
the presence  or not of adjustment  borrowing. This suggestion  has been  followed  up in an intrnal
review  of the adjustment  experience  in sub-Saharan  Africa [tis  publication  is not yet in the public
71domain].  In the Bank report a macro policy performance indicator' is constructed which is a
composite of measures of exchange rate policy, fiscal stance and monetary restraint for twenty
seven countries.  The changes in performance between the periods 1981-86 and 1987-91  are then
calculated.
This approach is an improvement over the compliance approach as a variable is defined to
capture the degree of policy reform.  But the methodology remains before versus after.  No
attempt is made to analyze whether or not the reforms would have occurred in the absence of the
reforns.  To answer such a question requires a model of the reform process.  The modified
control group appro-ch is one simple way of modelling  what policy would have been in the
absence of the program - but no studies applying this approach have reported this aspect of their
findings.
Judgements on likely policy scenarios in the absence of the adjustment  program are
probably best made by more in-depth analysis of the political economy of decision making in the
country in question. For example, in the Tanzanian case, it is likely that the government would
have attempted reform without donor support (indeed it had been doing so during the period of
dispute with the IMF).  But it is questionable  whether these reforms would have been either
politically or economically  sustainable in the absence of the aid money.
The Tanzanian example illustrates a second point - the role of aid in hindering or
supporting policy reform can change markedly over time.  Many would today identify the support
given to Tanzania's villagisation program in the 1970s as a prime example of how aid has
supported detrimental levels of state intervention. Import support received by Tanzania during the
1980s was often allocated to parastatals, reinforcing rather than restructuring the industrial sector.
However, as indicated in the previous paragraph, the aid donors have probably has a positive
impact on the reform process in the 1990s.
To repeat: a final decision on the aid-policy relationship  can only come from case studies
of actual cases, with comparative analysis to draw out overall lessons.  I am not aware that such
work has been undertaken on a systematic basis: though the review by Caisen et al. (1986:
Chapter 8) concludes that in general aid has been more beneficial to private sector development
than harmful (we return to this point in the next chapter).  Finally, the more technical issue of
whether reforms which have short-rmn  adverse impacts are sustainable without additional financial
72flows  can in principle  be analyzed  througi'  models  of how  policy  changes  affect  the economy.
Such  models  are the subject  of Part 4.3.
4.3  Modelling  the Macroeconomic  Impact or Policy Changes
As discussed  in Chapter  2, the before  versus  after and control  group  approaches  are much  used in
the analysis  of the macroeconomic  impact  of adjusunent  policies. For the reasons  discussed  there,
we do not pursue  such studies  here but concentrate  on the modelling  approach. Rather  than
present  a whole  range  of models  some  key conceptual  issues  are discussed:  (i) distinguishing
adjustment  policies  from adjustmentper  se;  (ii) measuring  adjustment  policies;  and (iii) the use of
dummy  variables  to model  structural  change;  and (iv) dynamic  aspects  of some results. A brief
discussion  of some  of the key relationships  follows.
Disinguidring  adjustmentfrom  adjustment  polices
The term "adjustment"  is used to refer  to two, quite  distinct,  phenomena. All agree  on
this distinction,  but it is not always  clearly  made,  and  this failure  to distinguish  results in
confusion.
The extrnal environment  facing  an economy  is constantly  changing. In the early 1980s
these changes  were large, abrupt  and mostly  unpleasant. Economies  automatically  respond  to
such changes  through  a variety  of price and quantity  adjustments  - this I call automatic
adinatnrnt.  Such  automatic  adjustment  may well  put the economy  on a low  growth  path, so that
governments  wish to intervene  in the adjustment  process  to enable  the economy  to grow in the
context  of the changed  environment. Such interventions  are adjustment  policies. As  just
mentioned,  all developing  economies  were  perforce involved  in substantial  automatic  adjustment
during  the 1980s  and nearly  all have responded,  at some  stage  or other, with recourse  to
adjustment  policies.
In both senses  then,  the 1980s  were "a period  of adjustment"  - the term adjustment  here
reflrring to the eighties  and  not specifically  either  automatic  adjustment  or adjustment  policies.
However,  this correct  observation  can lead to anibiguous  statements  such  as the following:
Private investment  has fallen  during  adjustnent  in all cases  - with no sign  of
recovery  by 1988.
(Fitzgerald  and Sarmad, 1990:  41)
73our results  suggest  a sizeable  output  loss because  of lower  aggregate  investment
levels during the period of adjustment  under IMF-WB  lending.
(Faini  ct al.,  1991a: 964)
In both  of these cases  the authors  are refrring nml  to the impact  of adjustment  policies  but
simply  to what  happened  during  the 1980s  - the period  of adjustment.  Whilst  the above  cited
papers a  (reonably)  clear on this point  - they are not laying  the blame  for lower investment  at
the door of adjustment  policies  - the terminology  makes  the statement  ambiguous,  open to
misinterpretation,  and, in the hands (or mouths)  of the less  scrupulous,  simply  incorrect. Others
are quicker  to make  the "sleight  of mind"  whereby  the responsibility  for poorer performance
during  the period  of adjustment  policies  make  this poor  performance  the fault  of those  policies:
indeed  this tendency  is intrinsic  to the before  versus  after  approach,  and  hence  one reason  for
rejeceing  the method.
Our concern  is to examine  how  adjustment  policies  influence  macroeconomic  performance
-that is, to disentangle  this influence  from the automatic adjustment  necessitated  by external  shocks
suffered  by developing  countries  during  the 1980s. In order  to conduct  such  an analysis  we must
have a measure  of adjustment.
Measuring adusbnent
It is common  to model  the impact  of adjustment  by using  an "adjustment  variable"  which
commonly  takes  one of three forms: i) a dummy  variable  which  is one in the presence  of a
program  and zero  otherwise  (e.g. Corbo  and Rojas, 1992);  Cii)  a measure  of the "intensity  of
adjustment',  usually  by a complian  .e index  (e.g. Mosley  et  a.,  1991);  or (iii)  the value of
adjustment  lending  (e.g. Mosley  et aL, 1991). None of these measures  are adequate. The use of
a dummy  variable  to capture  the effects  is flawed  for two reasons:  (i) it does not measure  the
extent  of reform;  and (ii) it does  not allow  fully  aliow  for structal  changes  in behavioral
relationships.  As mentioned  above,  different  programs  require  different  measures  and  so the
extent  of reform  is not indicated  by the existence  or otherwise  of a program. Moreover,  the
degree  of implementation  varies  greatly  between  countries.
This latter  problem  is not resolved  by using a compliance  indicator  since  the first
problem  -that what is there to be complied  with  differs  between  countries  - remains  (and  there is
a second  problem  that different  countries  may  comply  with different  conditions).  Compliance
74simply is not a measure of the extent of reform - although it has been used in this way.  For
example, the third report oun  adjustment lending presents a table of regression results for the
macroeconomic  impact  of adjustment policies "corrected  for implementation"  (World Bank, 1992:
28).  This correction has been applied by 'making the adjustment variable equal to intensity by
the percentage of conditions fully or substandally implemented". The study of Mosley et al.
(1991) includes a compliance indicator as an explanatory  variable, as well as the value of Bank
adjustment  loans and drawings from the IMF.
The second problem with the use of dummy variables is that there may be a structural
break in the slope of behavioral relationships, whereas the use of the dummy allows only for
changes in intercept.  For example, financial market liberalization may make private investment
more responsive to changes in the interest rate as administrative  controls on credit allocation are
relaxed - this change is a rotation, not a shift, of the investment  function. This problem can be
handled by using a slope dummy for the adjusting  countries/period of adjustment  - a solution that
can be less clearly applied if a compliance indicator is being used.  Slope dummies allow for
changes in the nare  of economic relationships rather than just imparting  exogenous shifts to
these functions.  Such allowance is particularly important if the approach adopted is, as
recommended  below, to model policies rather than the presence of a program.
The third measure of adjustment, that is the value of adjustment-related  borrowing, bears
no relation to either the extent of intended reforms or compliance with these intentions.  As
Mosley et al. themselves indicate, lending is little related to compliance.  Nor can the approach be
interpreted as separating out the effects of the aid funds from those of the policies.  As explained,
the compliance indicator is not a good measure of policies.  To measure the effects of aid monies
then all aid, not just adjustment  lending must be included (though, at least initially, as separate
variables).
None of the existing measures of adjustment  therefore seem very satisfactory: but in fact it
does not matter.  There is an analogy here with the literature on the macroeconomic  effects of aid.
Attempts to estimate the aid-growth link direcdy were misplaced - analysis should concentrate on
the channels through which the link is expected to operate. 5 Similarly, we cannot regress macro
performance direcdy on adjustment  programs - we should instead trace and quantify the links
from reform to changes in exogenous (policy) variables to changes in outcomes.
75Thie  importance  of identifi1ng  the policies  through  which  adjustment  lending  has its efflects
carries  over to the usefulness  of the analysis  as a tool  for appraiising  policy. The use of dummies
or comparisons  of adjusting  versus non-adjusting  leaves  the processes  through  which  adjustment
achieves  its results  inside  a black  bbx - which  is of no use In the design  of adjustment  programs.
It is necesary to open the box  to see which  bits  are working  (and which  are not),
Single  equation  models
Single  equation  estimation  has been  a common  approach  in the literature  (e.g. Mosley  et
at., 1991;  Faini  etal.,  1991a;  and Corbo  and Rojas, 1992). All of these  studies  estimate  a
number  of equations  modelling  the behavior  of key macroeconomic  aggregates. All of these
include  on the iright  hand  side (possibly  with  lags) variables  that  ;-se  also used  as dependent
variables.
In the study  of Mosley  et at. this practice  results  in a problem  of simultaneity  bias in their
estimation,  and we would  also expect  a loss in efficiency. Hence  their results, which  contain  very
few significant  relationships,  may  not be relied  upon.
The systems  estimated  by Corbo  and Rojas  (1992)  and Faini et al. (1991)  are not
simultaneous  in the current  period  and so bias does  not result  fr-om  the estimation  procedure. But
the models  do implicitly  contain  different  short and long  ran effe.cts  which  are not discussed. In
the former  study,  the change  in growth,  the investment  and savings  rate and the export  ratio are
regressed  on the lagged  values  of each of these  variables  and three exogenous  regressors:  a shock
variable,  the fiscal  deficit  (which  probably  ought  to be endogenous),  and an adjustment  dummy."
Regressing  the change  on a variable's  own lagged  value  will give  the identical  result  for
all the regression  results  as regressing  the level  of the dependent  variable  on the same  set of
regressors,  except  that  the coefficient  on the lagged  dependent  variable  in the latter  regression  will
be one plus  the coefficient  in the former  regression. Stated  thus, it is clear that in Corbo  and
Rojas' model  adjustment  policies  now  affect  currnt  growth,  investment,  savings  and exports
which  will, in turn, affect  all of these  variables  in the next  period.  The long run effects  may
well  be very different  from  the impact  effects.
The results  from simulations  of tWe  impact  of the introduction  of adjustment  policies  using
the four  equations  reported  bv Corbo  and Rojas  are shown  in Table  4.  1.  The differences  between
76Table  4.1 Short  and  long  run  impact  of  adjustment
policies  on nmacroeonomic  mggregmtes
Impact  Long run  Ratio
effect  effect
Simulations using results of Corbo and Rojas
Change in
growth of GDP  0.016  0.020  1.2
investment  rate  -0.035  -0.035  1.0
savings rate  0.014  0.115  8.2
export ratio  0.065  0.028  0.4
Simulations  using  results  of Faini  et at.
Change  in
.growth  of;GDP  -0.001  -0.016  16.1
investment  rate  -0.006  0.025  4.2
c-urrent-account  (% of GDP)  0.034  0.063  1.9
inflation rate  -- 0.00  -0.001  -0.1
Source: own simulations based on resmuI reported in Corbo and Rojas (192)-and FPni-:d
:a  (1991a).
short and long run effects are, except in the case of investment, marked.  The beneficial impact of
adjustment policies on growth and savings are reinforced, especially  that on the savings rate.  On
the other hand, the positive response of the export rate is more than halved.
The Faini et al. study is similar, except that rather than the savings rate and exports they
have the rate of inflation and current account deficit (as a per cent of GDP) as endogenous
variables.  As shown in Table 4.1, the effect of the dynamic simulations is even more dramatic
using the coefficients  from their study.'  The negadve impact on growth is strongly reinforced so
that the growth rate falls by 1.6 percentage points, rather than only 0.1 percent.  Despite this fact
the impact on all of the other indicators is improved: the adverse impact on the investment  rate
and inflation are both reversed and the long run improvement in the current account is nearly
double the impact effect.
77Reviewing  thc results
This chapter begun by saying that there is something of a consensus over certain key
relationships. But it has been argued here that cross-country regressions are not the best way to
carry out the analysis - rather a country-specific  modelling  approach is required.  Does the
consensus stand up in the face of the evidence to date from such studies? The answer to this
question is "not particularly" - here a range of the factors that need be considered are listed.
(a)  Growth
In Chapter 2 skepticism was expressed over the possibility  of adequately explaining
growth using cross-country analysis. Country-specific  economic models may also be poor
predictors of growth, unless exogenous factors are both included in the model and their time paths
accurately fbrecast.  Nonetheless, such models may still indicate whether certain policies are
"good for growth" (bearing in mind the possibility  that changing external conditions may require
different policies).  The model developed  at the OECD to analyze the impact of adjustment on
poverty (discussed in Chapter 6) has tcnded to find a positive impact of adjustment  on growth
(compared to a base run of the types of external shock typical to developing  countries in the
1980s)  - though purely contractionary  policies (which may be best characterized as stabilization)
do not always have such a favorable impact.
(b  Investment
Investment ratios have undoubtedly  fallen in the 1980s (hence the before-after approach
finds adjustment  to be bad for investment). It is worth remembering that this fall was from a
historical peak in investment  ratios reached by most countries around 1980  - this peak was fuelled
by the excess international  liquidity of the 1970s  and was not necessarily  very productive.
Nonetheless, the apparent failure of adjustment  policies to stimulate private investment  has rightly
been a cause for concern and led to a renewed interest in private investnent in developing
countries.
The conclusion  that can be drawn from this literature is that the determinants  of private
investment  are many, and the actual driving fbrce likely to vary from country to country.  Some
main debates are:
crowding in versus crowding out: some argue that the falls in government investment
associated with adjustment and/or stabilization  are a main cause of declining  private
78investment  (e.g. Taylor, 19S8;  Serven  and Solimano,  1992;  and Mosley, 1992);  others
(e.g. Benjamin,  1992)  assert  the more  conventional  view of crowding  out that government
*  ~~~~expenditure  will increase  recourse  to deficit financing  and therefore  reduce  credit
availability  to the private  sector  (either  through  quantity  rationing  or changes  in the real
interest  rate). The general  decline  in absorption  at the outset  of stabilization  or adjustment
will (often  through  expectationary  mechanisms)  reduce  investment. The issue  is clearly
an empirical  one, and both the type  and financing  of investment  will be important  in
determining  the outcome  in any particular  cuse.
- the role of financial  l  iberalization:  the McKinnon-Shaw  view that liberalizing  interest  rates
will stimulate  investment  (by increasing  savings  availability)  has found  a number  of
critics, for reasons  including  the following  - (i) higher interest  rates alter only the
composition  not the level of savings  (see review  by Fry (1988:  Chapter  6) and argument
by Morisset  (1993)  on.  portfolio  effects  of higher interest  rates); (ii) in a standard
structuralist  model  (e.g. Taylor, 1983)  higher  interest  rates push  up costs  and prices
because  of fixed working  capital  requiremnents,  but do nothing  for investmnent;  and (iii) the
interest  rate may go "too high"  for productive  investors  (Roe, 1982  and Rittenberg,  1991).
- the role of uncertainty  has been  stressed  by several  writers, investors  must be confident
that the reforms  will remain  in place  (the incentive  structure  will not change)  if they are to
invest. This aspect  is one of the most difficult  to model.
- exchange  rate policy  is policy  is a further  important  determinant  of investmnent;  although
there is some  ambiguity,  most channels  (e.g. contractionary  impact  and higher  cost of
capital  goods)  suggest  a reduction  in investmwot  as a result  of a devaluation.
In addition  to these relationships  the possibility  of increaing the efficiency  of investment  (through
financial  liberalization,  removal  of other  administrative  controls  etc.) need  also be considered.
Evidence  from returns  to World  Bank  supported  projects  show  the returns  to be higher in
adjusting  economies  (World  Bank, 1992.:  33).
(c)  The current  account
Rather  than  estimate  the rcsponse  of the current  account  to the ad-option  of an adjustment
program  it is more enlightening  to consider  how imports  and exports  respond  to changes  in
79reladve  prices brought  about  by devaluation,  relaxation  of price and quantity  controls,  changes  in
subsidies  and infrastructural  development/decline.
The flood  of imports  from trade liberalization  has been  one concern  of critics  of
adjustment,  who now  claim that  sub-Saharan  Africa  is undergoing  "deindustrialization"  (e.g.
Stewart,  1991)  - though  the data  on this point are not conclusive  (see Doriye  el al., (1993)  for the
case  of Tanzania), On the positive  side is the possibility  that  the removal  of quantitative  controls
will allow  a more  appropriate  import  mix, but little analysis  has been  done of this issue. Models
should  try and analyze  imports  at least  at the level  of capital,  intermediate  and consumer  goods
since (i) different  policy  regimes  and aid flows  will alter this composition;  and (ii) the import  mix
influences  the import-output  elasticity.
More attention  has been  paid  to the supply  response  of agriculture. Some  cases  (e.g.
cocoa  in Ghana)  seem  to have  been  successful,  whereas  in others  the response  is more  sluggish.
Estimates  of supply  elasticities  are often  low - and even  negative  (see Chhibber,  1989;  and
Binswanger,  1989). This sluggishness  is often  blamed  on: (i) lack  of supporting  infrastructure;
and (ii) incomplete  implementation  of reforms. To cater for (ii) models  should  be sure to use the
real producer price received by farmers (relative to altemnative  cropping opportunities).  Proxies
for (i) are harder to obtain  since  they are very region  specific  and relevant  data (say  on travelling
times  to market)  not  readily  available.
Aid-supported  policies  versus  aid monies
lt has been  argued  several  times  in this report that  good  modelling  can provide  the basis
for separate  analysis  of policy  reforms  and the impact  of aid inflows. One study (Radelet,  1991),
entitled M The  Gambia's  Economic  Recovery:  policy  reforms,  foreign  aid or rain?", explicitly
embraces  this use of a CGE  model. Radelet  reports  that  all three  factors  listed in the title
contributed  to growth  - and, moreover,  that all three together  contribute  more  than the three
individually:
When  simulated  individually,  the effects  from the policy  package  (5.1 per cent),
foreign  aid (4.7 per cent)  and rainfall  (2.9 per cent) account  fbr a total of 12.7  per
cent growth  in GDP. Yet  when  the exact  same  changes  are modelled
simultaneously  from the same  base, output  grows  by 14.9  per cent.
(Radelet,  1991:  34)
80Thus  a combination  of reforms  and aid is superior  to either  one alone. The increased  combined
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effect  (which  Radelet  ascribes  to "synergistic"  effects)  must result  from feedbacks  in production
and cDnsumption,  since  the model  does n~tallow  for changes  in structural  relationships  (for
example,  a stronger  supply  response)  under  the reform  program. Moreover,  the modelling  of aid
is quite  simple  - appearing  in additive  form in the investment  function,  but not affecting  the
government  budget  equations  nor (directly)  import  demand. The model  could  therefore  benefit
from incorporating  further  aspects  of the literature  from the macroeconomic  analysis  of aid.  This
is a theme  which  is returned  to in chapter  6, in which  the impact  of adjustment  on poverty  is
discussed.
4.4  Summary
Aids critics  have  argued  that it can reinforce  the position  of the state and help sustain  misguided
policies. Such  a criticism  seems  somewhat  dated given  the importance  donors  themselves  have
placed  on policy  reform  in the last 15 years. The more relevant  issue  now is the extent  to which
donors  are successful  in having  the policies  they propose  adopted.
Much  of the adjustment  literatur has asked  "what  is the impact  of adopting  an adjustment
program?". This seems  to be the wrong  question  - the right one is "what  effects  do these  polices
have". This is the right question  as we can more reliably  measure  a policy  than a program,  and
because  we want  to know  which  policies  in a program  are good  ones and which  ones not.  We are
therefore  led to adopt  a modelling  approach  - which  should  allow  the separation  of shocks
(including  aid inflows)  from policies. Neglected  aspects  of the models  that  have been  used are: (i)
allowance  for structural  change  as a part of the reform  program,  and (ii) explicit  allowance  for the
effects  of aid in accordance  with the impacts  discussed  in Chapter  3.  The next  chapter
demcustrates  that if this latter  link wer  u  made  then  the link could  also be made  from policy  to
social  welfare.
81Notes  to Chapter 4
1.  This question  being  the motivation  behind  my  formulation  of aid dependence  given in Part
3.7.
2.  In interpreting  results  from the current  account  two points  need also  be borne in mind: (i)
devaluation  from a deficit  position  will  worsen  the deficit  as a per cent  of GDP;  and (ii)
increased  aid supporting  the adjustment  program  will also worsen  the current  account. It
is not clear that all studies  have  allowed  for these  effects.
*:  3.  This indicator  was introduced  in Part 2.3 above  during  the discussion  of econometric
methodology.
4.  It was  noted in Chapter  2 that  the modified  control  group approach  can cater for changes
in the effectiveness  of policies,  but this aspect  has always  been left implicit.
5.  Some  studies  - for example  Doroodian  (1993)  - use both policy  variables  and an intercept
dummy  for the presence  of an adjustment  program. The correct interpretation  of the
results  from such  a regression  are unclear.
6.  The use of both investment  and  savings  rates as regressors  may  well  lead to problems  of
.ulticollinearity  - a possibility  that may  explain  the insignificant  coefficients  on these  two
regssors  in most of the equations.
7.  The regressions  reported  by Corbo  and Rojas  use time periods  of five to ten years - that is
the data are not annual. Long  run effects  would  therefore  take a very long time to run
through  the system. The simulations  are reported  to underline  the importance  of analyzing
all aspects  of a model.
8.  The authors  do not report the constant  term.  We used that from Corbo  and Rojas  where
possible  and  a guesstimate  for the other  equations. The use of an arbitrary  constant  is
unimportant  since  the term drops  out of the results  which  show  the change  between
periods. The reported  inflation  equation  is explosive  (the implicit  coefficient  on the
lagged  dependent  varable is 1.077)  - whilst  such  a coefficient  may  capture  situations  of
hyperinflation  it is not conducive  to a stable  equUlibrium  to analyze  the effects  of policy
experiments!  To conduct  the simulations  the inflation  equation  was "dampened"  by using
instead a coefficient of 0.9.
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THE DISTORTIONARY  IMPACT OF AID)
5.1  Introduction
Aid has four main  types:  project  aid, programmne  aid, commodity  aid (mainly  food  aid) and technical
assistance. We argued  in Part 3.2 that each  different  type of aid may be expected  to have  different
effects  on growth. More generally,  the macroeconomic  effects  of different  types  of aid will differ  -
yet miost  analysis,  including  that presented  in Chapter  3, does  not distinguish  between  types  of aid.
There are,  however, considerable  literatures on each type of  aid,  elements  of  which are of
macroeconomic  relevance.  The previous chapter discussed  the issues surrounding  the use of
programme  aid; in this chapter  debates  over the other  three types  of aid are considered.
Aid is, by definition,  a government  directed activity so that 'he use of aid implies the
possibility  of reinforcing  the role of the state and enabling  state-created  economic  distortions. Peter
Bauer (e.g. 1976)  has persistenty argued  that aid is detrimental  to development  for precisely  these
reasons  - earlier  Friedman  (1  957)  had argued  that  aid  was counter-productive  as a weapon  in the Cold
War since  it was promoting  the 'communization" of the developing  world.
It  is the possibility  that aid may impede market-oriented  development  and/or impose
distortions  to the pattern  of such development  that concerns  us here. The best known  example  of an
aid created  distortion is the "disincentive  efrect', whereby food aid may generate a number of
disincentives  affecting  domestic  agricultural  production.  In Part  5.2 we trace the  evolu-tion  of thinking
on the disincentive  effect  from concern  over its potential  strong  impact  in the 1960s  to the current
consensus  that the effect  can be, and mostly  has been, avoided  by careful  u-se  of food aid.
Far less extensively  analyzed  are the distortions  that widespread  use of technical  assistance
(TA) may  impose  on labour  markets. Yet current  writings  on  TA, which  emphasize  a general  failure
at institutional  development,  suggest  that  TA-created  distortions  of skilled  labour  markets  in recipient
countries  may  be quite  significant. Part  5.3 outlines  the relevant  issues,  illustrated  with such  data as
are available.
83Part 5.4 turns to project aid, discussing  first the specific issue of sectoral distortions  that may
be created by subsidised  credit programmes. The more gineral issue is that any aid-financed  activity
(which includes  food aid and TA) is potentially distortion-creating  since, somewhere along the line,
someone  usually receives benefits at less than the economic  cost of those benefits.  That is, the role
of projects in a market-oriented  development  strategy is not readily apparent, and must be argued on
a case-by-case  basis by reference to specific market failures.  Part 5.5 concludes, drawing together
the arguments in a discussion  of the appropriate balance between  different types of aid.
5.2  The disincentive effect of food aid
Food aid may generate disincentives to  domestic agricultural production through the following
channels (Maxwell  and Singer, 1979; and Maxwell, 1991):'
- a price effect as food aid pushes out the domestic supply curve, hence lowering  the domestic
price of agricultural output;
- a labour market effect when food aid is used in food for work projects, as wages in these
projects are higher than the income obtainable from agricultural production;
a policy effect as the availability  of food aid may allow a government to postpone necessary
policy reforms to stimulate domestic agricu-lture;  and
- by changing  the pattern of tastes away from domestic  output toward "exotic" imported foods.
The main debate has been over the price effect, to which we devote most attention.  The
possibility of adverse price movements from food aid was first raised by Schultz (1960), who -
contrary to general thinking at the tine  - argued that peasant producers were sensitive to prices.
Schultz's analy-is, as extended by Fisher, is shown in Figure 5.1(a), which shows the market for
agricultural output.  The domestic supply schedule is S and demand D, resulting in an equilibrium
price and quantity of P0 and QO  in the absence of food aid.  Food aid shifts the supply curve to the
right by the amount of the aid (to S+A).  To clear the market with the increase supply, price falls.
At the new market clearing price  of P,,  domestic output has fallen from  QD  to Q.
An early and often-cited study is Mann's (1967) finding of a strong disincentive effect in
India: showing  that food aid imports resulted in a decline in domestic agricultural output of one third
of the amount of the aid.  However, Mann's analysis  was based on the above theoretical  framework,
which has a number of shortcomings.  Further elaboration of the model has resulted in empirical
evidence  of, at worst, a weak disincentive  effect.
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The above presentation allowed price to be determined domestically.  By contrast, Figure
5.I(b) presents the same argument with the small country assumption (so that the domestic price is
fixed at the world price) - in this case the food aid di'-places  commercial food imports (which fall
from ac to ab) leaving domestic production unaffected.' But donors are not happy for aid to  displace
imports as this result frustrates the use of food aid as a surplus-disposal  mechanism.  Hence, usual
marketing requirements (UJMR)  are  imposed - by  which  recipients of  food  aid  must  import
commercially what they would have done in the absence of that aid.  In Figure 5. 1(b) aid and UMR
can only be accommodated  by forcing the domestic price below the world market price, so that the
disincentive effect is present.
But,  the above argument ignores the possibility of the aid generating increased demand.
Increased demand may come through two channels. Directly, the food aid is an increase in recipient
income (either to government who may  then spend the counterpart funds domestically  or to consumers
if distribution is subsidised).  If food is distributed to poor consumers who could not otherwise have
purchased it then there can be no displacement of existing demand.  Indirecdy, the food aid may be
used in food for work projects which promote income-generating  activities and improved nutrition
can enhance productivity.  The income increases result in a shift in the demand curve - at least
partially (and possibly more than) offsetting the shift in the supply clrve  so that the adverse prce
movement is mitigated.
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Tle  above considerations have led to a series of studies showing disincentive effects to be
weak or non-existent. Isenman  and Singer (1977) attributed their finding that domestic output in India
fell by only 3 per cent of the amount of the food aid to the fact of subsidised food distribution.
Model simulations by Kd) (1979) for India showed disincentive  effects from food imports (much of
which were PL 480) to be unimportant since its was easy to generate the additional demand for the
extra commodities: in  fact agricultural output as a whole is shown to rise slightly as a result of
foodgrains imports.
By the time of Maxwell and Singer's review of the literature in 1979, they could write that:
it does seem probable that a price disincentive effect on production can be and has
mostly been avoided by an appropriate mix of policy tools
(Maxwell  and Singer, 1979: 231)
If anything, this view has grown stronger during the 1980s - as donors become more practised in
avoiding disincentive effects and further studies report the absence of such effects (e.g. Bezuneh et
ai,  1988).
Policy initiatives to minimse disincentive  effects are mainly to use food aid in the context of
an overall food security strategy and carefiul  targeting of subsidised food aid distribution. Whilst, as
indicated above, these efForts  have more-or-less eliminated disincentive  effects at the national level
86it is still possible  that such effects  may operate  at the local level. The avoidance  of the effect  at the
local level  requires  generation  of demand  (through  income  earning  opportunities)  in conjunction  with
the food aid.
The second major debate of macroeconomic  relevance  linked to food aid is the use of
counterpart  funds from the sale of conmmodity  aid (or foreign  exchange). The debate is admirably
reviewed  by Bruton  and Hill (1990a  and 1990b)  who  reaffirmn  the view that such  funds need  MM91  be
inflationary. It would  be useful if studies of the impact  of aid on government  fiscal behaviour
explicitly  separated  out counterpart  funds  in their analysis  since: (i) many  donors  do not intend  these
funds  to increase  expenditure,  but rather to offset  deficit  financing;  and (ii) data  on counterpart  funds
are frequently  available  from government  accounts. In support  of Bruton and Hill's position  the
analysis  of Tanzanian  data by Doriye et aL.  (1994)  found  that counterpart.finds  (unlike  other forms
of aid) did not increase  government  expenditLre.
5.3  Technical assistance and the displacement of skilled labour
Aid projects  may  be expected  to generate  demand  for unskilled  labour. With  the exception  of (these
days  rare) ill-conceived  use of young  volunteers,  this labour  will be provided  from domestic  sources.
By contrast,  the requirements  for skilled  labour are likely  to be met by -,xpatriate  personnel. The
issue  of inierest  here is whether  the use of expatriates  substitutes  for domestic  labour.
Chenery and Strout's (1966) presentation  of the two gap model in fact identified  three
constraints  - savings,  forex and the capacity  to invest, the last arising  from a skills  gap.  Foreign
assistancL  may be required  to fill this gap to attain  the desired  level  of investment.4  But, as with  the
other two gaps, sustainable  development  is only achieved  by the closing  of the gap, and so the
important  question  is whether  TA has contributed  to the closure  of the gap as well as filling it.  At
first sight the  -figures  - which  show increasing  quantities  of aid personnel  - suggest  that the gap has
not closed. Why is this?
Technical  assistance  in fact  covers  two distinct  areas - overseas  training  and employment  of
expatriates,  the latter  nearly  always  including  an on-thejob  training  component  for counterpart  staff.
Ideally speaking, expatriates will be used where a genuine skills shortage exists and then be replaced
by local personnel  who  become  available  through  the two channels  of taining provided  by TA.  But
whilst the number of skilled people in recipient countries  has grown so have the numbers of
unemployed  graduates  and brain drain to developed  countries. These phenomena  exist despite  the
87high  cost  of expatriate  personnel  -estimated  to be nearly  US$300,000  a year in much  of Africa;  even
-- - low ranking expatriates are likely to earn ten times more than a govermnent minister (Berg, 1993).
Recent  reviews  - notably  Berg  (1993),  but  also Forss  (1990)  -have  been  critical  of the failure
of institution  building  via  technical  assistance.  This criticism  comes  despite  the acknowledgement  of
the achievements  pointed  to by earlier  defenders  of TA (e.g. Cassen  el  al., 1986). This  failure  may
partly account  for the continued  "need"  for expatriate  assistance. But also  important  is the "supply-
driven"  nature  of much  TA - that is the experts  who benefit from the contracts  are the ones that
benefit. Donor  insistence  on TA is in part because  of its "control"  function  to ensure  aid quality  (see
Cohen, 1992),  but  one must  suspect  that there  are considerable  material  incentives  to many  advisors
to extend  their work. By.  contrast,  the line ministry  receiving  the assistance  will often  pay less for
an expatriate  than  they would  have  to do for a local staff member  (TA is most usually  grant aid) -
so there is little  incentive  to build  up local staff  capacity  instead. 5
No empirical  work has been  done on the impact  of the 100,000  expatriates  estimated  to be
in sub-Saharan  Africa  on the skilled  labour  market. But  it seems  likely  that  aid has assisted  increasing
the supply  of local  skilled  personnel  but  may  simultaneously  undennine  the demand  for their  services:
permitting  low professional  salaries  and  encouraging  brain drain.
5.4  Project Aid
Project aid is seen as the "traditional  form" of aid. However, the role of projects in a market-oriented
development  strategy  can be questioned. Projects most usually  involve  either direct or indirect
subsidies  - if they did not, why the need  for a project? An important  part of adjustment  policies  is
often  the raising  of interest  rates:  yet many  aid funds  support  subsidised  lines  of credit. Projects  may
contain  components  to supply  sutsidised  agricultural  inputs  whilst,  nationally,  such  schemes  are being
removed. And  so on. At another  level,  donor  support  may  sustain  the existence  of unviable  entities  -
be they  goverment, paiastatal  or favored  private  sector  firms.  (Traditionally  it is the government
and parastatal  sector that bas benefitted  from this treatnent.  More recently a large number  of
developing  country  NGOs, dependent  on foreign  assistance  for their  activities,  has been  spawned).
However,  donors  are aware of these  problems. One  response  has been  the reduction  in the
importance  of project aid in the overall  aid programme. (Such a reduct;on  has also been  necessary
when  the recurrent  finance  for current  projects  has not been  available,  so  that it is senseless  to initiate
new  projects). Another  response  is to use projects  to pioneer  market  disciplines  - e.g. user fies for
:-  - - ~~~~~~~88social  services,  cost-recovery  for utilities  and  market  levels  of interest. Despite  trying  to operate  "like
the market"  would,  donors  appear  to believe  that  the market  would  irn do these  things  in the absence
of the projects. Although  it cannot  be denied  that aid projects  have at certain  times in certain  places
impeded  indigenous  market-based  development,  the  possibility  of designing  "market-friendly'  projects
demonstrates  that projects  are not inherently  anti-market. However,  more work is required  to learn
the extent  to which  project  aid can remain  as a compatible  part of aid programs.
5.5  What type of aid should there be?
The balance  between  the different  types  of aid varies  over time - with  the most  recent  trend  being  the
increase  of programme  aid at the expense  of project  aid.  What type of aid should  there be?  One
view is that all aid should  be an untied  transfer  for the recipient  government  to spend as it sees fit.
But  this answer  only  pushes  the question  one stage  further  back, since  then  the recipient  must  decide
how to allocate  the funds.
From the above  discussion  the following  may be conduded. If food  aid is fully  fungible  so
that it substitutes  entirely  for commercial  imports  then it is like untied  foreign  exchange  and, from
the recipient  view  point, as desirable  as untied  resources  (which  we assume  to be the most desirable
form of aid).  if, on the other hand, fungibility  is restricted  by UMR, then food aid becomes  less
desirable  - but should  still be accepted  so long as it is additional;  that is, there is no possibility  to
substitute  food  aid for other  forms of aid.  Whether  or not food aid is indeed  additional  is debatable  -
it is more likely  to be so from donors  using  it to dispose  of their own  surpluses  and for which  the
transaction  is not handled by the aid administration  (e.g. the US) than it is for donors which
incorporate  food aid in the aid budget  and buy food from a third parry  for their food aid (e.g. the
UK).
A similar  point  may be made  for TA: so long as it has no adverse  effects  then, since it is a
grant, it may as well be accepted  so long as it is additional. However,  both the assumptions  here
should  be questioned.  TA may  have  adverse  effects  on capacity  building  - both directly  and  through
the impact  on the skilled  iabour  market. Hence,  donors  should  be willing  to discuss  the substitution
of TA for other forms  of aid.
Projects  have in the past sometimes  acted  against  the market - but this need  not necessarily
be so, so that  continued  project  aid is  compatible  wiihfl  market-iented development.  What  is unclear,
and what  donors  are still  exploring,  is the shareproject shwld have in the overall  aid program.
. . . ~  ~  ~  ~Notes  to Chapter S
1.  By supporting  surplus  production  the existence  of food aid also supports  misallocation  of
resources  at the global  level, but we do not pursue  this point  here.
2.  In this case the aid is fully fungible,  since the food aid releases  an equivalent  amount  of
foreign  exchange,  so that the food aid is the same as untied  financial  aid.
3.  Maxwell (1986)  points out that food aid studies may be divided into formal modelling
favoured  by academics  and a less  formal  checklist  approach  used by donors. We focus  here
on formal  studies,  but the findings  from less formal  analysis  are similar.
4.  Chenery  and Strout  were not, however,  the first economists  to provide  an intellectual  basis
for TA, which  was given by Johnson's (1963)  argument  - captured in the expression  a
"gneralized  human  capital approach" - about the productivity  gains to be realised  from
institutional  development.
S.  There is usually a requirement  for counterpart  staff - so that aid staff may create a
requirement  for additional  local  staff. But in reality  counterpart  obligations  are addidional  to




AID, SOCIAL ISSU  AND THE ENVIRONMENT
6.1  Introduction
The ultimate objective of aid is to raise the living standards of the recipient population - our
interest in macroeconomic  aggregates is only as a means to that end.  In this chapter we review
the literature that traces aid's impact on the ends.
Most of the literature on these topics - especially on aid and the poor - concerns the effect
of aid-financed policy reform, rather than aid monies.  Nonetheless,  the point made in the
previous chapter - that modelling can capture and distinguish  the two channels of aid impact -
applies equally to this topic-  Some of the analysis of Chapter 3 - particularly how aid affects the
level and composition of goverment  expenditures should be an important part of such models.
In Part 6.2 studies of policy reforms and the poor are discussed. Much of the literature
has, rather unsa±isfactorily,  relied up-on  before versus after or simple control group approaches.
In addition to discussion of what modelling work there is, related work on ~he  determinants of
social indicators is also presented, in order to identify how such work may be integrated into a
common famework for the analysis of aid impact.
One important channel for improving the welfare of the poor is female education - which
is also important in its own right as one aspect of raising female living standards.  Therefore in
Part 6.3 we focus more closely on analyses of aid and gender issues.  Part 6.4 reviews the links
between aid and the environment, which are obviously of importance  for living standards ia the
long (and sometimes short) run.  Part 6.5 summarizes.
6.2  Aid and Poverty
The rhetoric of aid donors suggests  that poverty alleviation is the primary objective of aid - such
statements are common from the World Bank's current President.  What evidence there is
suggests that they have some way to go (see Cassen, 1986; and Chaudhuri, 1986).  As Mosley
(1987) points out, there really is very little evidence on the poverty impact of aid - donors have
made distressingly litte  effbrt to gather information either from or on the beneficiaries of their
914,.  ' 0  projects.  It is believed, however, that a number of biases operate at the levels of donor agency,
ecipient government and the project itself to mitigate against successful poverty alleviation.
These biases include the pressure for rapid disbursement, the "big is beautiful" syndrome,
lobbying by powerful pressure groups, elite identification (on the part of either local or expatriate
staff), and inadequate research into how the poor earn their living (a lack of knowledge  which is
itself the product of a bias).
Donors are making attempts  to overcome these biases.  Renewed concern with poverty
and basic neuds received impetus from work carried out under the auspices of UNICEF.  By the
late 1980s the World Bank was taking these concerns on board and has become an important
player in the development of the "New Poverty Agenda'.  Some data on the poverty impact of aid
to different sectors is available from efforts that the Jnter-American Development  Bank (IDB)
made in this direction.  In the early 1980s  IDB adopted the target that 50 per cent of project
benefits should go to the poor and set about monitoring atainment of the target.  The coefficient
of income distribution (CIM) is defined as the share of benefits accruing to the poorest 50 per cent
- sectoral CIDs for two time periods are shown in Table 6. 11  These figures, which demonstrate
that efforts at poverty alleviation should be intensified, are an aggregation of micro-level projects.
Tle concern here is to tace  the impact at the macroeconomic  level.  All the analysis conducted at
tlis level considers the impact of aid-supported policy reforms, rather than aid monies.  The
former literature is discussed before considering how the latter may be tacldedc
As in chapter 4, analysis must be concerned to trace the links from conditionality  to policy
reform to living standards.  The first of these links was discussed in Part 4.2.  Here we consider
the second link.  A first issue which immediately  arises is the measurement  of living standards,
given the paucity of incoGme  data in many countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa.
Measuring the Uivng standards of the poor
The most appropriate measures of the poor's living standards might appear to 1,e  data
from household income and expenditure surveys.  However, such data are frequently scanty,
unreliable and only available with a considerable  lag.  In many cases we need different indicators.
One such indicator is beneficiary assessment - if you want to know how well off people are then
ask them.  The use of such indicators is relatively undeveloped and could be more widely used in
future. 2
92Table 5.1  Sectoral CDs  for IDB Prajects
1979-1986
-Sector  - 1979-82  1983-86  1979-86
Agriculu  74.1  48.3  64.0
Fisheries  35.6  59.2  43.1
Industry  . 27.2  26.0  25.0
Toiurism  24.0  82.3  80.4
Mining  20.1  47.6  45.9
Energy  10.3  14.6  20.1
:Transport  26.6  27.7  27.3
Communications  54.6  83.4  74.4
Urban Development  83.5  74.5  76.3
Science and-  technology  91.2  912
-1Education-  31.9  77.1  5837
Kealth-  .87.2  87.3  872
:-Satation  .-  MA51  45-6  47.6
E: vironment;  *-  -Rx -:;-45.0  45.0
Tota  :533  37.-  4-47
.S-ouce:  -Pows  (1989: Table 3.4)
But most studies have used "objective indicators": such as life expectancy (e.g. Anand and
Ravallion).  Only very few studies have use direct measures of poverty as a dependent variable:
Morley (1992) is one of the few to use a poverty measure (the headcount index) as the dependent
variable in a regression analysis.  One World Bank (1990) report on adjustment lending briefly
mentions poverty incidence measures.  Ravallion and Huppi (1991) use more sophisticated
measures, but their diswssion of the link between these measures and policy is brief.
Most studies use indicators that capture one aspect of 'living  standards or are proxies.
Some of these measures are broad indicators, that is ones covering the population as a whole,
such as nutritional status, literacy, school enrolment rates etc.  The assumption is that the brunt or
benefit of changes in this indicators will be felt by the poor, which is probably not an unjustified
assumption, but one that could perhaps be subject to some critical scrutiny where possible. 3
93Morley and Alvarez (1992) use the real wage as a poverty indicator.
Sometimes a proxy is chosen which is one step removed in the line of reasoning - for
example, real social expenditure per capita.  But for such a measure to be satisfactory it must be
further demonstrated that the poor were benefitting  from these services and that it is the services
from which they benefit that have been cut.  Indeed, data from Latin America have shown social
indicators to be resilient in the face of declining social expendituree - either the social
expenditures did not matter for the welfare of the poor, or they are now better targeted, or the
*-  relationship  has a lag so that declines are to be expected in the near future.  Other objective
indicators are more narrowly defined - often by measuring some of the above measures by a
particular target group or area.
Since such a range of measures is available care should be exercised in the choice,
construction and interpretation  of these measures.  For example, Cornia and Stewart (1987: 115)
say that education  expenditure per head of population aged 0-14 in Jamaica fell by 14 per cent in
the early 1980s.  Behrman and Deolaikar (1990: 13) question this figure, suggesting one instead
of only 0.1 per cent (calculated  as per head of population aged 5-14).  The reasons the latter
authors give for this difference are: (i) Cornia and Stewart use the GDP deflator, whereas real
wages in education  have dropped sharply; (ii) difference in period of comparison; Qiii)  different
denominator, but with that used by themselves being the more appropriate.
A second example is provided from two studies using what may be thought to be similar
series - Pinstrup-Andersen (1989) shows a figure of child mortality in Brazil over the period 1977-
84, with the gently declining trend giving way to a sharp upward lurch in 1982-84. Zuckerman
(1991) reports the infant mortality rate for Brazil over the period 1970-1987  - the number declines
steadily throughout the period with no interruption. The two series are not necessarily
inconsistent, but if both are correct then the story they tell about changes in welfare is not the
unambiguous  one caimed by either author.
Medwods  of analysis
The original impetus for considering the "social impacts of adjustment' - meaning the
impact upon the poor, and which may not be very social at all - came from work done for
UNICEF, culminating in the seminal Adjutment  i4th a Hum  Face.  The World Bank responded
with reasonable speed to these concerns, although the initial reaction was to stress the ways in
94which the poor would benefit from adjustment policies.  The IMF also issued a series of studies
(e.g. IMF, 1986,  but these were of a mainly theoretical nature, whereas the World Bank's work
had a more applied focus.  A World Bank study of COte d'lvoire concluded that 'the poor may be
little affected by strucural  adjustment  policies because most of them are subsistence farmers in
rural areas" (Glewwe and de Tray, 1988).  More helpfully, methodologies  were proposed as a
basis for modelling the impact of adjustment on the poor (Kanbur, 1987; and Addison et al.,
1990) - but unfortunately it has taken time for model results to permeate the literature which has
been dominated by the other two approaches discussed in Chapter 2.
An important conceptual distinction is that between primary and secondary income, the
former deriving from income from factors of production (which, for the poor, is mostly labor)
and the latter from "unearned sources".  Primary income is therefore mainly affected by
movements in relative prices and other changes in the incentive structure and secondary income by
the government's subsidy policy (mcluding provision of health and education  services).  Broadly
speaking, models have analyzed changes via adjustments in primary income, whereas the non-
modeling literature has focussed on issues relating to secondary income.
As stated, much of the literamre has relied on before versus after or the simple control
group approach.  Maasland and van der Graag (1992) and Behrman and Deolaikar (1990) look at
deviations from trend, rather than a simple before-after, which is an improvement, but stll takes
no account of changes in the external environment. Maasland and van der Graag also control for
some factors using regression techniques but do not apply the full modified control group
approach.  In fact, to my knowledge, the modified control group approach has not been applied to
analyze this aspect of adjustment policies-  Despite the reservations expressed here about the
approach the absence of such a study seems a surprising omission, and a regrettable one since the
results may be expected to be different to those of the work adopting less sophisticated
methodologies.
The before-after and simple control group approaches are first reviewed.  An intermediate
literature, which uses country case studies, but without formal modelling, is introduced before
moving to the limited cases of actual modelling. Finally, some related literatures are discussed-
Before-after and control group approaches
As a broad (but not entirely accurate) generalization, studies that are critical of the impact
95of reforms on the poor rely on before versus after - showing a deteriorating trend in many welfare
indicators - whereas work that is more defensive of the policies uses a simple control group
approach - showing that adjusting countries fared no worse than non-adjusting. Clearly these two
sets of results are not incompatible,  the problem is in interpretation. This problem is compounded
by the very pervasive tendency in this literature to fail to distinguish between adjustment policies
and external shocks (see Part 4.3 above).
The introduction  to Adjustment with a Human Face makes the following  clear declaration:
Is adjustment  policy (or the adjustment process) the main cause of the human
difficulties and social set-backs, especially of vulnerable groups?  No, this is not
the position of this study.
(Cornia et a,  1987b: 5)
UnfDrtunately,  the bulk of the study does not appear so cautious - the distinction  between
adjustment  policies and the process of adjustment  seldom reappears.  Most of the analysis - for
example that of government expenditure (Pinstrup-Andersen  et aL,  1987) - relies on a discussion
of trends (that is before versus after), with no attempt to relate these trends to the different causal
factors.  Despite this fact the study makes such statements as:
Adjustment policies frequently involve cut-backs in government expenditure.
From 1980 to  1984,  real government expenditure per capita fell in over half the
countries of the developing  world, with a greater proportion declining among
countries with adjustment  policies than among those without.  Vulnerable groups
are particularly affected by changes in government expenditure on basic health and
education services and on food subsidies.
(Pinstrup-Andersen  et al,,  1987: 73)
The suggestion in this quotation that a simple control group is also applied is not apparent from
the analysis itself (which appears to be straight before versus after).  Nor is there mention of the
incidence of public expenditures, which are important in capuring the effects of expenditure
changes on the poor.
Subsequent work making the same case repeats this approach (for example, Pinstrup-
Andersen, 1989).  The caution expressed by the authors-of Ajustment  mih a Hrumn Face is not
shared by many, who have misinterpreted the work as conclusively  showing that adjustment
policies harm the poor.  For example Riddell states that
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There can be little doubt that the effects of SAPs in Africa have led to worsened
conditions.  Poverty has increased... The quality of life has declined as prices
have risen, as infrastructure has crumbled, as services have deteriorated, and as
employment opportunities have been reduced.
(Riddell, 1992: 66)
However, no evidence is produced to substantiate these assertions.  What, then, is the evidence?
Simple control group approach
The second World Bank report on adjustment  lending devoted a chapter to "Structural
Adjustment  and Living Conditions in Developing Countries". 5 The report's conclusions are a
sharp contrast to those just discussed:
The available evidence shows that changes in living conditions in the short run do not
appear to be systematically  related to adjustment lending.  Short-run indicators of living
conditions have not deteriorated in the early intensive lending countries, and long-run
indicators have continued to improve because of past investments.
(World Bank, 1990: 26)
In support of this conclusion the report presents the following data, in each case grouped
by early intensive adjustment lending (gIAL), other adjustment lending (OAL) and non adjustment
lending (NAL):
change in a poverty incidence measure for selected countries, from which no systematic
pattern emerges;
growth in real per capita private consumption, which showed that ELAL  countries had
protected consumption most strongly in the late 1980s, to the assumed benefit of living
standards (at least in the short rn);
nutritional intake, from which there are improvements  in all three groups over the period
1980-86 but with no systematic differences between groups;
social spending share in govermment  expenditure and real growth in social spending per
capita, showing weak growth or declines in the early 1980s amongst adjusting countries
with some recovery in the later part of the decade - in both periods this performance is
worse that the average for non-adjusting  countries; and
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gross primary enrollment ratios, which have grown across the board, but with the
(i  --:  strongest growth in non-adjusting countries.
*  i  - - However, the shortcomings of this analysis have been belabored in previous chapters.
M  The simple control group approach is subject to systematic biases, which render it useless as an
explanatory tool (rather than a descriptive one) in analyzing the effects of adjustment. Moreover
the emphasis should, as argued in Chapter 4, be on the impact of specific policies not whether or
not a country has taken out an adjustment loan.  To carry out such analysis it is necessary to turn
to the modelling approach.  Before discussing  this approach however, it is useful to look at
another common approach based on country case studies.
Cowury case sudies  of adjusment  and  poverty
Country specific analyses have the advantage of being able to capture local factors that
may be omitted from cross-country approaches. There are a number of examples of such work -
the poverty assessments now being produced by the World Bank mostly fall into this category - of
which just two illustrative examples are presented here.
The first example is Demery's (1993) analysis of COte d'lvoire,  whose actual experience
is a marked contrast to the assertion of Glewwe and de Tray (1988) that the poor will be by and
large unaffected  by the adjustment  process.  In fact, income has fallen in COte  d'Ivoire over the
past six years so that all groups appear to have suffered declines in living standards - though it is
true  th rural food (non-export) farmers have suffered relatively less; although their poverty has
increased, their share in the poor has declined.  Demery attributes COte  d'Ivoire's  poor
performance principally to the  'fetter" imposed by the inability to achieve real devaluation
because of the pegging of the CFA franc to the French franc.
Hicks and Per Brekk (1991) study the impact of adjustment in Malawi on the poor.  They
argue that the Malawian reform program has not involved any major reductions in subsidy or
exchange rate reform, and that the impact on the poor will be via changes in agricultural pricing
policy and the government's anti-inflationary  stance.  They also consider changes in taxation,
which are shown to have a marginal effect on the poor.  The price reforms are found to have had
a positive impact on the real incomes of the poor - an effect reinforced by the doubling of the
minimum wage.
98Such analyses are undoubtedly informative but they lack the ability to convincingly answer
the underlying questions: principally that we do not know what would have happened in the
absence of the reform program.  There is also no way to consider the effects of financial support
-rather than policies.  To answer these questions we must turn to modelling.
Modelling
In his review of the impact of adjustment on the poor in Africa, Sahn states that:
Performing counterfactual  analysis using econometric or general equilibrium
models is perhaps the most legitimate approach to examining the relationship
between poverty and economic reform.  HIowever,  models that would enable us to
do so with any degree of precision do not exist for sub-Saharan Africa... efforts at
modeling the impact of policy reform should, nonetheless, contipue.  There is
much to be learned from prototype models that do not achieve the desired level of
disaggregation.
(Sahn, 1991: 1-2)
I am in complete agreement with Sahn's argument - though his position is sadly little
reflected in his review of the evidence from which the above quote is taken. 6 However, in work
elsewhere, Sahn and others have produced models which yield valuable insights.
Van Frausmum and Sahn (1991) present an econometric model of Malawi, which includes
a demostion  that the concessionality  of doncr finance yields an extra 0.7 per cent GDP growth
each year - however, restricting imports to meet current account deficit targets has adverse
implications of growth (which may however disappear in the longer run).  The model contains
some distributional analysis at a high level of aggregation, but this analysis was found to be
linited by data constraints.  Another model (Sahn and Sarris,  1991) focuses explicitly on the
income of rural smallholders under structural adjustment: finding that there is no systematic effect
from adjustment on the rural poor.  On the other hand, Sahn (1990) argues that raising producer
prices in Cote d'Ivoire will have a positive impact on the nutritional status of the poor.  By
contrast, his discussion (Sahn, 1987) of the Sri Lankan experience suggests that the poor have
suffered from policy reforms (largely because of the effect of inflation, which has been a product
of the atypical investment  boom which accompanied Sri Lankan adjustment).
Ravallion and Huppi (1991) report that poverty indices  have not shown a deterioration in
Indonesia during the period of external shocks and the subsequent adjustment  program.  To the
conurary, "aggregate poverty in Indonesia decreased over the 1984-87 period for both urban and
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rural areas according to comparisons  of both income and consumption distributions" (1991: 79), a
:  fct  which is attributed to a "pro-poor' pattern of growth, but which requires further
investigation. The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank has modelled the
Indonesian case in an attempt to explain the optimistic picture presented by Ravallion and Huppi.
The study found that the government had protected consumption at the expense of investment  - but
that this policy is not necessarily inimical to long-term growth since the investment  projects cut
were "white elephants".
The OED is undertaking a series of studies of poverty and adjustment  based on calibration
of a model developed for an OECD project on the same issue.  It is this model which has
provided the basis for the most comprehensive  analyses of the links between poverty and
adjustment.
7he wOECZjQ  model"
The model, which is presented in Bourguinon, Branson and de Melo (1989 and 1992; see
also Bourguinon, de Melo and Suwa, 1991), is a reasonably parsimonious (31 equation) general
equilibrium model with four channels through which adjustment  policies can affect the distribution
of income: (i) the change in factor rewards consequent upon changes in relative prices; (ii)
reductions in real income through increases in the cost of living; (iii) changes in the return on
financial assets; and (iv) capital gains and losses.
Various policy simulations were run against a base run of external shocks in the terms of
trade and the world interest rate.  All policy responses achieve some growth of GDP, but this
growth is rather less with a credit squeeze or non-accommmodatory  monetary policy compared to
the other policy options (fiscal tightening, "policy rigidity" and "adjustment  with a human face" -
the latter involving public works, fbod subsidies and across the board tariff protection of 15 per
cent).  The first two policies are also associated with increases in the incidence of poverty
(measured by the headcount index), whereas the others bring about some reduction in poverty,
with the largest reduction from adjustment with a human face.  The authors conclude that
adjustment without some targeting may result in permanent damage to the welfare of the poorest
groups.
A special issue of World Development carried a series of papers on adjustment and
poverty which, to a greater or lesser extent, drew on the OECD model.  The case studies
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presented came to the following conclusions:
S  - in Malaysia it has been the recession, not adjustment policies, which are to blame for the
increase in poverty - policy simulations fail to find a realistic set of policies that could
have achieved a better result than that actually realized (Demery and Demery, 1991);
adjustment policies in Indonesia have been associated with, and appear responsible for,
improvements  in income distribution (Thorbecke, 1991);
drought was an important  factor behind increased poverty in C6te d'Ivoire (and a return to
rural areas reduced it) - reducing current government expenditures improved the
distribution of income but did not affect poverty, whereas devaluation could positively
affect both of these (Lambert e! at.,  1991);
reductions in government current expenditure in Ecuador would represent a progressive
adjustment  policy but is politically unfeasible.  To carry out these reductions they must be
supported by some policies which, whilst regressive, will increase the political support for
the adjustment effort (de Janvry et at.,  1991);
rising unemployment, falling real wages and declining social expenditures have resulted
from adjustment measures in Chile (Meller, 1991).
In summary, the results from model simulations are rather more optimistic than some of the less
formal analysis elsewhere in the literature.  (Meller's pessimistic analysis for Chile is the only one
in the collection not using a model-based approach)-
In principle the OECD model can be used to answer the question to which we keep
returning: how much can aid alone achieve or is reform also necessary? In practice the model
cannot be put to this purpose because of the way in which the equations for the goverment  and
balance of payments are written.  Notably, the three components of govermnent expenditure
(recurrent, employment and investnent) are exogenous.  Nor do the investment  or production
functions allow for the "import strangulation" common in sub-Saharan Africa.  The main channels
through which aid expresses its macroeconomic  effect  are thus excluded.  The model needs to
draw on parts of the literature on the macroeconomics of aid to allow a full analysis to be
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Additionally  the model analyzes income distribution and poverty solely as a function of
primary income - whereas much of the concern over the poverty impact of adjustment  has
fbcussed on secondary income, most notably declines in government social expenditure.  If the
model were to incorporate disaggregated  government expenditure categories then models of
categorical fungibility  could fall neatly into place.  Moreover, there is plenty of evidence linking
different aspects of government spending and participation in social services to wider aspects of
the welfare of the poor.  Some of this literature is now reviewed to see what links may be made.
Soaal sector  provision  and welfare:  some examples
The studies in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1993) explore the determinants of poverty
amongst the indigenous  population i-  Latin America.  This group are dispoportionately  poor -
around 70 per cent of indigenous people are poor compared to about half for the population as a
whole.  One of the strongest determinants of poverty (based on logit regressions of the probability
of being poor) is years of schooling, and educational attainment is much lower amongst
- indigenous  peoples than non-indigenous. Moreover, educational attainment of parents affects the
schooling and other human capital characteristics of their children.  The authors therefore
conclude that "equalizing schooling attaimnent  would result in a considerable increase in relative
earnings" (Psacharopoulos  and Patrinos, 1993: 230).  The implications for expenditure patterns
are clear: the analysis needs to take account of the changes in provision of educational services to
indigenous  communities, being one of the major channels for improving (or worsening) the
welfare of one of the poorest sections of the community in both the long and short run.
This implication is made explicit in the study of Cate d'Ivoire by Thomas et al.,  who
analyze the determinants of three anthropometric  measures of heath - child height, child weight
and adult body mass index (weight over height squared).'  They report that:
The provision of basic services (such as immunizations)  and ensuring facilities are
equipped with simple materials (such as having basic drugs in stock) will probably
yield high-  social returns in terms of improved child health.
(Thomas et al.,  1992: 32)
Hence they conclude that the cuts which have taken place in government expenditure, which fell
particularly-  upon the social sectors, are likely to have had a damaging impact on social welfare-
102The authors  also argue  that  higher food  prices, whilst  in the long run beneficial,  will have  had an
adverse  short run impact  on health.
The share  of govermnent  spending  to social sectors  was also found  to be a significant
determinant  of underweight  prevalence  in a cross section  global  model  (UJN,  1993:  96) - but this
variable  was not important  in 'he African  sub-sample. However,  in both models  female  secondary
education  was found to be a significant  factor, a finding  borne  out by many  other studies  (e.g.
Subbarao  and Raney, 1992').  This is one of the links pursued  in the next section, in which
issues  of gender  and adjustment  are addressed.
6.3  Gender and Adjustment
Moser (1993)  identifies  five phases  in development  policy  towards  women  in developing
countries:  welfare  (promote  welfare  of women for their benefit  and  that of their children);  equity
(redress  imbalance  of resources  between  the sexes);  anti-poverty  (a toned down  version of the
equity  approach);  efficiency  (gender  differences  impede  efficient  resource  allocation);  and
empowerment  (empower  women  to control  own resources). These  phases  have  their parallels  in
theoretical  developments  concerning  gender  aspects  of development.
The equity/anti-poverty  approach  made much  of the fact  that in sub-Saharan  Africa  the
bulk of agricultural  work is done by women. 11 But this conception  also introduced  a dualism:
women  were seen as food  producers  and men as producers  of cash crops. Structural  adjustment
policies,  promoting  the latter  at the expense  of the former  were thought  likely  to shift the intra-
household  income  distribution  away  from women,  to the detriment  of their welfare and that of
their children. Due and Gladwin  (199  1) present  a recent  example  empirical  analysis  carried out in
this framework  for the cases  of Zambia  and Tanzania.
More recent  work  by Collier  has emphasized  that  food production  too can be tradable.
Collier's work is rooted  strongly  in the efficiency  approach  and gender  restrictions  are seen as
limiting  the response  to changes  in price signals. He argues  that discrimination  may  act in credit
or labor  markets  or through  access  to services  (principally  education9f).  Hence  discimination  is
a brake on adjustment  (and relaxing  the brake will increase  women's  income),  rather dtan
adjustment  reinforcing  discrimination.
Elson  (1991)  counters  that any expansion  in women's  contribution  to production  will be in
103K  addition to their existing tasks.  Furthermore these existing tasks are also under additional
pressure - for example, declining goverunent health expenditures will increase women's burden in
child care (which may therefore also undermine their access to schooling and contribution to a
supply response).
Unfortunately, despite some cases studies (e.g. Geisler, 1992) good empirical work on
these topics is scanty."1 The task is to develop a systematic framework for analysis (a task
confounded by a relative absence of data).  Work prepared by Collier for the World Bank
sketches the basis for such an approach, but empirical application is awaited.  Analysis should,
however, draw on the emerging body of empirical work to link these issues into more general
analysis of aid effectiveness.
6.4  Aid and  environment
One conception of aid an the environment is of aid projects with an emphasis  oii large projects,
dams, power stations and infrastructure  which contribute to the destruction of forests and other
envirommental  resources. The environmental damage done by large projects has been documented
in many studies (for example, Adams and Solomon, 1985; and Searle, 1987). During the second
half of the 1980s multilateral agencies began to address the issue of the environmental
consequences of their aid-giving: for example by systematic screening of environmental impact but
also through a larger number of projects with an explicit conservation component.
But a project approach alone is not enough.  Much environmental damage is the result of
numerous economic activities outside the reach of development projects. Economic policies affect
prices of crops and agricultural inputs, exchange rates, interest rates and import and export
measures, and thus affect patterns of production and consumption and environmental behavior.
Therefore macroeconomic policies have a larger scope for policy makers to influcAuce
environmental behavior than individual  development projects.
However, adjustment lending was not intended to address the environmental dimension of
development, and environmental concerns were not incorporated into the design of policy-based
lending for several reasons (Reed, 1992). On the other hand, adjustment policies can have
beneficial environmental effects and these effects were emphasized  in the 1992 World
Development Report.  But reforms like reallocation of government expenditures, expanding
production of agricultural, and expanding industrial or extractive industries may also seriously
104damage  the environmenL  The remainder  of this part assesses  the evidence  on the various
channels  through  which aid may  affect  the environment.
Govermnent  intervention  and the environment
The argument  for government  intervention  on the enviromnental  front  derives  from the
notion  of "market  failure" kWinpenny,  1990;  and Girma, 1992).  Market  prices  do not incorporate
environmental  information,  large  parts  of the environment  are common  property  and liable  to
excessive  use (the "tragedy  of the commons"),  environmental  effects  are not  experienced  directly
by their instigators  and private  decisions  do not normally  take the interests  of future  generations
into account.  Thus, free market  prices  do not reflect  the environmental  external  effects  like
pollution  and the resource  depletion  which  is inherent  to certain  forms of production,  so that
market  intervendon  is required  to protect  the environment.
On the other hand, goverment interventions  may  worsen  environmental  conditions  - for
example  tax incentives  for deforestation,  subsidies  for pesticides  and fertilizers,  and the
underpricing  of energy. However,  as pointed  out by Reed (1992),  "getting  prices  right" will not
ensure  sustained  natural  resource  management  if the underlying  institutional  structure  (uncertainty;
pricing  refonrs not implemented  or sustained)  does not enable  economic  agents  to respond  to the
new price incentives. Jansen  (1991)  argues  that  the case is for better  government  intervention
rather  than for less, since manv  of the existing  forms of government  intervention  in developing
countries  are outdated  and should  be adjusted  to the changed  international  conditions.  But what is
'better intervention"?  To answer  that  question  requires  a closer look  at the links  between
economic  policy  and the enviromment.
Modelling the  inkrs:  the analyticalfiramework
Table  6.2 (based  on Mearns, 1991)  lists  several  policy  instuments and  their likely
environmental  consequences,  which  are the channels  through  which  policy  is often  considered  to
affect  the environment. One clear conclusion  is that the effects  are very specific  to the precise
nature  of the intervention  and local environmental  conditions,  so that analysis  must necessarily
proceed  on a country-specific  basis. Mearns  points  to several  weaknesses  in this approach:
principally  that it ignores  the problem  of uncertainty  for scientific  explanation.  Many complex
nonlinear  interrelationships  world  are reduced  to simple  causal  links  between  just two key
variables:  economic  policy  reform  and environmental  impact.  The linkages  are identified  ea ante
and at a very generalized  level,  assuming  that structural  adjustment  policies  are actually,  and
1051*.  1., -,  Table 6.2  NMatrix  of environmental  effects  ol policy  reform
i  Poly  instrwn.s  EnWronmental  consequences
- ,  0, -- Exchange rate adjustment  makes possible investnent in land
management (eg. soil conservation) if change
expected to be permanent.
a devaluation may lead to a shift out of foud
crops that may lead to food shortages that
may lead to enviromnentally  damaging
behavior.
Financial liberalization  will lead to higher interest rates w'ich  may
discourage credit-financed investments in
land improvement; it may also discourage
environment-damaging  investment.
reduced incentive to undertake resource
intensive activities (e.g. more heavily
capitalised estate agriculture).
Domesdc credit restraint  reduced allocations to environmental
protection and resource management directly.
Government expenditure  cuts  across the board cuts may reduce road
building and hydropower projects, which is
likely to slow the rate of defbrestation.
Smallholder  producer price increases for  may leave soil more susceptible to erosion if
maize, and export crops: tobacco, cotton,  land newly brought under crop production.
groundnut
switching between crops depending on
relative prices may leave land more, or less,
susceptible to erosion.
increased land values intensify problems of
access to the poor.
increased land values may inGiuces  land
owners to cultivate the land more carefully
and may invest in land improvementIncrease export taxes on tea and tobacco  disincentive  to produce should reduce the use
of wood to cure tea and tobacco and thus
reduce  pressure  for deforestation.
Fertilizer  subsidy  reduced  reduced  access  for poor farmers  will
exacerbate  declining  soil fertility  in case of
severe land  pressure.
Maintenance  of strategic  grain reserve  or  may reduce  pressure  to produce  an
buffer stock  ecologically  damaging  yield in a bad year.
Reduction  in energy  consumer  subsidies  (oil-  within  country  impacts  may  promote  oil-
based  fuels)  based  fuel conservation  but at cost of
forcing  backward  substitution  to woodfuels.
Raise  consumer  fuel-wood  prices  unless  strong  regulation,  higher  wood
stumpage  fees increase  incentive  both  to cut
and to avoid payment  - possibly increasing
forest 'mining' from natural forests - yet
provide  uncertain  incentive  tO grow more
trees.
Investment  in hydro  and geothermal  power  mixed  in impact,  even  if successful  in
generation  and other alternative  supply  reducing  pressure  on forests.
sources
Import  liberalization  increased  availability  of intermediate  foods
acts as incentive  to produce  marketable  crops
thus  similar  impact  to output  price reforms
(le. mixed).
reduction  of import  controls  may  lead to an
increase  in imports  of luxury  goods  like cars
with negative  effects  on the environment.completely, implemented  (a sentiment  which echoes the discussion in Part 4.2 above).
Many authors stress the point that the analysis of the links between economic reform and
the enviromment  has been eclectic, indeterminate  and too simplistic (for example, Mearns, 1991;
Cromwell and Winpenny, 1993; Jansen, 1991; and Girma, 1992). Cromwell and Winpenny
propose a simple structured analytical  system through which policy reforms can be filtered. They
argue that the construction of matrices to illustrate the links between policy instruments and
environmental  effects (like that shown in Table 6.2) would provide useful checklists for policy-
makers in the evaluation  of the likely impacts of reform programs. The potential impact of
structural adjustment measures on the enviromnent  should be analyzed according to how these
measures affect four crucial variables: (i) the spatial extent of production (bringing new land under
cultivation), (ii) the product mix (different  crops have different envirommental  effects), (ii)
intensity of production, and Civ)  the technique of production (some techniques are more damaging
than others).
Other authors (such as Reed, 1992; and Hansen 1990) propose a quantitative  modeling
approach as a more appropriate  technique for analyzing the macroeconomy-environment  links.
However - as in the case of modeling social effects - there is a lack of data and adequate models
designed to study these links. The traditional short or medium term macroeconomic  equilibrium
models designed to analyze adjustment  impacts can at the most provide ad hoc  assessment of the
environmental impacts. For a more comprehensive  analysis of medium and long term
environmental impacts of adjustment  programs, economic and ecological aspects have to be
integrated in one model. Braat and van Lierop (1987) give an overview of the state-of-the-art of
economic-ecological  modeling, and the problems of integrating the two disciplines  So far, only
tentative attempts have been made to use quantitative models in the analysis of the environmental
impact of structural adjustment.
Tlhere  are some examples of the use of general equilibrium models to address the links of
interest, since in CGEs sector specific environmental impact functions can be attached. These
models have been developed and estimated for developing countries, but have to be adapted to
include sectoral environmental impact functions (Hansen, 1990).
Reed (1992) adapts a 90-sector CGE macroeconomic  model to run several policy scenarios
to explore the economy-environment  link.  The simulations covered some of the basic policy and
106structural changes that took place in Thailand during the sectoral adjustment period. These
changes are (i) reduction of export taxes on rice and rubber, (ii) increase in domestic oil prices,
(iii) increase in labor intensive manufactured  exports, (iv) increase in tourism growth, and (v)
reduction in real public sector investment.  Each simulation led to changes in resource use and in
the pattern of production.  When possible, environmental coefficients, derived from existing
infbrmation  or independent  studies, were used to link environmental outcomes to structural
changes in the economy.  In the model simulations, the effects of policy measures on sectoral
output and land use are quantified. For example, in the simulation where export taxes were
reduced, agricultural output increased by 0.82% and industrial and services output decreased by
0.38% and 0.27% respectively. It is concluded that industrial pollution is reduced, as are
transport-related emissions and environmental  degradation by tourism. The effects of the increase
in agricultural output, however, are ambiguous, and with the exception of the expansion of
agricultural land as a result of the reduction in export taxes, remain unquantified. Hence, the
assessment of environmental impacts is to a large extent similar to that given in Table 6.2; for
example, it is argued that the reduced export taxes on rubber are likely to extend rubber
production  to higher slopes, with consequent  deforestation and soil erosion.
Cruz and Repetto (1992) adapted a CGE model currently in use in the Philippines.
Although the environmental impact of production activities are not modeled explicitly, particular
sectors known to have significant  environmental impact are distinguished. The model was used to
simulate the environmental effects of the various structural adjustment policies carried out in the
Philippines. For example, the CGE model was run to approximate full compliance with the tariff
reductions and export promotion reforms required by structural adjustment. It was found that the
environmental implications were negative since erosion-prone,  farming, logging, fishing, mining
and energy use increased.
An alternative strategy would be to use an input-output model to examine the
environmental implications  of economic policies in developing countries. The input-output
framework is flexible with regard to enviromnental  repercussions and has been applied numerous
times in environmental economic research (Braat and van Lierop, 1987). A well-known  example
is Leontief's  global input-output model designed for the study of the interrelationships  between
environmental  and other economic policies (Leontief et al,  1977) In this model pollutants are
treated as by-products of regular production and consumption, and their elinmination  is a special
type of 'productive' acivity.  Also, stocks of mineral resources are explicitly taken into account
107Reed (1992)  explored  the use of input-output  models  to study  the environmental  impacts  of
adjustment  lending  at the national  level, but concluded  that  the data requirements  are too large for
developing  countries,  while  the rigidity  of the technique  does  not lend itself  to use of partial  and
incomplete  information.
Some empirical  results
Hansen  (1990)  reviewed  83 of the World  Bank's  adjustment  lending  operations  up to
1987/88  and 10 Asian  Development  program  lending  operations  since 1987.  In the absence  of
appropriate  general  equilibrium  models,  he looks  at different  aspects  of structural  adjustment
lending  and examines  their environmental  effects  in Wa  partial  microeconomic  ad hoc analysis'
(Hansen,  1990:  541), which  has many  elements  of to the 'normal' model.  His major  findings  are:
(i) the environmental  impacts  of cuts in government  spending  are mixed; (ii) the environmental
impacts  of measures  to increase  output  prices to farmers  are mixed  and depend  to a large extent
on the chosen  caltivation  practices  and complementary  actions  (iii)  measures  to adjust  agricultural
input  prices  towards  their  economic  costs  tend  to benefit  the environment  by reducing  the use of
polluting  chemicals  like fertilizers  and reducing  wasteful  use of irrigation  water,  and (iv) measures
to increase  energy  prices  tend to benefit  the environment,  by promoting  conservation  of resources
and more efficient  technologies  and fuel switching  to less  polluting  forms of energy.
Reed's (1992)  examination  of the environmental  impact  of adjustment  programs  in COte
d'Ivoire, Thailand  and Mexico  concludes  that reductions  in public  expenditure  programs  may
adversely  affect  the environment  through  cutbacks  in resources  devoted  to the environment  This
effect  occurred  in two areas (i) the reduction  of environmental  infrastructure  activities,  such as
water  supply,  waste  disposal  facilities,  public  transport,  and  public  parks and recreational  areas;
and Cii)  project-level  investments  such as agricultural  extension  services.  A further  conclusion
from Reed  is that reductions  in total domestic  credit  reduced  credit availability  in rural  areas, and
thus  failed  to increase  sustainable  agricultural  projects:  These  reductions  countered  efforts  to
stabilize  the agricultural  frontier  and promote  intensive  agriculture.
Cromwell  and Winpenny  (1993)  analyzed  the environmental  impacts  of stuctr
adjustment  in Malawi  in a "structured  analytical  system". They point  at a perverse  response  to
commodity  price changes  following  from the agricultural  price reforms  between  1980  and 1986  in
Malawi.  They found  that for smallholders,  there had been  some  limited  expansion  of cultivation,
mainly  be expanding  onto steep slopes,-  and encroachment  onto game  parks and nature  reserves,
10&X  due to a desire to maintain real incomes in the face of declining  real producer prices. Thus,
assuming  that lower prices automatically  lead to lower production  is putting things too simply.
Cromwell and Winpenny  also stress the relation between producer prices and input prices: in
Malawi maize prices were increased relative to those of other crops in an attempt to improve food
security, but the fertilizer removal program resulted in extremely  high fertilizer costs for maize,
thereby inducing  farmers to shift to low-input  crops. In addition, when production is stimulated
through producer price changes, a simultaneous  increase in fertilizer prices may lead to increasing
intensity  of production by reducing  the proportion  of land left fallow each year. Their general
conclusion is that early reforms seem to have had a negative impact  on the environment  at the
start, particularly on the crop mix and intensity of production, but later reforms appear
incidentally  to have ameliorated  the environmental  impact  of macro-economic  policies.
The link between  external debt and the environment  has been made the centerpiece  of
criticism by many enviromnentalists.  However, the observation  that international  debt problems
(and the subsequent  policy based-lending  programs) have accelerated  the rate of exploitation  of
natural resources to enable countries to meet their external  financial obligations, has also been
challenged.  The 1992 World  Development  Report concludes  that the evidence  on the debt-
environment  observation  is limited and contradictory.  Reed (1992) argues that the link between
government policy makers and a country's natural resources was established  long before the debt
crisis: in the 1970s govermnents  quite often drew on stocks of natural capital to finance ambitious
development  plans (Reed, 1992: 144). Despite the fact that COte  d'Ivoire has the highest
deforestation  rate in the world, in the Cote d'Ivoire case study, no evidence that debt directly
aggravated  or eased environmental  degradation  was established. The Mexican case study did not
provide any evidence in support of the debt-environmental  thesis, pointing  out that response to
macroeconomic  crisis in the form of increases in natural output requires quite a number of years
and often additional  capital as well. In the Ihai case study, it was found that the rampant
deforestation  which occurred during the mid-1980s could not be linked in any direct way to
national
debt obligations.
Resource  pncing and resource  use
The 1992 World  Development  Report emphasized  that the cost of energy in developing
countries is subsidized  - electricity  costs on average one third of the cost of supply. The
introduction  of cost-recovery  policies may therefore be expected  to lead to greater efficiency in the
109use of environmental  resources. At the same time people  are willing  to pay more  for clean  water
and sanitation  services,  so that improvements  in environment  quality  would  result. It is not
market  failure  which is responsible  for environmental  problems  but a failure  to use the market. In
fact the evidence,  reported  above, is mixed.
Hansen's  (1990)  analysis  supports  the idea  that higher  cost of energy  and fertilizer  prices
has reduced  use.  But  there will be a counteracting  effect  from the output  expansion  brought  about
by aid financed  activity  and reforms. The analysis  of the Philippines  by Cruz and Repetto  (1992)
finds  these  effects  to dominate  so that  the total effect  is an adverse  one for the environment. On
the other hand,  switches  in production  (say, from industry  to agriculture,  as in the case  of Reed's
simulations  of the Thai case)  can have  a beneficial  environment  impact. The conclusion  must be
that the result  will always  be theoretically  ambiguous,  and that policies  can be designed  to exploit
this ambiguity  in pursuit  of a favorable  outcome.
Poveny and envronmenui degradation
The effect of policy  reforms  on poverty  levels is important,  given  the links between
poverty  and  the environment  (see  e.g. Turner, 1989;  and Mink, 1993).  The poor often live in
environmentally  vulnerable  or degraded  locations.  Poverty  often  implies  lacking  the means  to
avoid  the impacts  of environmental  degradation.  Pollution  damages  the health  of the poor and
environmental  degradation  constrains  the productivity  of resources  upon which  the poor rely.
Poverty  may  lead to an over-exploitation  of land  and natural  resources  in order to ensure survival
in the short  term, at the inevitable  expense  of long-term  sustainability.
Concern  with the effects  of aid on the environment  has many  parallels  with the effects  on
poverty,  and the two areas overlap.  Poverty  is a major cause  and effect  of global  enviromnental
problems.  However,  it is not necessarily  true that  aid policy  directed  at alleviating  environmental
degradation  will always  be complementary  to the poverty-alleviation  objecuve.  For example,  a
policy  to protect  forests  can mean keeping  poor people  out of them. Also, reducing  fertilizer
subsidies  may  have a beneficial  impact  on the environment  in general,  but in some  places  fertilizer
use is far below  optimal  because  people  cannot  afford  to buy it. The majority  of small-holders,
chronically  poor and under-resourced,  should  therefore  be protected  by complementary  program
elements  in case of a reduction  of subsidies  for fertilizers  (Hansen  1990;  and Cromwell  and
Winpenny  1993).
110Concluding  remarks
Structural  adjustment  is not designed  to deal with environmental  problems,  and the links
between  the two are complex. The evidence  from country  studies is mixed:  sometimes  structural
adjustment  policies  complement  environmental  goals,  but in other cases  they  conflict  and lead  to
environmentally  damaging  effects. The World  Bank  seems  to be rather optiinistic  about  the effects
of structural  adjustment  on the environment,  emphasizing  the beneficial  effects  of reduced
govermnent  intervention,  or correction  of "policy  failure". But most work suggests  governments
need  to intervene  to protect  the environment  because  of "market  failures".
There are few attempts  at systematically  qumintifying  or modeling  the links,  but many
authors  stress  the need for appropriate  models  and improved  data bases. Macroeconomic  or
general  equilibrium  models  should  be developed  that integrate  economic  and environmental
aspects.  Meanwhile  it is clear that we know  too litde about  the links to draw general  conclusions
about  the environmental  impact  of structural  adjustment.  The links between  the two are country
specific  and depend  on the particular  resource  basis, production  structure,  cropping  patterns,
cultivation  methods,  climatological  and soil conditions,  ownership  patterns  and social  and political
relations.  Identifying  the environmental  consequences  is further  complicated  by the difficulty  of
separating  the links: enviromnental  effects  may be caused  by adjustment  interventions,  but they
may  also be the result from relationships  originating  in previous  patterns  of consumption  and
production,  in the structure  of the economies  themselves,  or in the impact  of exogenous  ctbors.
Modelling  environmental  outcomes  to aid through  the latter's effects  on the macroeconomy  (as has
been  suggested  for social  analysis)  would  seem, at this stage  of our knowledge,  a precarious
exercise  that  should  best be avoided  until  further  country-level  research  on macro-environment
links  has been  completed.
6.5  Summary
Modelling  of the impact  of adjustment  on the poor has, in recent  years, been  based  on the
country-specific  modelling  approach  recommended  in this report for the analysis  of all aspects  of
aid's impact  The shortcomings  of existing  models  are that they do not allow  analysis  of the
impact  of aid flows, nor do they consider  how  the poor are affected  by changes  in their secondary
income. In this chapter  some  possible  links were discussed  - in particular  how  analysis  of aid's
impact  on government  expenditures  can be combined  with existing  models  of adjustment  policies
to get a fuller  picture. This fulleL  picture  can also include  links between  social  spending  and
education  and health  provision,  and the subsequent,  well documented  link, to health  and
111educationd  iniciato, md from  there to welfare  indicators  such as mortality. It would, however,
be preatr  to atwmpt  such an approach  for analysis  of environmental  impact.Notes to Chapter 6
i  1.  Where the share of benefits is not calculable the less satisfactory measure of per cent of
poor amongst project beneficiaries is used.
2.  Ravallion's (1992) excellent discussion of alternative poverty measures includes subjective
indicators.
3.  One example  where the implied relationship has been discussed reflects the need to make
explicit and justify this assumption: 'although the causes of the increase in child mortality
rates and deteriorations in maternal (and probably pre-school  child) nutritional status [in
Brazil] are not identified, it appears that large falls in real incomes  of the poor may be at
least partially responsible' (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1989: 91) - the data presented do  Mt-  show
a fall in real incomes of the poor, but rather a rise in working hours at minimum wages,
which is more difficult  to interpret.
4.  See Behrman and Deolaikar (1990) for the example  of Jamaica on this point.
5.  See also the paper of the same name by Kakwani et at. (1990) which was a background
paper for the report.
6.
7.  This review is necessarily selective.  An excellent more comprehensive  review is Behrman
(1990).
8.  See also Thomas a  a.  (1990).
9.  Height for age is a good indicator of long run health and weight for height a short run
indicator.
10.  This study presents a simulation  which shows that a doubling of female secondary
enrollment in 1975 from 19 to 38 per cent would have reduced the infant mortality rate
from 81 to 38.  -
* 11.  This discussion draws 6n the review by Lockwood (1992).
12.  Lele (1991) documents the relation between lower levels of female education and low
productivity in agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa.
13.  See the collection of papers in Gladwin (1991), which unfortunately  do not all qualifoyfbr
this description.
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A JIAMEWORI  FOR ANALYSI.S
7.1  Overview
Chapter 2 identified three approaches to analyzing  the effects of aid monies and aid-supported
reforms: (i) before versus after; (ii) control group Csimple  and modified); and (iii) modelling. The
literature on the macroeconomic  effects of aid funds (reviewed in Chapter 3) has relied almost
entirely upon a modelling  approach.  However, much work has used only single equations, so that
many potentially important relationships  - most notably aid's effect on output/income  - are
excluded from the analysis.  Even the simultaneous models employed are for the most part partia,
not general, equilibrium models.  This exclusion casts doubts upon the findings.  Moreover, much
of the empirical work suffers from methodological  shortcomings, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
Despite the amount of attention paid to the subject general  ly, detailed work is still required,
especially in analyzing the impact of aid on the private sector at the macreconomic level.  More
advance has been made in the analysis of the public sector's response to aid inflows.
Macroeconomic  analysis of policy refonns has been carried out using all three approaches.
Before versus after and simple control group approaches are not valid explanatory techniques; the
results from such studies should be used at most on a descriptive basis.  Much analysis is also
flawed by considering the effects of "a program'  (despite different intensities and compliance
rates) rather than the policies actually implemented. The modified control group is, theoretically,
a stronger approach - in practice however it has been limited by: (i) assuming a common vector of
exogenous factors between countries; (ii) not including aid or other capital flows as an explanatory
variable; and Cxii)  not separating out the three factors behind changes in performance. But this
report, aniyhow,  favors a country-specific  modelling  approach.
The advantage of the modelling  approach is that it readily allows for the separate analysis
of policies versus monies.  Moreover, individual  policies can be independently  analyzed.  The
modelling approach has, especially in the area of the social impact of reforms, yielded rather
different results to much of the "common  view" about the impact of such policies.  However,
existing models fail to  incorporate aid as an important macroeconomic  variable.
114iTus,  the literature on the macroeconomic  impact of aid flows is in want of better models
while  at the same time the modelling  of the impact  of reforms  inadequately  accounts  for the role
of foreign  savings. A marriage  of the two is dearly in everyone's  mutual  interest. This report
therefore  recommends  a research  strategy  along  these  lines. [t is also recommended  that models
incorporate  the well-documented  links  between  social  sector expenditures  and various  welfare
indicators.
7.2  A Research  Agenda
Having  identified  the general  strategy  that  should  be followed  in analyzing  aid's country-wide
effects,  this report  concludes  with a list of immediate  topics  for further research:
*  construction  of an "aid  database"  by recipient  showing  aid flows by functional  category.
modelling  and estimation  of the interaction  of aid inflows  with private  savings  and
investment.
*  development  and empirical  analysis  of the concept of aid dependence.
*  modified  control  group analysis  for social  consequences  of adjustment  policies;
disaggregation  of modified  control  group results  by change  in policy,  change  in policy
effectiveness  and confidence  effect
*  development  of theoretical  and  empirical  analysis  for analysis  of aid and the efficiency  of
investment.
$  analysis  of aid, income  and output  considering  whether  economy  is supply  or demand
constrained.
*  embedding  of categorical  fungibility  model  into  economy-wide  model.
proper  marriage  of macro  effects  of aid and policy  reform  in a single (CGE)  model.





Work  on this agenda  will be determined  by data availability,  parallel  research  activities
-- - and the importance  of each topic. It is to be expected  that academics  will themselves  pursue  the
-- f  fiscal response  literature,  as this area is currently  one of keen  interest, Donors  can play  a role in
:  supporting  and providing  improved  aid databases. Given  such data more  detailed  modelling  of the
impact  of aid monies  and policies  on macroeconomic  and social  indicators  should  become  a
possibility.
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